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Abstract 
The Condition-of-England Question - a series of discussions that involve 
commentary on the state of relations between disparate groups and classed subjects -
contains a nexus of competing and overlapping discourses, as well as an attention to 
feelings such as anger and to the comnumication of feeling that comprises sympathy. It 
evolves through the interrogative methodologies of moral philosophy, Romantic 
idealism, political radicalism, and the cultural assumptions that guide literary production 
and consumption. Condition-of-England novels, such as Elizabeth Gaskell' s Mmy Barton 
(1848) and Charles Kingsley's Alton Locke (1850), demonstrate the Carlylean premise 
that moral and social improvements within the body politic require a mediated reaction to 
the escalating discontent that characterized the nation in the period surrounding the 
reform acts. In this dissertation I analyze how authors and political leaders are impelled 
to address social and political problems through the representation of feeling and its 
communication. This dissertation affirms that anger, existing as a potentially corrective 
call for attention and action, is elemental for the formation of collective identities based 
on class or political beliefs. As such, it remains pertinent to Victorian debates of political 
reform and representation. In literary culture, anger and sympathy are conceptualized as 
narrative forces by which to address the declining spiritual and material conditions of 
England; they become considerations in the organization of plot lines or episodes, and 
they exist, whether named or not, in descriptions of literary protagonists, political leaders, 
and philosophers. 
11 
Using an interdisciplinary approach that includes social history, philosophy, 
theories of emotion, close readings, and rhetorical analysis, I examine the epistemology 
of feeling and its relation to social and political critique by comparing the philosophical 
and practical continuities between discourses of the sentiments and passions in the 
eighteenth century with discourses of feeling in the mid-nineteenth century. This includes 
extending my scope not only to include novels, but also philosophical treatises, periodical 
publications, and serialized fiction. My focus does not lie with envisioning anger as 
something adversative to sympathy, as much philosophical and sociological critique has 
implied, but in whether antisocial feelings such as anger have acknowledged social 
benefits. If sympathy is not any one feeling, but the interpersonal communication of 
feeling, then the changing discourses of sympathy in the nineteenth century imply a 
rethinking of the social functions of all emotion, including anger. 
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Introduction 
Much has been written, both cautionary and celebratory, on the passing of the 
"Great" Reform Bill of 1832, legislation that only extended male suffrage to small 
landowners, but had grand symbolic significance in Victorian Britain. In a well-known 
chapter in George Eliot's Felix Holt, the Radical (1866), a novel set during the passing of 
the Bill and written just before the passing of the Second Reform Bill in 1867, the 
eponymous hero is urged by Mr. Lyon to go and witness the nomination of the election 
candidates. The reluctant Felix expresses doubt at his suitability for such a contentious 
atmosphere: '"I shall get into a rage at something or other,"' he says to his apolitical 
friend (FH24I). Eliot does not intend her hero's words, despite their vague flippancy, to 
be idle threats; rather than blend into the expectant crowd, Felix stands out as a cultured 
and impassioned orator, incensed at the bribes that John Johnson, the electioneering 
agent, distributes to the borough's working-class colliers for political gain, and more 
generally, outraged at the opportunism, rather than conviction, that comes as part of 
politics and political life. For Felix, the ease by which the electoral agent can summon 
support for his candidate by way of "treating" the workers with alcohol demonstrates 
what he sees as the "panacea" of suffrage for people with few political loyalties. 1 In the 
midst of his lecture on the necessity for moral improvement before large-scale electoral 
reform, Felix sees Johnson, the object of his political sermon, in his audience; the 
sighting provokes in Holt a distinct physiological and verbal reaction: "In spite of his 
cooling meditations an hour ago, his pulse was getting quickened by indignation, and the 
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desire to crnsh what he hated was likely to vent itself in articulation. His tone becomes 
more biting" (FH 249). 
The latter scene is a particularly telling incident in which the expression of anger 
combines with politics (and political opinion) in an increasingly volatile mixture; in the 
narrative, it culminates in a looting riot on Election Day and the imprisonment of Eliot's 
well-intentioned hero. Felix's "liability to be carried completely out of his own mastery 
by indignant anger" (FH 241) marks his character throughout the novel and inevitably 
implicates him in the riot. This anger serves as a locus of ambivalence: it is proof of both 
Holt's sincere political commitment and his inability to be an effective political leader. In 
his Introduction to Eliot's novel, Fred C. Thomson argues that Holt's character was the 
result of Eliot's desire to write in the tragic mode, which requires a tragic subject to 
suffer some flaw and the plot to "represent irreparable collision between the individual 
and the general" (vii). In the depiction of her (would-be) eponymous and radical 
protagonist, John Barton, Elizabeth Gaskell strnggles with a similar ambivalence -
Barton's anger and bitterness increases with his involvement in Chartist politics, and 
functions both as proof of his flawed disposition and his sympathetic (and moral) attitude 
towards injustices and inequities of the labouring poor. 2 Like Holt, Barton is a flawed and 
tragic figure, but rather than viewing Eliot's (and Gaskell's) ambivalences as part of the 
dramatic tragedy, I propose that these ambivalences exist in part because of the 
uncertainties about anger and its social role in mid-nineteenth-century politics and 
political life. 
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Novelists, philosophers, and social reformers who discuss anger in this period 
explain and represent it in conflicting ways. Anger functions as a symptom or marker of 
classed identity, and in this sense, could well function as the argument against working-
class participation in suffrage. Yet, it also functions as a pa11ial indictment of a political 
system that does little to rectify inequities and corruption, whereby anger is the symptom, 
of this flawed political enterprise. Holt's anger, as political anger, is distinct from other, 
more brutish or pejorative, forms of anger; it exists as possibility, something more than a 
damning character flaw, and part of Eliot's own polemic on the general state of England 
and its political system. 
As a contrasting example to Holt's self-confessed, angry radicalism, John Stuart 
Mill's famous claim that Wordsworth's poetry acted as "medicine for his state of mind" 
during his nervous breakdown (89) presents feeling and its expression as something that 
instills repose rather than riot. Herein lie the vicissitudes of feelings: as "passions," 
especially strong or negative feelings, they take on connotations of disorder or loss of 
control, and consequently, a threat to personal agency, reason, and interpersonal 
relations; as "sentiments," tied to a kind of cognitive dimension that includes belief, 
feelings serve as a way to negotiate interpersonal relations, and their expression can help 
explain private (inner) experience and agency. For Mill, reading expressions of feeling in 
Wordsworth's poetry reaffim1S "the common feelings and common destiny of human 
beings" (89). Mill's declaration implies both personal and social necessity in feeling and 
its expression: as a humanizing curative, and a shared connection to other individuals as a 
means of sociability. 
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Feeling may encourage self-awareness and prompt imaginative reflection, as it is 
often represented in Romantic poetry, but in the increasingly segregated political climate 
of mid-nineteenth-century England, and among radical calls for reform, the "spontaneous 
overflow of powerful feelings" that Wordsworth advocates as the motivation for poetic 
expression becomes a source of unease (126). Expressing strong and negative feelings 
within the realm of politics, and against existing powers, has varying consequences: 
charges of sedition or self-interest, the establishment of collective movements of social 
and political reform, and the creation of public ideals and attitudes through shared beliefs -
and convictions. Psychologist Shula Sommers describes emotions as refractions of the 
social: "Emotions reflect, among other things, knowledge of the valuations of a 
community, concepts of social relationships as well as attitudes and beliefs held in 
common by members of a community" (26). Given the vicissitudes of feeling, then, how 
necessary or strategic is strong and negative feeling, such as anger, to political action and 
the desire for social change? Despite the historical spectre of the French Revolution, and 
subsequent riots and revolutions at home and abroad, and despite the Victorian 
preoccupation with the decorous, can anger have an admirable social and political 
function in mid-nineteenth-century England? 
In attempting to answer these questions, this dissertation will explore how anger 
is represented in fiction and political literature of the period between the two reform acts. 
The authors and texts examined in this project all respond to, and in part create, the 
public impetus of the Condition-of-England Question, a public discourse and mode of 
social critique that also comments on the condition of feeling - that is, the state of 
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interpersonal relationships within and between social classes. If feeling is cmcial to how 
people organize and interact with each other, then looking at how feelings become 
represented in political and literary writings of the period means exploring the civic, 
political, and moral connections between feeling and its expression. Representations of 
feelings make legible the varied and oppositional social cues, behaviours, and 
expectations that are required for the larger project of sociability. Given that this 
discussion will evolve through my examination of a series of literary and journalistic 
texts, I am also interested in the various narrative strategies for anger that comment on 
the condition of England and suggest reforms. How are these narrative strategies 
reflective of larger discussions of class, political action, and change in the period 
surrounding the refonn acts? By looking at the various expressions, categorizations, and 
displacements of anger in texts of this period, I will examine how authors and political 
leaders mediate expressions of anger in an attempt to rectify the ambivalences that 
surround its representation. 
In exploring the role of anger in the mid-nineteenth century, my scope necessarily 
widens to examine sympathy, the sharing and communication of feeling, which is pivotal 
to how feeling is conceptualized and discussed in post-Enlightenment contexts, 
particularly eighteenth-century moral philosophy. To be sure, discourses of feeling 
existed long before the eighteenth century - since the beginnings of Western philosophy3 
- but the empirical study of feeling, and the classification and taxonomy of feeling 
present in eighteenth-cenh1ry moral philosophy, enables authors to constrnct discursively 
and ideologically a social vision that explains sociability (and its antithesis) through 
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associations of feeling and their effects on others. Theorizing what motivates individuals 
to act, eighteenth-century moral philosophers provide a model for the methodological 
inquiry into feeling and its consequences and benefits. Eighteenth-century discussions of 
feelings also consider literature as a means to express and mediate feeling. 
Sentimentalism, and later Romanticism, lend credence to an emotional intelligence or 
privileged insight based on feeling, which can be used for the purposes of political and 
social reform, and in the case of Romanticism, informs Jacobin and popular radicalism 
and later, Chartism. The purpose of my project is the exploration of the ways that these 
intellectual backgrounds influence mid-nineteenth-century contexts, and the means by 
which feeling, especially strong and negative feeling, articulates the political and literary 
ideologies of the time. 
I. From Passion to Emotion: Definitions and Categories of Feeling 
When studying feeling and its representation, I am making two basic assumptions: 
that the operation of the emotions, and the representation of feeling, is an inescapable part 
of human nature; and that the socialization of individuals happens, in large part, through 
the legibility and expression of feeling, which requires a consideration of self and other, 
an intersubjective process of comparison (or more generally, association) that stands as 
the ethical foundation for sympathy. Finally, I also want to make note of how the 
historical practice of defining and categorizing feeling can tell us much about the 
ostensible social, moral, and political functions of feeling.4 As Gesa Stedman similarly 
notes: "Attempting to come to terms with the emotions and inventing sets of definitions 
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and classes of feelings is a practice which has been a staple ingredient of the discourses 
on emotions through the ages" (28). 
Catherine Lutz has asserted that academic discussions of emotions have long been 
dominated by ahistorical binary distinctions (positive or negative, social or unsocial, 
masculine or feminine, rational or irrational, cognitive or bodily, advanced or basic). 
These binaries, argues Lutz, have validated and perpetuated unequal power dynamics. 
Within the discursive context of gender and emotion, Lutz points out that emotions 
commonly deemed negative are often framed as feminine, while positive emotions are 
seen as humanizing or universal, which privileges the masculine.5 She proposes, and 
rightly so, that analyses of emotional expression need to consider discursive and 
historical contexts ( 151 ). 
My exploration of the intersections between sympathy and anger, and as such, 
sympathy with anger, is an attempt to reconcile these seemingly incongruous sentiments, 
and to interrogate their seemingly oppositional statuses as social and unsocial. Feminist 
scholarship has rightly pointed out that strict binaries, and strict binary oppositions, are 
reductive - used historically to uphold unequal power dynamics - yet rhetorically, and as 
an organizing strategy or heuristic, oppositional sets have the potential to be useful in a 
discussion of feeling because they can help conceptualize the parameters of interrelated 
feelings. By organizing and articulating the extremes of feeling, one can comprehend the 
ways in which feelings gain social credence or are deemed unsocial or antisocial. 
Oppositional sets of feeling can demonstrate the limits of sociality by drawing attention 
to the ways that feelings are sanctioned. Moreover, in discourses of feeling, oppositional 
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sets focus on various checks and balances - the regulation of feeling - as part of the 
social vision in the modern polity. Looking at binaries in this way, in relation to feeling 
and its legibility, seems almost inevitable, since as Philip Fisher explains, "[ o ]pposition 
and contrast are artifacts of our habits of thinking by twos" (31 ). The categorization of 
feelings into oppositional groups illuminates the methodological relations between these 
groups; Fisher describes how feelings in literature and philosophy were marked by a 
methodological search for "systematic interconnectedness, oppositions, matrices, 
transformations, and compoundings that would organize the inner world of the soul in a 
profound, scientific manner" (39). 
In theories of emotion, a major division is between those who consider emotions 
to be fundamental or "natural" - that is, felt or physiological, or part of an innate 
disposition - and those who deem emotions to be primarily social constructs, which are 
granted legitimacy through social needs that change over time, and are rooted in social 
codes or "display mles" (Harre and Parrott 16). Social constructivist approaches 
emphasize the centrality of language in the construction of these codes or rules and in the 
representation of emotional experience, since language maps out areas of experiences that 
enable individuals to make sense of feelings and their effects in the world. Regina 
Gagnier argues that this model interprets emotions as "endlessly malleable social 
constructions" (24 ), and in doing so, ignores patterns of behaviours across time. My 
work, in looking at the intellectual inheritance of the eighteenth-century, particularly 
moral philosophy and Romantic radicalism, attempts to consider the ways in which 
certain patterns or similarities have endured in the literary and empirical study of feeling. 
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This project also considers how discourses on feeling and emotional expression change in 
the mid-nineteenth century to reflect an increasingly stratified social and political 
struch1re and corresponding distinctions between socio-economic classes. 
Finally, given that this project also examines how feelings are represented in 
literary and journalistic texts, it relies in no small part on formal and rhetorical analyses. 
Formalist discussions of the ways that feeling is represented in texts would consider 
narrative conventions, tone, and characterization, while rhetorical analyses would 
consider the ways that an implied author (or narrator) makes appeals to feeling for a 
particular effect (pathos). While invaluable means of inquiry for my own research, these 
kind of analyses also have potential limitations: if emotional appeals in fiction are 
interpreted as strictly rhetorical, and representations of feeling are discussed through the 
unidirectional concept of reading as personal identification, then emotion in general is 
presented as being ahistorical, and to be interpreted unproblematically by all readers.6 To 
avoid this oversight, I will consider how feeling (and the sharing of feeling, or sympathy) 
is contiguous to wider political and social projects rooted in the achial world in which the 
text is read and experienced. 7 
The classification of feeling, the hallmark of discussions of the passions or the 
sentiments, stands as proof of the intricacies and gradation of feelings, and this can easily 
be applied to discussions of anger and its social role, for there are various fom1s and 
explanations of anger. In philosophical discussions, anger is often pejoratively linked to 
the social body as an antisocial response or reaction and a means of making distinctions 
within this social body. In more positive terms, however, anger within the social body 
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can be legitimized as a kind of collective claim-making that, when linked to politics, 
inspires campaigns for social justice or political reform. In anger's linkages to the 
physiological body, it stands as an affective and reactionary response and as an 
acknowledgment of injury or affront. 8 The purpose of my research, in discussing these 
implications for the social and individuated body, is to interpret the social significance of 
anger in a way that considers the means by which anger becomes sanctioned as part of 
the condition of England and in addresses to the populace, and also to examine how it can 
help discern between moral and immoral actions, and how it informs novelistic 
discourses that comment on the writing and reading of fiction. As such, my discussion of 
anger considers its representation within distinctly political contexts that in turn affitm 
distinctly literary endeavours. Indeed, literature is perhaps the best means of exploring 
emotion and social legibility; Rom Harre explains that because emotions exist not as 
stable substances or states that affect the body, but rather as representations of social 
exchanges or encounters, literature becomes an appropriate medium to study such 
representations ( 6). 
The language used to describe anger and its cultural context has varied and 
changed according to newly-established forn1s of public order and governance, but 
philosophers and theorists of emotion agree that anger always involves, or implies, a 
judgment on something - usually the actions or character of an individual or group. Thus, 
it requires as its object something other to the self. In Anger and Aggression: An Es·say on 
Emotion (1984), the most sustained study of anger in contemporary psychology, James 
Averill discusses anger as an "interpersonal emotion," one which receives its definitions 
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and restrictions from the social contexts in which it operates~ its interpersonal role is 
distinguished by its temporary role of adjusting social regulations and obligations ( 10 I). 
As a particular interpretation of the world, anger can be a tacit acknowledgement 
of the necessity to "fix" things, and as such, it has a concomitant relationship with social 
and political reform. Despite its negative reputation, anger is a commonly-experienced 
emotion, one, according to Averill, which is "intimately connected not only with our 
sense of well-being but also with our sense of fairness and justice" (31 ). Since it involves 
judgment and a sense of accountability, which would impute blame and responsibility on 
oneself or another, anger has a profound moral dimension. It can be assertive, a form of 
claim-making and the impetus to articulate injury; it can also involve, as part of this 
judgment, a hopefulness or corrective vision. As a refusal to accept conditions or losses, 
anger implies a belief that obstructions can be changed or overturned (Stein et. al. 294). 
In this respect, Robert C. Solomon, who defines emotions as thoughts and judgments that 
enable us to engage with the world, suggests that the expression of anger has a "strategic" 
function and value (23). Similarly, in his study on hatred and antisociability in Victorian 
England, Christopher Lane suggests that sanctioned anti-social behaviours often fall 
under the banner of reform, as a means by which to "turn rancor into a type of virtue" 
(51). 
As a vehement emotion, anger's faintest expression may still have consequences, 
at least in the most immediate relations, and the ostensible danger of anger as a passion is 
its potential to exist as something outside of and stronger than the self (and the individual 
will). As both a literal and figurative force, however, anger's intensity and moral purpose 
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are critical to how it becomes socially and politically legible. Anger can be destructive or 
dominating - linked to the demonstration and possession of power - and it can be 
dismptive, in situations where those being given orders attempt to resist those orders. 
Finally, anger can also be righteous, a moral indignation that arises from the belief that 
something sacred has been violated. The "flush of indignation" that many Chartist 
periodicals cite as the reaction to the disparities between urban poverty and wealth, 
functions not solely as a symbolic turn of phrase, but also an indication of anger's 
affective dimension. Literally, the experience of anger, linked to its empirical origins, 
may energize the individual, providing necessary force behind one's a11iculated 
convictions as in the case of Felix Holt, or it may supply the motivation necessary for 
further action. 
It is precisely because of its physiological or affective dimension that discourses 
on anger are often cautionary: out-of-control anger, when affect impairs cognitive 
judgment, has real consequences for the functioning of the social body. Even as a 
symptom of a weak mind or faulty disposition, as in the writings of the Stoics,9 or as in 
Thomas Carlyle's critique of working-class radicalism, anger is part of meaning-making 
in the social body. My aim, then, is not to create a strict taxonomy of anger - literary 
scholars and theorists of emotion have noted the futility of such taxonomies and the 
reductive or normative tendencies of strict and unexamined binaries. Inevitably, 
discussions of anger are not neatly distinguished from aggression, hatred, and vengeance. 
This study will instead focus on anger by way of its transitory social role, as an adjustor 
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of social relations and a fonn of claim-making, and by its rhetorical effect within 
narratives. 
II. Passion and Politics: Moral Philosophy, Romanticism, and Emotional 
Intelligence 
Writing extensively about the role the "the passions" in seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century moral philosophy, Susan James summarizes the motivation for moral 
philosophy at this time, and its implications for politics, by posing the question, "How 
antisocial are human beings" (55). James notes that philosophers attempt the categorical 
interpretation of the passions, and in doing so, ascertain culturally-specific patterns of 
behaviour that are not always intentionally political, but are nevertheless "shaped by, and 
contribute to, the theory and practice of politics" (55). Exploring the philosophical and 
political works of numerous philosophers,10 James concentrates on the interconnected 
passions of fear and esteem, which she argues play a pivotal role in detennining social 
and antisocial behaviours. Considering the importance that philosophers such as Hobbes, 
Malebranche, Hume, and Burke place on esteem - an elevation of the self that depends 
on others - and the fleeting nature of esteem, James identifies the frightening prospect of 
"disempowerment" as the impetus for political organization: 
This is one reason why people habitually pursue competitive and 
aggressive courses of action, and the only effective solution to these 
antisocial tendencies is a sovereign capable of terrifying us into obeying 
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the law and thus imposing a sort of order on our passion. The quest for 
esteem is therefore one important aspect of a more general question for 
power, which can only be contained by an absolutist form of government. 
(57) 
James' focus on how political philosophers, by using the passions as an organizing 
category for an explanation of human disposition and action, assign "an indirect 
legitimation of hierarchical societies" ( 60). Granted, examining justifications of power 
and control, as part of a discussion of human nature, can aid us in better understanding 
and distinguishing the imperatives of governance, and subsequently, oppression or 
- subjugation at a particular historical moment, but the focus of my research lies elsewhere. 
Like James, I contend that moral philosophy should be a point of inquiry in an 
examination of feeling and emotion, but philosophy does not exist as the solitary 
discipline that examines feeling and human action - literature also attempts to provide 
explanations and representations of patterns of behaviour. For all her thorough 
scholarship, James ignores the intersections between philosophical and literary queries on 
feeling and its social effects. The philosophical treatises that this project examines -
David Hume's Treatise on Human Nature (1739-40), Adam Smith's TheOIJ' of Moral 
Sentiments (1759), and Alexander Bain's The Emotions and the Will ( 1859) -
consistently rely on literary examples to illustrate their theories of human nahrre and 
interpersonal relations. While feeling may seem like an intangible concept, especially in 
social constructivist approaches, when represented in literature, feeling can become an 
embodied force that dictates social relations within the exploratory and less immediate 
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world of fiction; literature, and of particular interest to this project, fictional and non-
fictional prose, is a major system of interpretation for feeling and action, and as such, has 
a constitutive impact on how people view the role of literature in mediating and 
informing public life. 
Further, my interest is not so much centred on esteem or fear, although 
interrelated sets of feelings are the major organizing schema of much philosophical 
discussion on the passions. By examining anger, which can variously be destructive, 
disruptive and righteous, I am concentrating on an emotion whose effect can produce 
either fear or esteem in others. Unlike James' guiding question, the inquiry of my 
research is not to determine the magnitude of how antisocial people are, and how this 
determination gets reified in governmental or religious authority; instead, my focus lies in 
whether these antisocial feelings have acknowledged social benefits. As such, this project 
must inevitably consider how individuals attempt to minimize anger's negative or 
destructive consequences, and how they evoke anger to make judgments on the nature of 
human relations and the inequities or injustices of the period, the latter of which can 
explain anger's role in social and political critique. 
Many political and social writings in the mid-nineteenth century (such as 
condition-of-England texts) are concerned with the state of material conditions - the large 
urban slum or the factory - but they also discuss the conditions of sociality in public life. 
This attention to collective relations, to public consensus through shared feeling, emerges 
as a response to large-scale social and economic disparity and industrial labour relations. 
In representing class hostilities in numerous journalistic and novelistic discourses, writers 
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and political leaders express concerns over the lack of feeling (or benevolent bonds) 
between groups of individuals. This concern is manifested not distinctly as a discussion 
of apathy, but also as the lack of shared or common feeling (sympathy) across 
socioeconomic classes, which can ultimately breed hostility. Thus, sympathy, as the 
communication of shared feeling, becomes a part of this discussion, a necessary counter 
to anger, and a socializing force that may mitigate antisocial actions and impulses, which 
is why concerns over sympathy include discussions of anger and vice versa. 
In the treatises of Hume and Smith, humans tend to sympathize with each other: 
the (imagined) communication of feeling is part of the human disposition. A discussion 
of human nature - specifically, whether individuals are inherently disposed to 
benevolence, or whether they are self-interested - is the guiding impetus of post-
Enlightenment moral and political philosophy, as well as the emerging discipline of 
psychology. In Leviathan (1651), Hobbes' interest in controlling the passions is hardly 
separate from his discussion of politics, and he interprets human nature as it pertains to 
the development of a civil and political society. In responding to the Hobbesian notion of 
self-interest as the basis for sociability, Smith emphasizes sympathy and the benevolent 
affinities as the primary guides for human relations. This philosophical tension helps 
explain and justify human action, and also preferential modes of governance or 
regulation. The "benevolent theory" found in Smith's treatise, and in the philosophies of 
other moralists such as Francis Hutcheson ( 1694 -1746) and Anthony Ashley Cooper, the 
Third Earl of Shaftsbury (1671 -1731), avows a moral sense (and a moral and civic duty). 
This moral sense or duty reappears in Smith's more famous work on political economy, 
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On the Wealth of Nations (1776), as the "invisible" and benevolent hand that regulates 
the marketplace. It also anticipates the utilitarian theory of the "greatest happiness for the 
greatest number" propounded by nineteenth-centmy philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748-
1832). 
By way of its central tension concerning what constitutes the driving principle of 
human behaviour and interaction, moral philosophy provides an articulate point of 
contention around which philosophical discussions of feeling could categorize sets of 
passions and their antitheses. As human nature becomes systematically explored and 
categorized, it becomes characterized by practical concerns, such as the control and use 
of the passions within the realms of sociability. Indeed, the psychology and empirical 
origins of feeling in the eighteenth century are intertwined with discussions of ethics, and 
by extension, with standards of conduct, all of which relate to political theories of 
governance. Moral philosophy's empirical inquiry into the passions renders feelings as 
the "authoritative grounds for aesthetics and social experience" (Pinch 8) and provides 
counters to Rationalist claims that reason alone guides thoughts and actions. 
To be sure, the associationist principles of philosophers such as Hume, and 
benevolent theories such as those of Smith, did not take into account physiology (or 
evolutionary and biological comparisons), but as Harry H. Gardiner explains, 
psychophysiological theories were a nineteenth-century approach to the study of emotion 
(276). Both Hume and Smith's discussion of the passions, however, display an 
increasingly complex social vision that becomes applicable to mid-nineteenth century 
contexts. Hume's Treatise considers the epistemology and legibility of feelings through 
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relationships established by contiguity and resemblance, which ultimately requires a 
conscious and reflective understanding of the self and one's relation to others. By linking 
sympathy to propriety, Smith posits the sympathizing subject as a critic or judge who, in 
order to evaluate the conduct and feelings of others within the bounds of propriety, 
requires a social knowledge that can then judge the validity and intensity of the feeling in 
accordance with the situation that excites it in the first place. Scholars discussing Smith's 
Themy of Moral Sentiments have identified the treatise's distinctly social purpose: the 
delineation and enunciation of an emergent class system. Maureen Harkin argues, for 
instance, that Smithian discussions of virtue and propriety provide virtuous principles 
adapted specifically for "commercial society" of economic competition and self-interest 
(175); John Dwyer asserts that the Theory was written for the purpose of providing the 
"middling ranks" in emerging capitalist society - and Dwyer equates Smith, as a 
professor and public servant, with this rank - with "a framework for social behaviour" 
(42). 
The nineteenth-century reception of Hume's Treatise was quiet, largely due to his 
skepticism. Smith gained considerably more attention in the period as the celebrated 
author of The Wealth of Nations, but has been overlooked outside of his contribution to 
economics. Writing in 1876, Leslie Stephen explains that the muted reception Smith 
received as a moral philosopher in the nineteenth century was due to his "complacent 
optimism," an outlook that espoused a moral sense as an instinct that guides human 
passions towards what is good and ignores the less benevolent side of human nature (77-
78), and Stephen also includes Smith's mentors, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, in this 
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school. Smith's The01y may have been popular in his day, but Stephen ascribes this 
attractiveness to the effect of optimism, which produces a "cheering" affect rather than 
any conviction (71 ). Clearly, in the context of the nineteenth century, doctrines appealing 
to a natural instinct for social ha1mony might be admirable, but unrealistic or na1ve. 
Despite Stephen's charge, Smith's Theory, which is centred on the categorization 
of feelings as social or unsocial, is not without resonance in Victorian contexts. By the 
mid-nineteenth century, the emergent socioeconomic system that Harkin and Dwyer 
discuss had been firmly established and many were decrying its flaws: dissent against 
increased mechanization (Luddite and Swing riots) gave way to demonstrations 
surrounding the factory reforn1 movement, New Poor Law (1834) repeal, Chartism, 
legalization of trade unions, and extended suffrage. Such political and social protests not 
only tested the affinities between groups of classed subjects, they also considered feeling 
and its expression by way of social and political distinctions, and in light of specific class 
interests. 
In a Blackwood 's article titled "On Parliamentary Reform and the French 
Revolution" (May 1831 ), published less than a year before the passing of the Reform Act, 
the author commences his condemnation of parliamentary reform by quoting a passage 
from The01y that illustrates Smith's concern regarding feeling as it relates to politics. 
The author in Blackwood's, in describing the calls for reforms, brings up Smith's 
discussion of public opinion in times of political turbulence. Smith argues that although 
the government usually maintains peace and tranquility, in times of public and political 
factionalism, and general discontent, a pressing need for reform captures public and 
19 
political attention. Smith calls this the "spirit of the system," which "en flames" public 
opinion and provides a fomm for the leaders of discontented parties to attempt to 
overthrow the tested system of governance for the "imaginary beauty" of an ideal and 
untried system ( TMS VI. Ii. IL 15). Similarly, the author of the Bluckwood 's article warns 
against a particular "spirit of the system" in times of political turbulence or hostility and 
links Smith's general worries to the present situation of the 1830s: "One would have 
imagined that the illustrious philosopher was here portraying the history of the present 
Reform Bill, instead of calmly reflecting on the effects of public folly in former times" 
(745). The author's use of Smith is apt: both are concerned with feeling and the 
communication of feeling within an increasingly stratified system of competing interests 
and ideologies. 
The intersection of politics and feeling - the "spirit of the system" or, in 
nineteenth-century contexts, "the spirit of the people" - can also be applied to a 
discussion of radical politics and, as part of that, certain Romantic ideals, but William 
Reddy has also suggested that eighteenth-century sentimentalism, which briefly allowed 
emotions to play a more open role in political decision-making, was necessa1y to British 
perceptions of the French Revolution, and more widely, revolutionary politics. 11 Yet by 
the late-eighteenth century, sentimentalism had distinctly pejorative connotations. Iain 
Wilkinson explains this change in thinking as a shift from one that emphasizes a 
particular critical or cultivated stance or perspective to one that is increasingly open to 
charges of self-interest: 
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whereas the word "sentimental" was used in the middle decades of the 
eighteenth century to refer to the process of critical thinking about social 
problems as well as the experience of humanitarian sensibility, by the end 
of the century it had begun to lose its positive associations with 
Enlightenment social reform and was increasingly being used in a purely 
derogatory sense to signify a disposition to wallow in emotional feeling. 
(115) 
In this traditional sense, sentimentalism, as a process of reflection that can aid reform, 
includes feeling in daily and political life. 
If Hume and Smith provided an emphasis on interpersonal relations in their 
discussions of human feelings and virtues, Romanticism provided an emphasis on 
emotional intelligence. In the widest sense, I use the phrase "emotional intelligence" to 
mean the self-conscious engagement and scmtiny of feeling. Emotional intelligence can 
be a skill, a contemplative one that makes the individual more prone to aesthetic 
experiences and meditative poetic forms such as the lyric or ode, or it can be a heightened 
sensibility and ability to control (or at least harness) emotions toward a purposeful goal. 
The Romantic period prompted individuals to "claim their emotions as guarantors of their 
individuality" (Pinch 3); the capacity for feeling (as a kind of emotional intelligence) was 
a mark of personal distinction. Within art, the expression of feeling provides a privileged 
point of insight, which can, in turn, infom1 cultural and social critique. John D. Mayer, 
Peter Salovey, and David R. Camso define emotional intelligence not only as a set of 
abilities that can process emotional information, or a group of beneficial personality 
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traits, but also as a zeitgeist, "an intellectual or passionate trend that characterizes the 
moment" (93-93). 
Condition-of-England texts, in commenting on the Two Nations of England - the 
rich and poor - also "characterize the moment" by way of feeling, or lack thereof. In this 
respect, they comment on the condition of the present age in a way that involves the 
expression of an ostensible emotional intelligence. Condition-of-England texts express a 
particular perspective on society in a way that privileges feeling, and the exploration of 
feeling, as a means by which to discuss social relations and problems of the period. Such 
discourses also provide sanctions for the expression and disclosure of feeling, even strong 
feeling such as anger and its kin. My exploration of feeling in this period will consider, as 
part of this legibility, the organized growth of working-class radicalism or activism, and 
the concomitant rise of a working-class literary culture (in particular, Chartist fiction). 
The chapters that follow consider philosophical and moral inheritances from the 
eighteenth century, but deal mostly with mid-nineteenth century texts and their 
immediate contexts. The chapters are not intended to provide a continuous or sequential 
approach to literary history; rather, my aim is to examine specific and interrelated ways 
that mid-nineteenth-century authors represent strong and presumably unsocial feelings 
such as anger or indignation, and to consider the productive potential of anger and its 
representation. 
The primary texts explored in this dissertation are disparate: they range in form -
novels, short stories, periodical essays, newspaper articles, political pamphlets and 
philosophical treatises - and in political ideologies and intellectual affinities, yet they all 
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assert, as part of their social and political critique, that feeling is necessa1y to social and 
political amelioration. The novels explored in this project - Charles Kingsley's Alton 
Locke ( 1850) and Elizabeth Gaskell' s Mal}' Barton ( 1848) - have been variously 
designated as social problem, industrial, and condition-of-England novels, both by 
Victorian and contemporary critics. By calling them condition-of-England novels, I am 
purposefully emphasizing the intellectual debt they owe to Carlyle, who both coined and 
shaped the Condition-of-England Question. To be sure, numerous industrial or social 
problem novels were published in the mid-nineteenth century- notably, Benjamin 
Disraeli's Sybil (1845), Charles Dickens' Hard Times ( 1854), and Gaskell' s second 
industrial novel, North and South (1855)- but I have chosen Kingsley and Gaskell's 
novel not only because of their overt Carlylean references, but also because their plots 
entwined concerns over working-class radicalism (and anger) with the expression of 
strong feeling in daily life, and in literary and political life. Disraeli's novel offers readers 
the phrase Two Nations, which is integral to the conceptualization of the condition of 
England as one of disparity as much as lack of feeling, yet the novel's plot point of 
making Sybil, the working-class eponymous heroine, a lost aristocrat, obscures the 
complexities of inter-class feeling and cooperation that this project discusses. Gaskell 's 
North and South is similar in subject matter - the mistrust between masters and men that 
largely leads to a labour strike - but I contend that the novel avoids the narrative 
intervention found in Maly Barton, and the direct address to readers is an important 
component to my discussion of sympathy and fiction. 
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Rather than concentrate predominately on the condition-of-England novel, 
however, which numerous critics have argued is predominately directed to middle-class 
readers, I have also consciously included Chartist and working-class texts in an effort to 
show how this underlying concern with feeling and its expression endures, albeit with 
distinct political goals, in texts not distinctly deemed as serving middle-class interests. 
Indeed, contemporary scholars discussing sympathy in novels of the period have 
continually, and necessarily, remarked on how appeals to shared feeling have helped reify 
class differences, particularly middle-class moral superiority and emotional control. As 
such, appeals to feeling have been subject to criticism that they are apolitical or the 
antitheses to action - complicit in maintaining the current socio-economic system rather 
than radically overturning it. By considering how Chartists make appeals to feeling, and 
envisioning these appeals as part of political meaning-making, my aim is to explore how 
shared feeling is not distinctly the product of (middle-class) consciousness in the 
literature of the time, and thusly, address what I take to be as a critical oversight in 
contemporary discussions of sympathy and mid-nineteenth-century fiction. 
Chapter One considers the philosophical inheritance of eighteenth-century moral 
philosophy, and in particular, Hume's Treatise on Human Nature and Smith's Theory of 
Moral Sentiments. Both philosophical works include lengthy discussions of sympathy as 
the basis for sociability. Rather than any one feeling, sympathy is a communicated 
feeling that enables the sympathetic spectator (to use Smith's term) to share in, and judge, 
the feelings and behaviours of others. It exists, then, as a form of social judgment or 
approval. In contrast, Smith considers anger to be an unsocial passion and declares that it 
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is a feeling with which one does not easily sympathize. Looking at the conditions that 
Smith deems as necessary before anger can be readily accessible for the sympathetic 
spectator provides an importan.t entry point into my examination of how anger can be 
sanctioned and made legible in daily and public life, and my discussion of Hume and 
Smith demonstrates the various affinities between sympathy and anger. 
Yet, by the 1840s, the concept of sympathy as a humanizing and socializing force 
falls under considerable suspicion as worries over class hostility increase. Sympathy 
becomes, in this period, more intimately tied to self-interest than to benevolence: a self-
indulgent foray into the gross inequities of the time. This charge - which I argued earlier 
is an enduring one in contemporary scholarship on sympathy - is one that was also 
discussed by nineteenth-century writers and reformers. By exploring these criticisms of 
sympathy as another set of limits to its social and moral import, I connect both sympathy 
and anger to narrative, and in particular, the cognitive and rhetorical features of sympathy 
and anger when represented through fiction. My contention is that theorizing sympathy in 
the strict context of class-interest, while legitimate, ignores its fundan1ental ethical 
function. 
Chapter Two more specifically considers the Condition-of-England Question as 
an articulated urgency and discourse about shared feeling and its social role - one that 
particularly shaped the early works of Thomas Carlyle. In Signs of the Times (1829) and 
Char/ism ( 1839), Carlyle summarizes the profound cultural changes of the early 
nineteenth century as the emergence of a divisive, callous system of wages and 
competition, with "Cash Payment as the sole nexus between man and man" (SW 199). 
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The widening material and ideological gulf between the working classes and the middle 
and upper classes - between what the Victorians variously called the toiling and 
untoiling, workers and masters - is imagined as both a geographical or spatial separation, 
and also as a separation or lack of shared feeling. Cha1tist authors such as Thomas 
Cooper (1805-1892) and Ernest Jones (1819- 1869), like Carlyle, also used anger as part 
of their social and political critiques. As part of my discussion, I explore how the 
representation of anger, as the rhetorical force of indignation and as the public 
articulation of grievances, becomes vital to how mid-nineteenth century writers and 
Chartist leaders discuss class and direct their critiques to an envisioned, and potentially 
embodied, readership and populace. 
Chapter Three discusses "The Education of the Feelings," a publication by the 
philosopher and social radical Charles Bray (1811- 1884). More generally, it also is a 
phrase I use to discuss public and reformist discourses that explain feelings by way of 
associationist principles and by a series of limits and balances. Attention to the social 
body meant an attention to public morality as well as public health, and the two were 
intrinsically linked in governmental and charitable projects of education and reform. As 
well as emphasizing conduct and habit as a means to socialize emotional expression, the 
"Education of the Feelings" also considered physical education, and the physical body, as 
a site of emotional regulation. 
Bray's handbook is both a philosophical and educational treatise that, like 
eighteenth-century moral philosophy, provided empirical origins for feeling. The other 
texts that I examine in this chapter - Thomas Carlyle's On Heroes, Hero-Worship and 
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the Heroic in History (1841) and Charles Kingsley's Alton Locke, Tailor and Poet: An 
Autobiography (1850) - are also concerned with feeling and its relationship to right 
conduct and just action, insomuch that what emerges as a unifying observation about 
these otherwise disparate texts is the underlying preoccupation with heroes (and moral 
and political leaders) as embodied models of civic conduct and feeling. 
Chapter Four of this dissertation considers philosophical discussions of suffering, 
and sympathy with suffering, in order to explore suffering's political dimension. Long 
seen as redemptive or even unavoidable in Christian contexts, suffering, in the secular 
sense, must consider the potential for redress which, like anger, means the attribution of 
blame and, potentially, punishment. The political philosopher Hannal1 Arendt (1906-
197 5) considers suffering as part of what she calls the "politics of pity": groups motivated 
by a compassionate response to suffering can be easily persuaded towards violence, 
insofar as the ''boundlessness" of feeling as a response to the suffering of the masses has 
the potential for violence and revolution (90). Like Arendt, I contend that sympathy with 
suffering requires anger, or indignation, because it requires the attribution of blame and 
the possibility and force ofredress. Rather than being solely destructive, however, I see 
the politics of suffering as being potentially ameliorative, and a practice grounded in 
narrative, rather than in strict spectatorship. 
In looking at Elizabeth Gaskell 's Ma!JJ Barton ( 1848), this chapter explores how 
suffering can provide a means of community-building that encourages class cooperation 
and dialogue. Importantly, however, Gaskell 's narrator suggests that class solidarity 
alone cannot help alleviate the social problems or class hostilities that cause suffering. As 
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part of my discussion .. I will also examine nineteenth-century and contemporary 
receptions of Mwy Barton .. pa11icularly the prevailing critique that Gaskell used feeling 
to temper her "impassioned polemic" (Lennox-Boyd 22). Rather, I argue that sympathy, 
the sharing of feeling and a perspective or openness that enables individuals to endure 
difference, is both material and ideological. In this respect, sympathy becomes part of 
Gaskell's polemic. 
The conclusion to this project briefly considers the affinities between anger and 
sympathy by way of their particular roles in political protest and activism. My aim, in 
conjunction with an examination of scholarly work on Victorian activism, is to 
summarize what I take to be the tenants of Victorian activism in a way that takes into 
account condition-of-England novel. 
What unites this disparate group of authors for this project is their focus on 
feeling as the means by which to discuss the current condition of England, and their 
ability to express and sympathize with strong and negative feeling. Indeed, anger has a 
role in the formation of class-consciousness and personal agency, as it has a role in how 
daily and political life come to be represented in literary discourses. History shapes the 
aiticulation and potential utility of feeling. Given the legacy of the French Revolution, of 
Peterloo, and with revolutions in continental Europe in the early and mid-nineteenth 
century, the English public expression of strong feeling must be articulated in ways that 
makes it capable of sympathy from others. This requires an affirmation and mediation, 
rather than strict repression, of feeling. 
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Endnotes 
1 In Chartism, Thomas Carlyle argues for suffrage as a panacea (216). 
2 
Catherine Gallagher suggests that Barton's radicalism functions as "proof' of his 
inability to make "moral choices," as well as "an emblem of his moral responsibility (73). 
See The Industrial Reform l?f English Fiction: Social Discourse and Narrative Form, 
1832-1867 (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1985). 
3 
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics uses the passions as a means of ethical inquiry. 
Aristotle's Ethics also provides the classic, and enduring, example of the ambivalent 
relation to anger; he links anger to a virtue, as a just and natural reaction to offense. See 
Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000), Book IV . 
.i The definitional categories of passion, sentiment, feeling, and emotion vary 
historically and have long been used interchangeably. As "the passions" became 
semantically detached from their Christian connotations in the latter Middle Ages, they 
acquired a distinctly pejorative connotation. From its ve1y etymology, passion implies 
passivity, and in this sense, passion is a "disclaimed reaction" - whereby the subject (or 
sufferer) disclaims responsibility or agency - and its negative overtones are linked to 
notions of biological agitation and disorder (Averill 16). Encompassingly, the term 
passion was often used to discuss negative or strong feeling in general, such as anger; 
Stedman also notes that the term often appeared in texts as a synonym for anger or 
destrnctive emotional expression. In seventeenth- and eighteenth-centmy moral 
philosophy, the term "sentiment" was distinct from "feeling" in moral philosophy; the 
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former implied a distinct cognitive capacity (a "mental feeling"), the latter emphasized 
physical agitation, sensation, or affect (Stedman 39). The term "emotion" became 
increasingly used in place of "passion" or feeling pa11icularly in scientific and 
physiological disciplines during the nineteenth century. Unless otherwise noted, I use 
these tenns based on the connotations above, and in accordance with their historical 
usages. 
5 Since such binaries also underscore the gender asymmetry that devalues women 
for being irrational and excessively emotional, Lutz points out that gender is inseparable 
as a point of discussion on the representation of emotion ( 151- 58). 
6 Stedman also makes this point and refers to Barbara Hardy's Forms of Feeling 
in Victorian Fiction (Athens: Ohio UP, 1985) as an example of this ahistorical approach. 
Hardy claims that while all Victorian novelists manipulate reader's feelings for fictional 
effect, the distinction between great Victorian novelists - Hardy discusses Dickens, 
Thackeray, and Eliot - and less-skilled novelists is that the latter make this appeal to the 
emotions more apparent through overtly manipulative and stereotyped modes (14). In this 
respect, Hardy ignores the political context of specific (and perhaps didactic) strategies of 
address and conceives of literary merit as separate from political and social purpose. 
Mary Ellen Doyle attributes the rhetorical appeal to the emotions as an element of style -
particularly a Dickensian style - but does not consider these rhetorical appeals as the 
means by which authors make certain feelings socially and political legible. See The 
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Sympathetic Response: George Eliot's Fictional Rhetoric (London: Associated 
University Press, 1981 ). 
7 
Even when a person knowingly reads fiction, this individual can still have 
sympathy for characters that he or she knows do not exist - what many call the "paradox 
of emotional responses to fiction." There is much divergent research on this paradox: that 
the emotions that one feels when reading fiction are "make-believe"; that they are our 
responses to an illusionary world that has been created through fiction; and that cognition 
or belief is irrelevant to emotional responses to fiction. See Kendall Walton, "Fearing 
Fictions" in Journal of Philosophy 75.1 (1978): 5 -27; Colin Radford, "How Can We Be 
Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 49 
(1975): 67-80; Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen, Truth, Fiction, and Literature: 
A Philosophical Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994). Regardless of the explanations 
provided, sympathy is an imagined identification that entails a response in the actual 
world. 
8 
In later theories of emotions, such as in Charles Darwin's The Expression of 
Emotions in Man and Animals ( 1872), anger provides the "fight" in fight-or-flight 
responses that are part of the survival instinct, whereas the flight response is marked and 
motivated by fear (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1965). 
9 
The Stoics (approximately 200 BCE to 300 CE) viewed affective states 
(impulses, desires, fears, and more generally, feeling) to be unreliable and easily 
com1ptible. In Stoical thought, and post-Enlightenment philosophers influenced by the 
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Stoics such as Baruch Spinoza ( 1632-1677), the passions were misguided or poorly-
directed thoughts that thwart rational judgments and decision-making. 
w Specifically, James examines the following: Thomas Hobbes (1588 - 1679), 
Nicolas Malebranche (1638 - 1715), David Hume (1711-1776), and Edmund Burke 
(1729 - 1797). In Passion and Action: The E'motions in Seventeenlh-CenlwJJ Philosophy, 
James includes lengthy discussions of Hobbes, Malebranche, Spinoza, and Descartes. 
(Oxford: OUP, 1997). 
11 See William M. Reddy' s "Sentimentalism and Its Erasure: The Role of 
Emotions in the Era of the French Revolution." Journal ofModern Histoty 72.l (2000): 
109-152. 
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Chapter One 
"What has befallen you?": Narratives of Sympathy and Anger 
He who walks through a great city to find subjects for weeping, may find 
plenty at every corner to wring his heart~ but let a man walk on his course, 
and enjoy his grief alone-we are not of those who would accompany 
him. The miseries of us poor earth-dwellers gain no alleviation from the 
sympathy of those who merely hunt them out to be pathetic over them. 
The weeping philosopher too often impairs his eyesight by his woe, and 
becomes unable from his tears to see the remedies for the evil he deplores. 
Thus it will often be fotmd that the man of no tears is the truest 
philanthropist, as he is the best physician who wears a cheerful face, even 
in the worst of cases. 
- Charles MacKay 
Extraordinmy Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds {1841) 
A socializing force in eighteenth-century moral philosophy, sympathy undergoes 
a series of changes in the nineteenth century, noteworthy not only in philosophy, but also 
in litera1y forms and modes of representation. For eighteenth-centmy moral philosophers 
such as David Hume and Adam Smith, sympathy is a human disposition, and both 
philosophers provide categorizations and taxonomies of feelings as more than personal 
vices or virtues by discussing how feelings influence social relations. 
By the early and mid-nineteenth centmy, this social vision expands to include the 
modem class system and the pressing need to a11iculate class relations and class interests. 
The passions, increasingly replaced by designations of feeling and emotion, become the 
objects of scrutiny in politics and in sociological and scientific sh1dies. In the period of 
Charles MacKay's popular history, the Hungry Forties, sympathy becomes the self-
indulgent property of the "weeping philosopher." In its excesses, sympathy does little to 
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remedy the widespread miseries of mid-nineteenth-century industrialized and urban life. 
Yet even under considerable critique and suspicion, sympathy, as a socializing force, 
endures and serves an array of purposes in politics and the representation of daily life. 
In MacKay's critique, the tears of the philosopher impair the effectiveness of 
social action - the conscious process of diagnosing and documenting social problems and 
offering ameliorative solutions. Indeed, MacKay' s description of the weeping 
philosopher as a person who "merely hunts [problems] out to be pathetic over them" 
implies a certain self-centred motive, and MacKay trenchantly ridicules the lofty aims of 
sympathy (and emotional expression in general); instead, he favours the controlled, 
almost scientific, actions of the philanthropist-physician. In his popular history, MacKay 
is touching upon a common public sentiment: by the mid-nineteenth century, the rise of 
working-class radicalism, the creation of workhouses in accordance with the New Poor 
Law ( 1834 ), and Benthamite and Malthusian doctrines, provoke new discussions about 
charity as opponents and proponents consider its effectiveness in alleviating urban 
poverty and social inequity. 1 Throughout the nineteenth-century, individuals (including 
policy makers, reformers, and social scientists) questioned whether philanthropy was 
trnly a practice born out of sympathy and Christian duty, one born out of a prevailing 
class-based fear of the urban poor, or simply, a self-interested exercise. 
In discussing the origins of the class system in the period, Harold Perkin argues 
that the Poor Laws, along with other legislation aimed at controlling the working classes 
(such as the Combinations Act), were products of the period's political thought, which 
evaded paternalistic responsibilities while attempting to "enact paternal discipline" (187-
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89). Perkin's model of social control is influential, and similar models continue to be 
used in contemporary Victorian scholarship to explore sympathy and, more widely, 
nineteenth-century class relations. Variously, scholars have discussed sympathy as a 
disciplinary tool that operates through visual and discursive means in literature and 
joumalism,2 or as a process of middle-class self-constitution and reification of 
socioeconomic difference.3 These approaches assume an inherent self-interestedness as 
the impetus of sympathy and sympathetic identification. The once-innate disposition of 
sympathy- available to individuals of all social ranks according to Hume and Smith's 
treatises - becomes increasingly interrogated by contemporary scholars as a suitable 
means of expressing and representing relations between the classes. The interpersonal 
(and imaginative) sharing of feeling becomes, in mid-nineteenth-century texts, an 
ostensible means of either ameliorating or avoiding "the violent dislocations of 
industrialization" (Shaub 19). Yet, much contempora1y scholarship questioning the 
efficacy of sympathy ignores how nineteenth-century authors and refonners expressed 
similar arguments in relation to sympathy and its expression. 
This chapter examines the extensions of, and overlaps between, discourses of 
feelings, in particular sympathy and anger, from eighteenth-century moral philosophy to 
nineteenth-century political and social writings that attempt to document and diagnose 
the condition of England and discuss interclass relations. The response to the either 
inhumane or indifferent treatment of the labouring and urban poor was one that both 
affirmed sympathy's role in social projects and sociability and designated its limits. For 
political radicals, political representation was a better means of alleviating the conditions 
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that social and Christian reformers attempted to mitigate with charity. If sympathy is not 
any one feeling, but the interpersonal communication of feeling, the changing discourses 
of sympathy in this period imply a rethinking of the social functions of all emotion, 
especially of those that seem antithetical. In this respect, my examination of sympathy 
implies an interrogation of the proposed limits and exceptions to these communicative 
processes or exchanges. As a model or means of control or self-constitution, sympathy 
garners critique as to its social and moral value. There is a fundamental uncertainty 
behind sympathy and its ethical function, one that both Hume and Smith must confront in 
their philosophical treatises, and one that endures in nineteenth-century discourses on 
feeling. Understanding the philosophical nuances that reside in eighteenth-century moral 
philosophy can provide valuable insight into sympathy's relation to politics, interpersonal 
relations, and literature, even during periods of its critique. 
By its very title, Extraordinary Popular Deh1s·ions and the Madness of Crowds·, 
MacKay's study speaks to prevailing and intertwining concerns about feeling and its 
expression. In particular, MacKay focuses on the crowd, whether it be the throngs of 
people in the city, the spontaneous formation of individuals, or the political crowd 
demanding attention and political change. Historically, the language used to describe the 
crowd becomes the very language used to describe unregulated, strong emotions such as 
anger; the crowd is both a literal force and an analogy that reinforces the concurrent 
concerns over emotional expression and the organization and movement of individuals 
into groups.4 I want momentarily to contrast MacKay's weeping philosopher with another 
figure of feeling: the angry man in Smith's The Theory of the Moral Sentiments ( 1759). 
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Like Mackay's overly emotive philosopher, the angry man is an exemplar of the social 
limitations of sympathy. MacKay's figure may prompt mild ridicule, but Smith's angry 
man is threatening to both individuals and social order. 
For Smith, anger is one of the "unsocial passions," a category that also includes 
resentment and hatred: the unsocial passions drive individuals from each other and are 
ineffective in garnering sympathy. This chapter asserts that despite Smith's designation, 
the unsocial passions are necessary in social and political life and requisite to the 
formation of collective identities. Between the 1830s and 1860s, the period surrounding 
the reform acts and the rise of working-class radicalism such as the Chartist movement, 
anger becomes an inextricable and strategic part of political assertions and calls for 
enfranchisement as the means to alleviate the suffering and inequities of the working 
classes. In this context, anger functions as proof of sympathy with the suffering of the 
poor, or as proof of one's moral outrage and concern over the state of relations between 
the classes. In literary culture, anger is a narrative force by which to address the declining 
spiritual and material conditions of England; it becomes a consideration in the 
organization of plot lines or episodes, and it exists, whether named or not, in descriptions 
of literary protagonists, political leaders, and philosophers (the latter best exemplified by 
Carlyle). 
By invoking the weeping philosopher and the angry man, I aim to point out the 
possible extremes, or parameters, of sympathy and anger, as such extremes provide an 
important heuristic for the understanding of the social and political implications of 
feeling. A concentration on extremes (or antitheses) focuses on the limits of feeling, their 
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social utility, and the varying strategies that legitimize their expressions or minimize their 
consequences. Despite their ostensible oppositions, overlaps between sympathy and 
anger persist: both come under considerable critique in the nineteenth century~ both 
involve a conception of the self; and both are theoretically linked to larger discussions of 
narrative and the role of literature in alleviating soc.ial issues. Conceiving of anger as 
something oppositional or exclusive to sympathy is in itself purposeful, since both can, 
given a degree of social legitimacy, engender collectivity by creating affective and 
emotional bonds between groups of people. 
At best, sympathy is a socializing force: it enables individuals to identity with 
each other on the basis of fellow feeling and has the potential to transform one's views of 
people unlike oneself. In excess, sympathy can immobilize an individual: the person who 
sympathizes too much is unable to act against suffering and victimization (Shaub 15-17). 
At best, anger can be an ameliorative or productive force and a form of claim-making: it 
can be an assertion of a wrong or injustice against an individual or group; it can be a 
motivating force used to correct a wrong, a situation, or prevent further harm; or it can 
restore or overturn the balance of power. At worst, anger is destructive and antisocial, 
used to inflict pain or injury for personal gains or pleasure and produce social fissures or 
antagonistic responses. Embodied in the crowd, as a mob or a riot, anger also exists as a 
potentially revolutionary force. Thus, in their excesses, sympathy and anger can both 
motivate and compromise actions of social and political reform and can give rise to 
considerable tensions in the body politic. 
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In examining the epistemology of feeling in eighteenth-centmy moral philosophy, 
I want to compare the philosophical and practical continuities between discourses of the 
sentiments and passions in the eighteenth century with discourses of feeling (or emotion) 
in the mid-nineteenth centmy. Emotion is an organizing category; understanding the 
trajectory of changes and similarities in conceptions of feeling (and their shared 
expression) can illustrate how philosophers and authors attempt to describe feeling by 
way of human nature and psychology, by way of social critiques about the material and 
spiritual condition of England, and by way of literary merit. 
I. Sociability and the Epistemology of Feeling: Representing Sympathy 
Hume identifies the subject of A Treatise on Human Nature (1739- 1740) as the 
"science of human nature" (I. i. I. 7). Given the philosophical inheritance of the 
Enlightenment - intellectual and social progress and reforms, the advancement of 
sciences and scientific methodology, and empiricist epistemologies to explain human 
behaviour- this does not seem surprising. Hume's lament in the Conclusion to Book I, 
however, which comes immediately before his sustained discussion of "the passions" in 
Book II, can be characterized by what Adele Pinch cans "emotional extravagance": it 
eludes definitions and boundaries ( 4 ). Feelings, and particularly the feelings of the 
"weeping" philosopher, compromise Hume's philosophic and systematic observance of 
human nature and action: 
I am first frightened and confounded with that forlorn solitude, in which I 
am plac'd in my philosophy, and fancy myself some strange uncouth 
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monster, who not being able to mingle and unite in society, has been 
expell 'd all human commerce, and left utterly abandon' d and disconsolate. 
Fain wou'd I run into the crowd for shelter and warmth~ but ca1rnot prevail 
with myself to mix with such defom1ity. I call upon others to join me, in 
order to make a company apart; but no one will hearken to me. (Treatise I. 
iv. VII. 264) 
Hume's observance of human activity alienates him from the objects of his study. He is 
both "confounded" and "forlorn" at his intellectual endeavour; like Smith's angry man, 
he is an "uncouth monster" unable to "mingle and unite in society." Hume's hyperbolic 
moment of despair and self-doubt at the first book's conclusion, whether feigned or 
otherwise, could be a pronouncement of failure for this "science of man" and the -
unsystematic relationship among feelings, intellect, and imagination. Formally, Hume's 
emotional extravagance inserts feeling into a discussion of both sociability and its 
antithesis, which in his example is social alienation and despair. 
Hume's central epistemological distinction is between impressions and ideas, a 
division that is based on intensity: impressions, which include emotions and sensations, 
are forceful and immediate, while ideas are "faint images" that are recollected from 
impressions (Treatise I. i. I. 1 ). Impressions strike the senses, explains Hume; what 
remains in the mind is a copy after the impression ceases, and this becomes an idea 
(Treatise I. i. II. 8). These objects of the mind are not invariable or solitary; along with 
personal memory and imagination, they produce variable - or, in the case of Hume's 
resultant despair, unexpected - results. Imagination may be "inconstant and fallacious" 
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(Treatise I. iv. VII. 265), yet it is a means by which individuals make associations 
between certain objects and causes. Similarly, the passions are, for Hume, associative 
rather than stable or closed states, in which one passion can readily change into or merge 
with another.5 These associative principles help explain the "changeableness" of human 
nature (Treatise II. i. IV. 283), perhaps a fitting reason behind Hume's philosophical 
despair. 
His moment of despondency is doubly interesting, since it also acknowledges, 
rather dramatically, the magnitude of existing unsociability, even within the very 
"crowd" of people to which he nms for consolation: "When I look abroad, I foresee on 
every side, dispute, contradiction, anger, calumny and detraction. When I tum my eye 
inward, I find nothing but doubt and ignorance. All the world conspires to oppose and 
contradict me; tho' such is my weakness" (Treatise I. iv. VII. 264). This enlarged vision 
is both cautionary and descriptive; animosity and conflict abound as impressions and 
beliefs differ. This illustrative moment of concern for the unsociability of individuals 
widens the philosopher's field of inquiry: from simply classifying the passions to 
examining their manifestations and social consequences. 
Hume's categorization of passions focuses on binaries and oppositions: hate is 
examined in the same section as love; pride, in the same as humility; anger, in the same 
as benevolence. These sets of feeling are what Hume calls the "indirect passions," since 
they require a belief about an object, real or imagined. As this object is either the self or 
another person, these groups of feelings are intimately concerned with interpersonal 
relations: "Hatred, resentment, esteem, love, courage, mirth and melancholy; all these 
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passions I feel more from communication than from my own natural temper and 
disposition" (Treatise II. i. XI. 317). For Hume, individuals are susceptible to the opinion 
of others, and they judge objects and people more through imaginative comparisons than 
from any intrinsic merit or value (Treatise II. i. VI. 291 ). 
Another unique predilection of human nature in Treatise is its capacity for 
sympathy: "No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its 
consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by 
communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even 
contrary to our own" (II. i. XI. 316). Sympathy is not isolated feeling, but a formidable 
communication of feeling framed by social conventions and recognizable cues: one 
individual interprets another's emotional state through visual or discursive cues (facial 
expressions, language, etc.), and this is conveyed as an impression that "acquires such a 
degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself' (Treatise II. i. XI. 
317). The force of this sympathetic communication is determined by the strength of the 
relation between the self and the person with whom one sympathizes: "The stronger the 
relation is betwixt ourselves to any object, the more easily does the imagination make the 
transitions, and convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we 
always fom1 the idea of our person" (Treatise II. i. XI. 318). In this respect, Humean 
sympathy is dictated by two conditions: the existing or imagined relationship between the 
sympathizing subject and his or her object of sympathy, and a conception of the self, 
which enables the understanding of associationist principles, such as resemblance and 
contiguity, that are required in the first condition. Thus, for Hume, affections and 
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hostilities depend on, and are a reflection of, ourselves and our relationships with others 
(Treatise II. i. XI. 319). Both conditions are shaped by the imagination (imagined 
relations or resemblances), and historical forces, since resemblances between individuals 
- recognizable social identities or shared beliefs - take on new aiticulations over time. 
In discussing Hume's theory of associative relations, Susan James outlines the 
importance of resemblance - as the recognition of similarities - in interpersonal 
communication and feeling: 
Resemblance is the first relation at work, but once a basis for comparison 
has been established, contiguity or proximity comes into play. Humans 
compare themselves with other humans because they resemble each other, 
but while a common soldier compares himself with his sergeant corporal, 
he does not compare himself with his general. As Hume puts it, the 
distance between general and solider "cuts off the relation." ( 63) 
Associations such as resemblance, contiguity, and proximity, in this regard, have explicit 
connotations with social position, or rather, the overt recognition of one's position in 
regards to another or in regards to one's own. Ultimately, then, Hume's communication 
of sympathy is a socialized response, since such associative relations, or lack thereof, link 
the individual to his or her relative place in the social order - a particularly regimented 
order, if one takes Hume and James' analogy further. As James' discussion illustrates, 
Hume's examples of sympathy involve significant attention to the social relations 
between the sympathetic subject and his or her object, and his assertion that sympathy is 
strongest towards those with whom one shares a physical or social resemblance is 
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significant. In this respect, sympathy, necessary to the project of sociability, regulates 
interactions with members of one's own social position or station (and dictates relations 
with those outside of this position), and in doing so, it prompts identification or even 
resentment.6 As an affinnation of one's place (and fidelity to that place) in society, this 
aspect of sympathy becomes more explicitly reiterated through Smith's own 
philosophical treatise on feeling. 
Hume and Smith's conceptions of sympathy demonstrate an increasingly 
organized social vision, and Smithian sympathy is a suitable extension to Hume's. The 
examples of sympathetic exchange that Smith provides, as well as the limits he imposes, 
are telling as to how he conceptualizes feeling (in this case, sentiment) in relation to 
sociability. Smith qualifies his discussion of sympathy by linking it to "propriety," yet he 
also proposes sympathy as a requisite of human nature: 
How selfish so ever a man may be supposed, there are evidently some 
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and 
render their happiness necessary to him, then he derives nothing from it 
except the pleasure of seeing it. ... The greatest mffian, the most 
hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it. (TMS 
I. i. I. 1) 
Throughout The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith also provides consecutive examples 
of the sympathetic communication of feeling as a process dictated by imagination rather 
than certainty, and by a consideration of the self and other: a person observing someone 
being tortured imagines what the other is feeling, albeit to a weaker degree; those 
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sympathetic to beggars on the street, with their sores and ulcers, are likely to experience a 
corresponding unease or itch in their own bodies "because that horror arises from 
conceiving what they themselves would suffering, if they really were the wretches whom 
they were looking upon" (TMS I. i. I. 2-3). 
Importantly, Smith provides sympathy with a narrower definition by restricting it 
to certain passions. One needs to know the cause of a person's emotional state, he 
explains, before sympathy is possible; otherwise, the sympathy will be "imperfect," 
spurred by curiosity rather than true feeling. In order to know the cause of sympathy, the 
first question that Smith asks is, "What has befallen you?" (TMS I. i. I. 9). The use of the 
word "befallen" is telling; first, it implies that what has "befallen" the individual is 
something negative or unwanted, and second, that this predicament has materialized for 
an individual through no action of his or her own. By this question, then, Smith proclaims 
that the traditional definition of sympathy is fellow-feeling with suffering (TMS I. iii. I. 
1). Thus, when an individual sympathizes with suffering, he or she makes certain 
evaluative judgments about the sufferer (a tacit acknowledgement of injustice or cruelty 
that has befallen the object of sympathy) and his or her feelings. 
Smith sets up his "impartial spectator" to be a judge or critic. His discussion of 
impartiality does not negate the self, but envisions the sympathizing subject as one whose 
sympathy entails moral approbation towards the feeling of another. Charles Griswold 
explains that in proposing an impartial spectator, as opposed to an actor, Smith's provides 
"a theory of the spectator's approval of emotions" (104). The spectator-actor dichotomy 
is central in Smith's treatise and Griswold notes how Smith himself provides the analogy 
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of the theatre critic as the model by which one could best discuss moral and social 
judgments and express either approval or disapproval (65-67). Linking propriety to 
sympathy is understandable in this respect: the impartial spectator must judge the 
propriety of the feeling given the social context, and the propriety of its expression 
relative to the situation that excites it. 
Despite the prominent place that sympathy holds in Hume and Smith's 
discussions of the moral sentiments, there is no genuine or promised outcome as a result 
of sympathetic engagement and exchange, and this may explain why sympathy falls prey 
to critique in post-Revolutionary contexts. Nancy J. Hirschmann acknowledges this point 
as the inherently "problematic individualism" of sympathy, wherein the understanding of 
others only comes from a projection of one's own experiences. Hirschmann's observation 
provides another uncertainty between sympathy and its ability to motivate action: "The 
fact that sympathy cannot on its own motivate people to act suggests that it is a deeply 
individualistic psychological principle: my sympathetic feelings may be 'natural,' but 
they are locked inside me until some 'trigger' happens to motivate me to act" (184). 
Herein lies the epistemological uncertainty of sympathy in Hume and Smith's theories: 
prompted by the imagination, sympathy may well be a fictitious response, and while it is 
not guided by self-interest (as the Smithian term, "impa11ial spectator," implies), it does 
require an immanent conception of self. It is enough for a person to imagine how another 
feels, rather than have assurance of that feeling, which explains why one is able to have 
sympathy for the dead, or fictional characters, or feel embarrassed for those who are not 
embarrassed themselves (but perhaps should be). 
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Conceptions of sympathy in moral philosophy, such as those posited by Hume 
and Smith, are counter-responses to the doctrine of self-interest adopted by philosophers 
such as Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Mandeville. As counter-responses, they claim an 
ethical doctrine that grants human nature the disposition of benevolence; this benevolent 
disposition, however, can never fully escape the central figure of the self. Indeed, both 
nineteenth-century and contemporary authors and scholars have addressed the possibility 
(or inescapability) of sympathy's relation to self-interest. In Hist01y of English Thought 
in the Eighteenth Centwy (1876), Leslie Stephen provides a compelling reason for this 
paradox: since philosophy itself is "'obligated to start from considerations of the 
individual mind, instead of contemplating the social organism," the "plausibility" of the 
selfish doctrine is bound to pervade (70). More recently, Anne Cvetkovich discusses 
sympathy in Victorian sensation fiction by linking it to pleasure. Shared feeling is 
pleasurable as it can link the spectator to another individual, and Cvetkovich argues that 
the pleasure of sympathy exists as a form of power that converts pain into the pleasure of 
the spectator (154). Hume would likely concur; in Treatise, he discusses the pleasure that 
can ensue when comparing one's own state with the misery and suffering of another's: 
"The misery of another gives us a more lively idea of our happiness" (Treatise II. ii. VIII. 
375). In discussing Hume's conceptions of sympathetic virtue, Christine Swanton points 
out that this pleasure is not always constant, but rather, determined by the magnitude of 
the scene or event and the proximity of the spectator to the object. 7 As such, this pleasure 
implies that it comes from a kind of interpersonal triumph or power over another 
individual - a situation that is rife with potential hostilities. 
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Amanda Anderson has noted how significant scholarly work on Victorian 
literature and culture has tended to view nineteenth-centmy intersubjective practices and 
capabilities - from which new paradigms, norms, or perspectives emerge as a means of 
understanding culture - as legitimizing forms of power, and she discusses, pa11icularly, 
contemporary critiques of critical detachment or disinterest. Her contention is that a 
"hermeneutics of suspicion" suffuses contemporary discussions of critical or aesthetic 
detachment, which questions the possibility of critical (or cultivated) distance and the 
ethical or moral value of such a perspective (8). A similar interpretation pervades 
contemporary discussions of sympathy and sympathetic engagement: scholars looking at 
benevolent theories in moral philosophy, whether primarily as a means of self-
constitution, or prompted by individualistic motives, tend to overlook sympathy's social 
role as a point of view or perspective, concentrating instead on sympathy as a strict 
subject position. 
This "hem1eneutics of suspicion" also frames much mid-nineteenth-century 
discussion of sympathy. MacKay's quote in the epigraph raises questions as to whether 
sympathy is a formidable force for social good, or whether it is a self-indulgent foray of 
the philosopher or philanthropist (a broad designation that could well include authors, 
critics, reformers and political leaders). In Signs of the Times ( 1829), Carlyle quite 
tellingly describes "the noble omnipotence of Sympathy" as one in which "all are cast as 
victims and as fuel" (SW 61) - a potentially explosive catalyst for self-interested political 
agency and the pursuit of power. 
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In contemporary Victorian scholarship, those who question the efficacy and 
validity of sympathetic engagement might consider appeals to sympathy as apolitical (or 
at least avoidant) responses within interpersonal and social relations. Most notable is 
Raymond Williams's discussion of mid-nineteenth-century industrial novels, such as 
Gaskell' s Mary Barton, which he characterizes as having "a combination of sympathetic 
observation" and a "largely successful attempt at imaginative identification" (Culture and 
Society 88). This "structure of feeling," a concept that Williams uses to characterize the 
daily experiences and standards of living of a particular time and place, makes certain 
assumptions. First, it implies that feeling - its expression and representation - is 
necessary to the characterization of a period and its dominant beliefs, given (as Humean 
theo1y also explains) that many of our most fundamental emotions - love, hate, anger, 
benevolence - require an ascertained belief about the particular object of feeling. Second, 
it also links feeling, and conflicts in feeling, to public opinion and sentiment. Yet 
Williams' description of Gaskell's novel illustrates his own contention that sympathy is 
not enough; it may act as a smokescreen to political solutions or avoid the laying of 
blame on those who should be held accountable for the period's inequities and miseries. 
Williams 's "strncture of feeling" is one that attempts to characterize a pa11icular 
historical moment- much like Hazlitt's "spirit of the age" (albeit less idealistically) or 
Carlyle's "condition of England" - by outlining dominant perceptions and values shared 
among individuals and articulated in literary forms and conventions. For Williams, the 
industrial novels of the Hungry Forties - as literary responses to large-scale industrial 
suffering - are examples of these strnctures of feeling, and Mary Barton is an 
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"imaginative re-creation" of working-class Manchester life (Culture and Society 87). Yet 
with its changes in emphasis - from John Barton, the intended eponymous protagonist, to 
his daughter, Mary, and from the political plot to the domestic and melodramatic -
Gaskell's novel, Williams argues, ultimately reflects the author's middle-class fear of 
working-class anger and violence. Thus, for Williams, Gaskell' s response to suffering is 
"deep and genuine," but pity or sympathy (Williams uses the terms interchangeably) 
cannot stand alone in this stmcture of feeling, and Barton becomes, in the narrative, a 
projection of middle-class worries (Culture and Society 90-91 ). 
In this respect, sympathy is admirable but, like MacKay's weeping philosopher, 
woefully insufficient. It does not resolve the conditions that prompt sympathy in the first 
place; moreover, it ostensibly fails to overcome feelings of anger, fear or condemnation 
that are entrenched, not necessarily in conscious self-interest, but in class differences and 
ideologies. This is a charge leveled at many condition-of-England writers, and Gaskell's 
contemporaries, such as Charles Dickens, Thomas Carlyle, and Charles Kingsley. 
William's observation that Gaskell' s sympathy is inconsistent is apt, especially 
considering that, by Hume and Smith's own assurances, sympathy is inconsistent by its 
very nature - it changes according to one's position in the world (and relation to the 
object), and it varies according to the kinds of feelings with which one could sympathize. 
In discussing appeals to feeling in Victorian fiction, Valerie Bystrom argues that 
sympathy in condition-of-England novels is prompted primarily through pathos~ the 
novels' unevenness arises from the fact that sympathy is represented through fiction: "As 
the conventions of sympathetic pathos evolve through the eighteenth and nineteenth 
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centuries, they reflect the inconsistencies which arise simply from the effort to introduce 
the sympathetic program into the traditions of fiction" (219). Bystrom, however, ignores 
the possibility that sympathy could be inconsistent on its own, regardless of literary and 
fictional conventions, and she subsumes the potential for excessive sympathy under a 
moral doctrine of Christian duty, whereby sympathy linked to Christian virtue is safe 
from charges of excessiveness (219). 
Yet the relationship between feeling and its representation in literary conventions 
is reciprocal. Literary forms or conventions do not simply dictate the representation of 
feeling (although forms such as sensation fiction and melodrama certainly rely on 
deliberate affect). Moreover, feeling is not, as we say of fom1, an empty vessel to be 
filled by words; instead, literary forms and conventions are partly constituted by 
recognizable conceptions of feelings that respond to some need (or outrage, or fear, or 
anger) of the moment. Philip Fisher makes a similar point when he argues that 
"vehement" emotions have a stake in determining literary form: "the passions are not 
important mainly as momentary situations within works. They are not only occasions 
where some character or another feels shame or anger, love or sorrow. Instead, wonder, 
pity, mourning, fear, anger, grief, and shame legislate what we mean by genre and by 
form" ( 11 ). 
Unlike Williams, then, I do not consider the representation of feeling in industrial 
novels of the 1840s to be apolitical, but as part of a recognizable dialogue between 
sympathetic author (or narrator), a readership, and the object(s) of sympathy. My 
particular interest in condition-of-England texts is one that affirms this connection 
51 
between feeling and form: condition-of-England texts are purposefully concerned with 
feeling and its role in public life, and in turn, the representation of feeling in these texts 
informs their formal aspects. Formalistic concerns - such as the tone of the narrator, 
direct addresses to the reader, and changes in focalization - can aid in what George Eliot 
calls "the extension of our sympathies," which is, according to Eliot, the "greatest 
benefit" to the public given by an artist, whether visual or literary. 8 In discussing how 
sympathy operates through the act of reading fiction, Keith Oatley also considers Eliot's 
declaration linking artistic achievement and merit with sympathy, and he contends that a 
story's organization - its discourse stmcture - has the potential for differing 
psychological effects ( 440). Different narrative techniques influence the amount, or 
"spectrum" of sympathetic identification between readers and objects of sympathy in 
fiction by way of associations (reflections, emotions, memories). Oatley's "associative 
stmcture" is a varying structural element and a point of dialogue between readers and 
charaeters whereby the reader identifies with a protagonist or narrator ( 445-44 7). 
The mid-nineteenth century was a period of profound concern over interpersonal 
relations: the lack of identification (and thus, sympathy) between individuals articulated 
as a physical and emotional gulf between the Two Nations, and the emergence of new 
forms of identification based on class and political motives. In such a period, the 
extension of one's sympathy could be a decisively political act and as such, it becomes 
particularly contentious and hard to represent. Moreover, with the emergence of political 
radicalism and working-class movements such as Chartism, calls for sympathetic feeling 
exist alongside populist concerns. The crowd in Mackay's popular history may be 
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delusional or "mad," but it serves as a powerful trope at the time - one that informs both 
feeling and literary and discursive forms. The crowd is embodied sympathy, a group of 
individuals linked by some common feeling, however fleeting. Indeed, such fellow 
feeling can provoke particular fears of unrest or insurrection that may impede or quell 
sympathy by those who do not share similarities (or in Hume an terms, resemble) those in 
the crowd. In this respect, the Frankenstein reference that Gaskell and other mid-
nineteenth century authors employ to describe the "uneducated" and increasingly hostile 
masses (of which John Barton is a part) is particularly apt: this "monstrous" assemblage 
is the object of both sympathy and fear, the latter being the typical reaction to displays of 
anger.9 Like other reactions to anger, sympathy with anger also produces antisocial 
responses: the very danger of such sympathy is that it can breed more anger. 
II. The Unsocial Passion, Social Order, and Legibility: Representing Anger 
Smith's angry man, like Frankenstein's monster, may be a difficult figure to 
sympathize with; yet despite anger being an "unsocial" passion, it is not impossible to 
have sympathy with anger. Smith explains that individuals are "averse to enter into 
[anger], and, til informed of its causes, to be disposed rather to take part against it" ( TMS 
I. i. I. 8). Not knowing the response to the question, "what has befallen you?," and thus, 
being unable to judge the propriety of the feeling or the situation from which the feeling 
arose, the spectator responds with fear or anger. Smith is not arguing that sympathy with 
anger cannot exist, nor is he cautioning against all forms of anger; indeed, the lack of 
"proper" indignation is, for Smith, a defect in character, 10 since it renders a individual 
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"incapable of protecting either himself or his friends from insult and injustice" (TMS VI. 
Iii. 16). Despite its categorization as "unsocial," anger has, in Smith's discussion, a 
discernible social function as an asse1iion of a perceived wrong or injustice, and it is not 
the actual emotion that elicits sympathy, but the situation or context that one enters into 
as a spectator. Thus, the sympathizing subject must have a clear understanding (and 
certainty) of the situation that excites the feeling in the first place in order to judge that 
feeling accordingly. 
In this sense, anger must be contextualized and defined before one can have 
sympathy with this feeling: the situation that excites it must be articulated, and its object 
must be recognizable. Moreover, it must be expressed at a level relative to its object and 
the situation, and this Smithian requirement exists, alongside many similar historical 
treatments of anger, because as an unsocial passion, anger carries connotations of 
madness or disorder, or at the very least, a likely escalation of feeling and consequent 
action. For Smith, anger must be "humbled and bought down below that pitch to which it 
would naturally rise;" he attributes unmitigated expressions of anger to an "undisciplined 
nature" (TMS I. ii. III. 1), a charge that resounds in Carlyle's own critique of Chartist 
anger and the threat of physical force. Without mediation, explains Smith, the "hoarse, 
boisterous, and discordant" qualities of anger inspire antisocial reactions of aversion or 
fear (TMS I. ii. III. 5). 
This discussion of anger - that its qualities require feeling be mediated in order to 
be socially recognizable and valorized - has implications for how it is represented. For 
context (and the conditions necessary to incur sound judgment on its ethical and social 
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import), anger requires disclosure11 on the part of who is angered: one that articulates the 
cause of such a feeling in the first place. While these may be viewed as justifications or 
excuses for anger, Smith makes it clear that it is the role of the spectator to judge the 
propriety of these reasons, which although problematic (a point I will take up in Chapter 
Four), may be intended to disavow such disclosure to be a self-serving justification on the 
part of the angry subject. Like other reactions of anger, sympathy with anger also 
produces antisocial responses: like-minded discontent and the escalation of hostilities. 
Yet, as a reaction to injustice, anger, if judged by the spectator as so, can be sanctioned as 
appropriate, or even necessary. 
The ways that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century writers define and describe 
anger provide examples of this tenuous relationship between sociability and emotional 
expression. Definitive categories of the social and unsocial passions, like the distinctions 
between high and low culture, are characterized along the lines of social utility - that 
which stabilizes a coherent social body and that which undennines it. As a potential 
disturbance to prevailing order or authority, anger can be either an assertion or claim 
about oneself or a reaction to one's treatment at the hands of others. Thus, like sympathy, 
anger requires a "conception of oneself that enables one to judge another" (Sommers 31 ). 
While the "social passions" arise from a benevolent desire to contribute to or help 
society, "unsocial passions" such as anger instill what Fisher calls "the absolute priority 
of the self' (46). Despite its connotations, or indeed, pai1ly because of them, angry 
expressions assert the importance of the individual (which is why Smith deems them 
unsocial), but they also articulate an individual's place in, and reflections on, society. 
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Fisher explains that expressions of anger operate as reactions to an affront that threatens, 
however minutely, the project of sociability and interpersonal relations: for it is in "the 
everyday actions of noticing offenses, requiring apology, and making or receiving 
apology that a banal but conspicuous policing of the borders of self-worth takes place" 
(66). Anger expressed by the unified or collective assertions of a group can serve as an 
important social barometer of a particular period or event; it can exist as the interrogation 
of existing norms, as the demand for social (and perhaps political) apology or solutions, 
and as the validation of a collective identity or authority whose outrage is worthy of 
sympathy. 
Expressed collectively, anger adheres less to abstract notions of injustice and 
more as established resistance to, or assurances of, existing orders, norms or authority. 
Of the latter, Smith provides a notable exan1ple of anger's role in the regulation of power 
and existing relation: "Magnanimity, or a regard to maintain our own rank and dignity in 
society, is the only motive which can ennoble the expression of this disagreeable passion" 
. (TMS I. ii. III. 8). The maintenance of "rank and dignity" is not only just cause for anger 
in Smith's discussion; it has also been intrinsically linked to philosophical discourses 
about anger itself. Aristotle similarly discussed anger ( orge) as an impulse most often 
manifested towards inferiors or those close to us. Discussing the importance of 
controlling and defining anger in Graeco-Roman tradition, William V. Harris discusses 
the variant forms of anger, orge and thumos, respectively: orge, conceived of as wrath or 
an impulse, is tied to punishment and the "infliction of concrete penalties" by magistrates 
(62-63); thumos, is a sudden vehement passion, usually subsiding, and as "spiritedness," 
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it is a principal part of the human psyche and its capacity to feel (66). The former is 
deliberate, and largely the privilege of those in positions of authority, and Averill 
summarizes this impulse by explaining that one does not become angry at those we fear 
or respect (81). 
In her study of anger in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, Carol Z. Steams 
argues that anger in socially-powerful individuals was often tolerated as a prerogative, 
while anger (and its display) in those with little or no power has historically been 
perceived as a form of insanity, hence the double meaning of the word "mad" (49-53). 
The assumption behind Steams' discussion, one that historically has worked as a 
socially-determined means of regulating anger, is that marginalized individuals have little 
recourse to anger, since the conditions which inspired the emotion in the first place would 
never be changed. In this respect, it is significant that Steams fixes her historical scope to 
pre-Revolutionary contexts and prior to the emergence of the modern class system. While 
sociability requires consensus, and established and widely-accepted norms, anger raises 
objections to the existing structures of power by articulating grievances, a situation not 
readily available in classical and medieval contexts.12 Socially-recognizable and 
sanctioned anger must carry with it the possibility of the alleviation of said grievances, 
and thusly, the possibility of change in a social order that makes the amelioration of 
injustices and wrongs realistic in the first place - herein lies its importance in social and 
political activism and campaigns. As self-assertion, anger can be a response to an 
injustice or pain inflicted upon the individual, or a distinct group: as an articulated 
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reaction (and disclosure) of such infliction, it can defend, contest, and redefine authority 
and existing norms. 
In this relationship between anger and its legibility there exists the promise of or 
impetus for refom1, and in its extreme, revolution. The associationist principles of moral 
philosophy that are used to explain human nature and action continue into the nineteenth 
century, but they become imbricated within a larger project of reforn1 and the concerns 
over social cohesion. The work of Alexander Bain serves as a formidable example of 
mid-nineteenth-century approaches to feeling and the emerging field of psychology. 
Nineteenth-century psychology - itself intimately connected to philosophy with its 
concerns over ethics, epistemology, and aesthetics - also Jinks anger to power, either as 
an expression of its assurance or as a challenge to existing powers. Bain' s scholarly and 
professional background explicitly demonstrates his intellectual indebtedness to moral 
philosophy, psychology, education, social justice and reform. 13 
· As Daniel N. Robinson notes, Bain's singular contribution to the field was that he 
combined a materialistic (deterministic) perspective on psychological development with 
empirical facts of human psychology (xxiv). Hume's ambitious intellectual undertaking, 
to produce a "science of human nature," is reiterated similarly by Bain, who asserts that 
his two works, 1'1e Senses and Intellect (I 855) and The Emotions and the Will ( 1859), 
jointly comprise a "systematic exposition of the human mind," which served for more 
than thirty years as a standard guide for the discipline of modern psychology. This 
"systematic psychology," explains Robinson, develops an ethics from its epistemological 
base, whereby feelings provide credibility and legibility to abstract notion of aesthetics 
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and ethics, and from opposing forces of checks and balances between the intellect, the 
emotions, and the will (xxv, xxvii). In discussing Bain's philosophical legacy in 
particular, Robe11 H. Wozniak aptly notes that Bain combined associationist principles of 
philosophy with "an exhaustive taxonomic catalogue of the facts of everyday human 
experience and action" ( 48). For Bain, emotion entailed physiological movements, 
changes in the body and the nervous system that accompanied mental states, and the 
expression of emotion was a pivotal component of "the subjective experience of 
emotion" (Wozniak 50). 
Bain links anger to both pleasure and the pleasure of power, the latter being a 
pleasure that goes beyond simply the physical sense of empowerment (as the potential for 
violence or aggression), to the "consolation of the wounded feelings'' - in this case, the 
pleasure of relief or vindication - which Bain argues forms the empirical basis for a 
desired sense of agency (EW 167). In Bain's taxonomy, the experiential linkages between 
feeling and action provide a social vision that takes into account the influence of 
deterministic explanations for behaviour found in many sanitary and social studies of the 
period, and Bain examines expressions of feeling, and specific behaviours and practices, 
by their affect not only in the physiological body, but also in the social body. With this in 
mind, one could look at Bain' s philosophical and psychological interest in anger as part 
of mid-nineteenth-century discourses of feeling, and as part of a larger project of 
sociability and reform that tried to define the role of emotion in public and political life. 
If one considers that emotions gain meaning from varying social practices, and this 
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includes writing and reading, then one should not be surprised that Bain 's discussion of 
anger should include the topic of its representation in literature and the fine arts. 
Bain explains a1t as the "educated outburst of feelings'' that guides such 
expression into "appointed channels" and "takes the place of the wild and transient 
outburst of untutored nature" (EW 65). For Bain, a1tistic expression of emotion can 
provide the best means of organizing and mediating feelings and their expression, and he 
affirms "the varying modes of expressing the feelings constitute a principal class 
distinction" (EW 65). The designation of art as an "educated outburst" is purposeful, 
since it is a designation of culture as much as class. Language, explains Bain, and 
especially artistic language, is a much-lauded and refined form of expression: "instead of 
savage laughter and frantic gestures, the hero of cultivated society finds diffusive scope 
for his emotions in some lofty strain of poetry or music" (EW 14). Emotions manifested 
in art are "refined" - and by this Bain means both humbled and cultivated - through 
aesthetic skill; they exist as "remembered or anticipated emotion" (EW 38). By this 
extension, literature provides a means by which to reflect on and even indulge in 
antisocial impulses, and it provides a place in which to express them. Antisocial emotions 
make formidable artistic subjects; Bain notes, for instance, that "noble rage" is a lofty 
aesthetic sentiment and has a certain artistic quality (EW 180). Anger's intensity, 
explains Bain, makes it a theme for "energetic description" and motivation in tragic and 
comic modes of art (EW 182); as such, the representation of anger is particularly useful 
and even desirable. 
In discussing nineteenth-century discourses on feeling, Gesa Stedman envisions 
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Bain's compendium on the subject as being a major example of the "expression-and-
control" paradigm, which overlaps scientific and philosophical writings on emotion with 
"explicit calls for self-control and social order" ( 152). Distinctions based on feeling, and 
various expressions of feelings, provide a means of making social (classed) distinctions 
by way of emotional control. Stedman argues that nineteenth-century authors use this 
paradigm to create "a stable middle-class habitus": a distinctly middle-class set of values 
whose legibility is predicated on contrasts and class difference. As part of this middle-
class habitus, the "correct and authentic emotional behaviour" of the middle classes is 
contrasted with "aristocratic pride and lack of true feeling," and with excessive feeling 
associated with "lower class immorality and the dangers of the impassioned 
'mob'"(Stedman 123). 
Bain' s psychological and philosophical discussion of emotion relies on the 
regulation, rather than strict repression, of feeling, since a lack of feeling was., especially 
in social reform and condition-of-England texts, also problematic. In this respect, 
Stedman makes the point that the purpose of Bain's discussion of emotions was to "find a 
'place' for the emotions to operate safely" (164). Bain's psychology, among other 
writings on feeling in the mid-nineteenth century, attempted, in finding this safe place, to 
instill a moral framework for feeling that also considered the consequences of excessive 
or strong negative feelings. In the case of Victorian melodrama and sensation fiction, 
Stedman argues that such emotional excesses are controlled and "conventionalized" in a 
way that is more pleasing than threatening: through highly stylized literary conventions 
and an athmed reading public who understood these fictions to be entertainment (73). 
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In Bain's "systematic psychology," the goal of achieving equilibrium between 
objects of the mind and the actions they inspire includes the physiological body. 14 Bodily 
movements, or "posh1res," can control the expression of feeling and the feeling itself, but 
so can social factors such as habit and education. Through habit and "moral discipline," 
argues Bain, an overly emotional person can be trained to rely on other parts of the mind 
such as intellect and volition. Bain discusses education as one of the few "artificial 
barriers" that can "check and repress the bodily manifestations of feeling, especially 
those of a violent nature" (EW 6). In this respect, Bain's treatise shares similarities with 
other treatises on education and feeling in the early- and mid-nineteenth century, such as 
Charles Bray's The Education of the Feelings (1838), which will be discussed in Chapter 
Three. While "violent" emotion certainly has consequences for the social body, it also 
holds implications for the physical body, and this forms the basis for Bain's classification 
of emotion as calm or "tranquil" and violent: tranquil emotion does not dish1rb the 
physical system of the body, and consequently, it has little impact on the will (EW 8). 
The way that Bain categorizes anger and its antitheses sheds light on the legibility 
that Bain ascribes to anger and its expression within social relations, and helps one to 
understand how Bain finds a place for violent emotion to operate safely. Art, as an 
"educated outburst of feeling," allows for the safe expression of violent feelings; like 
education, it can modify expressions of emotion. Emotions such as anger are exemplary 
objects of artistic quality, due to their particular intensity and prominence in gesture or 
form. An angry outburst expressed in art enables the reader or spectator to engage with 
their own reactions to the mediated display (EW 257). Bain also identifies anger as an 
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irascible emotion and likely borrows this means of classification from historical works on 
the passions, notably St. Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologice ( 1265-74), which 
categorizes anger in terms of the concupiscible (directly related to impulse and 
propensity) and the irascible, which is the result of conflicting demands placed upon the 
individual by society (experienced as the result of competition or defensive reactions). 
As in Hume and Smith's epistemology, Bain's concept of the self, then, is 
something distinct from (and even in conflict with) society, and is requisite for 
interpersonal feeling, which is why Bain also discusses emotions of the self as part of his 
categorization. For Bain, the regard of the self is, above all, introspective; it considers 
that "feelings and operations of the mind [are] something to be controlled or to be 
studied" (EW 125). Preferring to use the term self-love, Bain admits that, pejoratively, 
this regard is referred to as selfishness, 15 but he affirms the role of sympathy as the means 
to keep these emotions of the self under control: it is "our susceptibility to become 
fascinated and sympathizing with our fellows, and with things out of self, that constitutes 
the check or counterpoise to excessive" feelings of the self (EW 143 ). 
Yet, if individuals admire themselves, and seek the admiration of others, they also 
want to be feared, and Bain' s discussion of emotions of power is necessary to a larger 
discussion of strong or violent feelings such as anger, hostility or resentment. For Bain, 
this sense of power comes from "the effects or consequences of our own agency" and a 
corresponding sense of superiority towards others (EW 151). This power, however, is not 
physical; Bain uses the example of manual labour and acknowledges that while there is 
an "elation of conquest" in the completion of a difficult manual task, this is not an 
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emotion of power (EW 150). Instead, the sense of power comes from an assessment of 
one's place (and superiority) in the social world and in relation to others: "There is a 
great pleasure in bending the wills of other men by force, authority, terror, or persuasion" 
(EW J 55). The pleasure of power comes through assessment and comparison: "We 
measure ourselves by another person whom we utterly subdue and prostrate, and feel 
elated by the degree that our agency passes his" (EW 155). In this respect, the onus on 
control in Stedman's "expression-and-control" paradigm is apt, but unlike Stedman, I do 
not think that it is the sole means of forming a nineteenth-century middle-class habitus. 
Bain' s discussion of the self and power certainly informs his social vision as one that is 
distinctly classed (and as such, potentially hostile), but the idea of control has always 
been a part of discourses of strong and excessive feelings, and part of a discussion on 
how feelings are represented in art and literature, both before and after the nineteenth 
century. Bain's assertion that language "civilizes" emotional expression (EW 14) 
implicitly affirms the role of speech (and communicative acts of speaking, writing and 
reading) and thus, the social and political role of literature. 
III. Literature, Narrative, and the Representation of Feeling: Art and Emotion 
For Bain, art is cultivated (or mediated) expression, and this becomes particularly 
pertinent in discussions of strong or violent feelings such as anger. If one considers 
literature in particular as a place in which such feelings can operate safely, then literahtre 
(and narrative) become pertinent to the social legibility of emotions, as a way to 
"humble" anger (to use Smith's analogy) to more socially-acceptable levels. If the 
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"unsocial passions" such as anger require mediation in order to gain sympathy from 
others, literary texts can provide a means of mediating emotion. Smith's example of the 
angry man, which prompts him to address the limits to and sanctions of anger in regards 
to sociability, also illustrates another similarity between sympathy and anger: not only do 
both sympathy and anger require a conception of self, as I have discussed previously, but 
they also require a narrative (or some other form of disclosure) in order to be socially 
legible and appropriate, and as such, worthy of sympathy. They require an answer to 
Smith's framing question, "what has befallen you?" 
Hume also understood the force of feeling in literature, and his Treatise employs 
examples from multiple literary texts and a discussion of literary conventions. For 
instance, for tragedy to be tragic - that is, to be suitably grand and to inspire readers to 
reflect on the circumstances or respond to pathos - the spectator (or reader) must 
sympathize with the literary hero and his or her changes in fortune (Treatise II. ii. VII. 2). 
Griswold, in considering the ethical model of sympathy in Smith's work on the moral 
sentiments, explains that "access" to the world and the daily experiences of another -
whether story world or actual world - requires, foremost, imagination. Sympathy is, as 
Griswold puts it, "bound to fall short," since one is not immediately transported to the 
exact same physical state: 
To paraphrase Smith, we do not grow hung1y simply by imagining the 
situation of a hungry person; we may, however, become terrified when we 
bring home to ourselves someone else's tenifying situation. The 
sympathetic imagination is not solely representational or reproductive. It is 
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also narrative, always seeking to flow into and fill up another situation and 
to draw things together in to a coherent story, thus bringing the spectator 
out of himself and onto a larger stage. ( l 16) 
To understand sympathy-as-narrative, Griswold argues, explains Smith's recurring use of 
litera1y references, which are more numerous than his philosophical allusions, since 
literature has the potential to "exemplify something of the essential nature of the 
sympathetic understanding or imagination that is at the heart of sociability as well as of 
moral evaluation" (116). Literature's import in matters of moral philosophy is that it can 
demonstrate the sympathetic understanding that is necessa1y to both sociability and moral 
judgment. Sympathy, as either a psychological process for the creation of ideas or beliefs, 
as in Hume's philosophy, or a process of imaginative communication and social 
evaluation, as in Smith's treatise, can determine how the reader responds to a text and 
how he or she views the world outside of the story or narrative. 
Like Griswold, Dabney Townsend considers Hume's conception of sympathy as 
it is represented in literature: to be the medium through which to resolve the 
epistemological uncertainty between self-interest and benevolence. This tension between 
these two opposing doctrines is temporarily suspended, since sympathy in literature 
provides a means for ideas and impressions to be shared in a way that does not depend on 
whether the exchange is guided by egoism or benevolence. In this respect, Townsend 
posits Hume's aesthetic theory, from essays such as "Of the Standard of Taste" or "'Of 
Tragedy," as the means ofresolving the epistemological inconsistencies in Hume's 
Treatise. Sympathy varies depending on the relationships and resemblances to and with 
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sympathizing subject and object, yet sympathy with fictional characters (or fictional 
situations) cannot happen through relation, since in fiction "no real relation is possible"; 
rather, it requires resemblance, an antecedent in the actual world (Townsend 100). For 
Townsend, sympathy from fiction (or for fictional characters) requires, then, an element 
of realism; despite the fears sun-ounding fiction in the early and mid-eighteenth century, 
Townsend does not use the term, realism, specifically. Even though it ignores how 
abstract or non-representational works of art can still move individuals emotionally, 
Townsend's point does provide a compelling link between sympathy (as a 
communicative exchange) and 1itera1y forms and modes. 
This dissertation examines condition-of-England writing, a wide range of texts 
that vary in terms of their ideologies and formal conventions, yet all make appeals to 
feeling (and shared feeling) from readers by way of describing the conditions in the 
world. In order to use sympathy as a moral and communicative force, these texts must 
remind their readers of the actual world, however they choose to represent it in their 
narratives. Rae Greiner uses the term "sympathy" as a "special ability" that enables one 
to identify with others through feeling; for Greiner, this ability is linked to narrative 
strategies such as omniscient narration, and free indirect discourse - narrative techniques 
common to English realist writers (291-92). Smith's treatise, argues Greiner, "provides 
its nineteenth-century realist inheritors a compelling paradigm for sympathy production 
through narrative"; rather than emphasizing the visual or spectatorial account of 
sympathy, Greiner views Smithian sympathy as an "intellectual and imaginative power" 
that takes a "self-consciously naffative form" (293-94). 
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Indeed, sympathy is both a process of interpersonal communication and an 
imaginative capacity that mid-nineteenth-century authors use to bridge divisions between 
the "Two Nations" in an effort to mitigate hostilities between groups. To diagnose the 
conditions of England and suggest, even demand, amelioration is tied to a realist impulse: 
both are reactions against the existing misrepresentations or falsities, a particular stance 
or perspective, and ostensibly, a corrective vision. The imperative to exhibit the ordinary 
over the dramatic, and to dramatize the ordinary, requires a mediated control of feeling, 
and in most cases, a kind of moral and aesthetic standard and awareness - it is both an 
imaginative and intellectual activity and social critique. Since narrative "must begin from 
- the act of taking up a position in the world," explains Fisher, it has "inevitable and 
unbreakable links" to feeling (251 ). 
This imperative of sympathy and realism in the nineteenth century culminates, 
most notably, in the moral realism of George Eliot. As the narrator in Middlemarch 
(1871-1872) suggests, "[t]here is no general doctrine which is not capable of eating out 
our morality if unchecked by the deep-seated habit of direct fellow-feeling with 
individual fellow-men" ( 481 ). Like Bain 's discussion of emotion and equilibrium, 
sympathy can keep both self-interest (or self-regard) and hostilities in check, and Eliot 
tasks the realist novel with such a responsibility. The aesthetic rendering of feeling is not 
static representation; by way of the imaginative capacity of sympathy, it can inspire 
feelings based on those representations. Whereas anger in reality (and in real proximity) 
may produce certain negative reactions - fear, aversion, resentment - literary 
representations of anger may provide possibilities for contemplation or examination. 16 
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In attempting to explain how and why negative emotions are represented in art, 
Jerrold Levinson argues that art that expresses negative emotions - "that is, art that 
represents, expresses, or otherwise deals with emotions such as shame, grief, horror, 
sorrow, anger, remorse, and despair" - has a ''propensity to elicit parallel responses" in 
its audience (29). Levinson puts foiward some explanations as to why, in the case of 
fiction, readers would be drawn to this reaction; like Hume, he points to the example of 
tragedy as a literary form that requires negative emotions, and produces "parallel 
responses" from readers, and yet is held in high regard. People, explains Levinson, 
"rationally desire or value the emphatic experience of negatively emotional art," since its 
rewards outweigh any momentary discomfort of these negative or violent feelings. 
Negative emotion aroused by negatively emotional art becomes, for Levinson, part of a 
comprehensive (and moral) view, "a total experience, an organic whole;" in short, it is 
part of a realistic emotional experience that bridges the world of the text with the actual 
world, and one that can provide a kind of contemplative perspective on this experience 
(29-30). Literary representations of anger, then, can be ru1 exercise of socializing unsocial 
passions. 
The mid-nineteenth century was a period of highly-recognizable social 
fragmentation, from which contesting ideologies and assertions of power emerge; this has 
an impact on the way that feelings were represented and granted social utility. In 
representing the condition of England and in offering vaiying corrective visions, many 
mid-nineteenth-century authors attempted to find ways of fostering collectivity by 
articulating the affinities and hostilities that bind people together. Though differing in 
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political and social visions, and in the class interests that they may serve, condition-of-
England texts depend on the restoration of feeling between those who may, by way of 
associationist principles, not resemble each other, while also providing examples of how 
feeling, as the distinct property of groups or interests, may breed more hostilities. In 
representing mid-nineteenth century urban life, with all its prosperities and miseries, 
these texts usually start with the major premise that sympathy no longer exists in the 
socially and economically demarcated urban space. 
IV. The Historical Grounds of Class Experience: Understanding Class Discontent 
and the Condition of England 
The object of scrutiny in the Condition-of-England Question seems, at first 
glance, quite general - the overall well-being of the nation, a place encompassing more 
th&n 130, 000 square kilometers, and, according to an 1841 census, a population just 
under 16 million. 17 Yet as a distinct discourse, and a distinct concern, of the mid-
nineteenth century, the condition of England encompasses varying inquiries and 
commentaries: a simultaneous general critique and documentation of the present system 
alongside the specific portrayal of daily, labouring life. The cellar dwellings and posh 
interiors of Manchester's poor and rich, respectively, in Gaskell's Mmy Barton, the 
London sweatshop in Kingsley's Alton Locke, the smokestacks of Coketown factories in 
Dickens' Hard Times - all provide a conm1entary on the material state of a particularized 
locale, but they also instigate an exploration of the spiritual and moral state of England in 
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general. Like discussions of feeling, the Condition-of-England Question deals with a 
heuristic of contrasts: not solely the contrast between rich and poor, a central tension, but 
also between vying cultural spaces that provide the symbolic and literal ground for 
contesting experiences of class in the current system. Cultural spaces - such as that of the 
factory or urban slum - drive the philosophical inquiry of feeling and the moral urgency 
of condition-of-England discourses. 
In much mid-nineteenth-century writing, the factory and the city are the two 
interconnected symbols of progress - and, for many, the reasons behind the deteriorating 
relationships between individuals, labourers and employers, and families. For Carlyle, 
and for others, the development of the factory system meant that traditional bonds of 
sympathy, loyalty, and benevolence were replaced by the "cash-nexus," artificial bonds 
of wages and labour (SW 199): "Our old modes of exertion are all discredited, and thrown 
aside. On every hand, the living artisan is driven from his workshop, to make room for a 
speedier, inanimate one. The shuttle drops from the fingers of the weaver, and falls into 
iron fingers that ply it faster" (SW 68-69). Carlyle's emphasis on wages and labour is one 
that stresses the interrelationship between new modes of production and collective 
behaviour, and this emphasis is one that endures in contemporary social history and 
Marxist scholarship. In discussing the pivotal differences between eighteenth-century and 
nineteenth-century working-class protests and populist movements, E. P. Thompson 
points out that in eighteenth-century England, workers were stirred to public action and 
outrage by rising prices, especially among daily essentials such as food; a century later, 
explains Thompson, "[ e ]conomic class-conflict in nineteenth-centu1y England found its 
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characteristic expression in the matter of wages," whereby the '"bread-nexus" gives rise to 
Carlyle's "cash nexus" ("Moral Economy" 79). The increasing mechanization of daily 
life implicit in Carlyle's observation could also explain, in a more practical than 
philosophical mien: the imperative to represent feeling as a potential antidote to this "Age 
of Machinery." 
Many writers and reformers of the period widen their object of critique beyond 
the factory to discuss the impact of massive urbanization; in the mid-nineteenth century, 
the city becomes viewed as the place where sympathy ends in both social and religious 
commentaries. Writing about fellow Unitarian minister Joseph Tuckerman, a well-known 
social reformer and advocate for Boston's poor, W. E. Channing explicitly links the lack 
of fellow-feeling, especially for the poor and marginalized, to the urban landscape: "This 
estrangement of men from men, of class from class, is one of the saddest features of a 
great city" (7-8). Gustave Dore and Blanchard Jerrold's London: A Pilgrimage (1872), 
although published decades later, typifies the moral imperative infonning the 
representation of the city as a place of two distinct nations with little knowledge of each 
other, the very impetus for writing about the condition of England. Through a series of 
180 illustrations, Dore vividly portrays the contrasts of the city: fashionable society at 
leisure in contrast with "work-a-day London" and various industrial work scenes and 
east-end slums. The freedom that the city provides in its delights and in its anonymity is, 
in Dore's illustrations, the privilege of class, and with its title, Don~'s Pilgrimage denotes 
an exploratory journey of moral significance. Writing about industrial Manchester in the 
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same decade that Channing writes about Boston, Friedrich Engels also describes the 
"Great Towns" of England as alienating impediments to feeling between individuals: 
The very turmoil of the streets has something repulsive, something against 
which human nature rebels. The hundreds of thousands of all classes and 
ranks crowding past each other, are they not all human beings with the 
same qualities and powers, and with the same interest in being happy? 
And have they not, in the end, to seek happiness in the same way, by the 
same means? And still they crowd by one another as though they had 
nothing in common, nothing to do with one another, and their only 
agreement is the tacit one, that each keep to his own side of the pavement, 
so as not to delay the opposing streams of the crowd, while it occurs to no 
man to honour another with so much as a glance. The bmtal indifference, 
the unfeeling isolation of each in his private interest, becomes the more 
repellent and offensive, the more these individuals are crowded together, 
within a limited space. (37) 
For Engels, the members of the urban throng are devoid of interest in the well-being of 
each other, and he, like Carlyle, dismisses the "rotting Blue Books" (I 0) that attempt 
mechanically to document the facts and figures of urbanization without the humanizing 
leaven of sympathy. In observing the slums and suburbs of Manchester, Engels points out 
that the very layout of the city impedes fraternization between people of different classes, 
except in the locality of strict labour such as the factory or workshop (57). Engels, like 
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Channing, views the city as a site of alienation and estrangement, whereby society exists 
as groups of individuals with their own interests. 
This pointed vision of the city may serve as a means to critique individualism or 
the philosophical doctrine of self-interest but it also serves, as Asa Briggs notes, to carve 
out class distinctions in the stratifications of the urban space (7). Raymond Williams 
argues that images of the city and country in English literature function as symbols for 
understanding the social and economic changes spurred by industrial capitalism. For 
Williams, the urban-rural divide - whereby the city is the alienating syn.1bol of modernity 
and the country a nostalgic place of harmony - is an oversimplified distinction that may 
well serve, like paternalistic discourses, to uphold the existing order, yet the divide (or 
contrast) is culturally and historically relevant as "one of the major forms in which we 
become conscious of a central part of our experience and of the crises of our society" 
(The City and the Count1y 289). Indeed, the factory and the city loom large in the 
Victorian imagination as literal and symbolic places of the disintegration of relations 
between classes, and as a means to discuss these "crises" or conditions of industrial 
capitalism. More positively, the factory, and factory work, function as the loci for new 
articulations of social identity and agency: as Perkin explains, the daily labour of the 
factory encouraged punctuality and hardiness, among other attributes, and it also 
provided the capacity for "comradeship and social action" among labourers ( 158). 
Emphasizing the collective feeling and behaviours of the populace in such spaces 
becomes vital to how mid-century writers and radicals discuss class. Class, as modern 
scholars understand it, is a collective identity and category that encompasses more than 
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simply economic status; it also includes strategic moral distinctions that explain 
particular socio-economic privileges. Thompson describes the rise of this new class 
structure as a "making," a process requiring a claim to agency rather than a static event 
(9). As part of this claim, another requisite is a new set of "vocabularies" and narratives 
discerning one's position and role in society (G. S. Jones 2). Feeling, and specifically 
how one conceptualizes feeling in the service of class-based distinctions, becomes 
integral to these vocabularies and narratives. To extend this point, I would like to focus 
briefly on how the articulation of discontent becomes a pivotal signifying practice for the 
wider enunciation of class experience and agency. 
There has been considerable discussion by social historians about the emergence 
of class consciousness in the nineteenth century, much of which has focused on issues of 
"social control" or hegemony. From Marx onwards, social historians often describe class 
developments through connotations of hostility or struggle. Perkin, for example, in 
providing a history of the origins of class, focuses on three "battles" (or grounds) for the 
dominance of one class over another: the control over the dominant morality and 
particularized (classed) virtues and ideals; the control of educational structures and public 
opinion; and the control over legislative power and influence (273). For Perkin, 
contestations on these grounds galvanized class demands and shaped class consciousness; 
class antagonisms developed not solely through income or its disparity, but through the 
push to entrench a "consensus image of [a] class in its relation to rival classes" (219). By 
extension then, violence and its threat were intrinsically linked to the institutionalization 
of class (Perkin 342). 
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The "social control" model could explain middle-class fears over working-class 
literacy and education, 18 as well as the various laws against political and labour 
combinations - two practices that breed "potential revolutionaries" (Perkin 293). Yet 
Gareth Stedman Jones raises the point that the social control model does not account for 
working-class movements and behaviours - the "more mundane material exigencies" of 
working-class daily life - as it exaggerates the likely affect of punitive measures of 
control ( 16). Moreover, this model, argues Jones, treats the "social" as something outside 
of or prior to language, and as such, does not take into account the linguistic context of 
class distinctions (7). The language of class, then, is not simply a verbalization or 
recounting of experience - of the factory or the urban slum - but rather, a "complex 
rhetoric of metaphorical association, casual inference and imaginative c:onstrnction" (G.S. 
Jones 12). Language shapes consciousness; it is not the medium through which 
consciousness or experience is manifested: 
Language disrnpts any simple notion of the detem1ination of 
consciousness by social beings because it is itself part of social being. We 
cannot therefore decode political language to reach a primal and material 
expression of interest since it is the discursive strncture ofpolitical 
language which conceives and defines interest in the first place. What we 
therefore do is study the production of interest, identification, grievance 
and aspiration within political languages themselves. (G.S. Jones 21 - 22) 
The constitution of class and class-based identities involves a spectrum of "culturally 
signifying practices," and metaphors of social control imply a "static metaphor of 
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equilibrium" that ignores the ways that labourers, artisans, and activists organized their 
leisure time and their everyday practices (G. S. Jones 8, 77 - 80). 19 
Jones, whose conceptualization of class informs his discussion of nineteenth-
century Chartism, asserts that the ideology of Chartism was not separate from the 
language it used to describe itself (94). Thus, for Chartists, it was not simply the 
experiential quality of class difference that could make its members and the general 
public believe that lack of political power was the cause of social inequalities, but the 
"particular linguistic ordering of experience," whereby the success of Chartism was its 
ability to persuade individuals to "interpret their distress or discontent within the terms of 
a political language" (96). I agree with Jones that representing Chartism as no more than 
a social movement - that is, focusing on "the movement's class character, social 
composition, or more simply the hunger and distress of which it was thought to be the 
manifestation"- ignores Chartism's political platform (93). Indeed, Carlyle's Char/ism, 
by emphasizing Chartist discontent, does just that, and a number of historians and literary 
scholars have cited texts by authors such as Carlyle, Kingsley, and Gaskell as 
representative examples of nineteenth-century authors who envision working-class 
radicalism as a manifestation of social symptoms or pathologies. Jones also makes the 
point that in focusing on anger or violence, social historians have deflected the politics of 
Chartisrn as an integral part of the movement (97). Chartist historiography, Jones argues, 
concentrated on emotional capabilities of Chartists, since the first Chartist historians were 
"embittered ex-Chartists" such as Gammage, Lovett, and Cooper. Moreover, historians 
characterized the rifts within the movement according to delineations of hostility -
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between the "constitutionally-minded artisans'' in London or Birmingham, who were 
followers of Lovett and other moral force Chartist leaders, and the northern and midland 
factory workers and weavers, the "hostile" and "quasi-insurrectionary," who were 
followers of O'Connor (G. S. Jones 97-98). 
My argument diverges from Jones' in the role that he eventually assigns to anger 
in the emergence of radical working-class consciousness. For Jones, the characterization 
of Chartism (and Chartists). in terms of discontent is strictly a means of downplaying the 
political ideals of the movement; discontent cannot be part of the political platfom1 since 
"[a] political movement is not simply a manifestation of distress and pain, its existence is 
distinguished by a shared conviction articulating a political solution to distress and a 
political diagnoses of its causes" (96). In this respect, feelings of discontentment or 
hostility exist, for Jones, separately from political ideology, and may even serve to 
obfuscate, rather than define, a political movement. Yet if the goal of a movement is to 
interpret this discontent within a political language, I would suggest that this political 
language requires an articulation of anger, since feeling is not separate from the 
expression of political ideals and ideology. 
In attempting to create a unified language to reinforce their own class distinctions 
- between employer and labourer, but more importantly, between the politically 
enfranchised and disenfranchised - Chartists developed their own ··vocabula1y of 
grievance" from the Jacobin radicalism of the 1790s (G. S. Jones 102). This vocabulary 
becomes integral as a rhetorical force for strategic political demands (such as political 
representation) and social legibility. Cha11ists were well aware that their political 
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platform required them to respond to, and anticipate, the charges of hostility and 
violence, and because of this, Chartists had to conceptualize and justif:y negative feeling 
as part of their political platform, and in a way that enabled them to demonstrate that 
such feeling was a vital part of political consensus, and more specifically, of class-based 
approbation and criticism. 
In a period of mass industrialization and urbanization, and in the 
acknowledgement of great disparities between rich and poor, one could. assume that it 
was difficult not to feel sympathetic to the plights and miseries of the labouring poor, but 
as MacKay's weeping figure attests, such sympathy may not necessarily be productive. 
Working-class radicalism, such as Chartism, and a distinctly working-class literature and 
culture, used feeling and its expression to define their own narratives and vocabularies of 
class experience - including an articulation of negative feelings such as anger or hostility. 
Connecting emotions and politics is not unique to this period; seventeenth and 
eighteenth-century philosophers discuss human passions and sentiments as part of their 
political philosophy. Yet the social imperatives of the mid-nineteenth century, and the 
calls for political representation, meant that feeling, especially strong feeling, could 
ostensibly motivate political action. For many, Chartism was not something to be feared 
or controlled; instead, it provided a new means of articulating hostilities and affinities 
between social groups as part of the condition of England. The chapter that follows 
discusses further the ways in which Chartists represented anger and assigned to it a social 
and political value, and the way that Chartist authors, such as Ernest Jones and Thomas 
Cooper, relied on anger as a rhetorical and moral force. Chapter Two will also discuss 
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Carlyle's Chartism (1839) and his contribution to the shaping of the Condition-of-
England Question. 
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Endnotes 
1 Malthusian reformers critiqued both the effectiveness and the humanitarian 
impulses behind charity. By the 1830s, these critiques culminated in the Poor ~aw 
Amendment Act (1834), passed by the Whig government. The new laws discouraged 
monetary aid and promoted, in its place, workhouses. 
2 See Melissa Shaub for a discussion of social control and sympathy. Various 
accounts of mid-nineteenth-century industrial fiction have discussed sympathy as a 
means of class-based control: see Sabin, Sanders, and Wilkes. 
3 
In discussing Victorian philanthropy and cross-class relations, Seth Koven posits 
"slumming," the fashionable act of touring East-end slums, as an act of freedom from 
middle-class social conventions and a foray into self-realization. See Slumming: Sexual 
and Social Politics in Victorian London (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2004). See also 
Cvetkovich, Jaffe, and Anderson. 
4 
Elias Canetti describes crowds as the modern forms of "eruptions," and this 
natural analogy has also been used to describe spontaneous emotional expression. See 
also James Averill, "Six Metaphors of Emotion," Metaphors in the HislOlJJ of 
Psychology. ed. Davis E. Leary (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994): 104-132. For a 
discussion of common analogies used to describe emotion in the nineteenth century, see 
Stedman, Chapter One. 
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5 Hume does maintain a certain distinction between the association of ideas and 
the association of impressions: "ideas are associated by resemblance, contiguity and 
causation; and impressions only by resemblance" (Treatise II. i. IV. 283). 
6 As an example of sympathy as an impediment, Hume provides a lengthy 
description of a situation whereby sympathizing with an individual equal in "birth and 
education" actually breeds contempt or unease. In this example the individual, of good 
family but "narrow circumstances," goes abroad so as to escape the sympathy of his 
social equals or blood relations (Treatise II. i. XI. 322-24). 
7 See "Compassion as a Virtue in Hume," Feminist Interpretations of Hume 
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 2000): 15-73. 
8 In "The Natural History of Gennan Life," published in the Westminster Review 
(July 1856), Eliot makes a distinction between a conventional sympathy (which motivates 
the numerous social and statistical studies of social problems at the time) and an ethical 
and social one, that like moral philosophy, resides in larger considerations of the moral 
sentiments: "Appeals founded on generalizations and statistics require a sympathy ready-
made, a moral sentiment already in activity; but a picture of human life such as a great 
ai1ist can give, surprises even the trivial and the selfish into that attention to what is apart 
from themselves, which may be called the raw material of moral sentiment" (51-56). 
9 In discussing the threat (or monstrosity) of the literate masses, and connecting it 
with the cultural capital of reading and literary production, Patrick Brantlinger provides a 
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more sustained discussion of the Frankenstein analogy as it pertains to condition-of-
England writers such as Gaskell and Carlyle. Brantlinger's discussion of Hobbes also 
provides an interesting bridge between eighteenth-century political philosophy and 
nineteenth-century politics. See Chapter Three, The Reading Lesson. 
10 More precisely, Smith qualifies this as "manly character," which opens up 
considerable discussion about the gendering of anger and its various fonns. There has 
been some attention given to the role of negative feeling in relation to gender. Susan 
Sprecher argues that negative feelings (such as anger) are most closely related to inequity 
for both men and women, and she discusses the differences between experiences of 
inequity for both~ see "The Relationship Between Inequity and Emotions in Close 
Relationships," Social Psychology Quarterly 49 (4): 308-21. See also Leslie R. Brody 
and Judith A. Hall, "Gender and Emotion in Context," Handbook of Emotions, 3rd ed. 
(New York: Guilford, 2010): 395-407. For an overview of these forms of inqui1y into 
emotional theory and gender studies, see Reiser, Chapter I. 
11 One could use also the term "confession" given that anger, as one of the deadly 
sins, is also present in religious sanctions or prohibitions, and thus, requires a similar 
mediation. My intentional use of disclosure aims to consider the term outside of strictly 
religious contexts, and as something that answers the question, "what has befallen you?" 
12 This may be a reason why studies of anger in social relationships have drawn 
considerable attention with the emergence of equity studies as an academic discipline, 
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and with increased examination of the practices of and approaches to social justice and 
activism. See Sprecher~ see also James T. Tedeschi and Mithcell S. Nesler, "Grievances: 
Development and Reactions," Aggression and Violence: .Social Jnteractionist 
Perspectives (Washington D.CAmerican Psychological Association, 1993): 13-45. 
13 Bain served for three years as assistant to the Professor of Moral Philosophy 
(1841-1844) at Marischal College, and would, until 1860, work as a lecturer taking a 
number of short-term appointments, including Assistant Secretary to the London 
Metropolitan Sanita1y Commission and then to the General Board of Health. In the 
1840s, Bain wrote a number of articles for the Westminster Review, Edinbw·gh Magazine, 
.Fraser's, Chambers's Journal, Papers for the People, and lectures for the Mechanics' 
Instih1te of Aberdeen. Many of his articles and lectures were written for a working-class 
and popular audience on topics including "Language," "Logic," "Human Mind, and 
"What is Philosophy?" He also wrote numerous textbooks on education and pedagogy, 
English grammar, and composition. Biographical information taken from Wozniak. 
14 Feeling, although distinct from physicality, depends on the "material 
organization" of the body and its surrounding environment (EW 3-4). Bain connects the 
experiential origins of feeling to the nervous system, which transmits signals from the 
mind to stimulate the corresponding muscles or organs (EW 5). 
15 Bain also makes the point that self-love can motivate individuals to look after 
those that resemble (in Humean terms) them: "As members of a family we may renounce 
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self, on to another, but assume it in a high degree towards strangers" (EW 126). 
Arguably, the analogy of the family can be extended to include social resemblances and 
affinities that form the basis of class identity and class interests. Indeed, this is often an 
underlying assumption in contemporary scholarship on nineteenth-century sympathy that 
discuss sympathy as spectatorial. 
16 
In this sense, my discussion of this aesthetic rendering of feeling evokes 
Aristotle's idea of catharsis, one that endures in much literary and psychological 
analyses. Aristotle uses the term in his discussion of tragedy and as a response to Plato's 
devaluing of mimesis. Cathars;s implies an intellectual endeavour and control over 
feeling. Such a notion has been used in psychoanalysis as part of the treatment for violent 
feelings such as anger. 
17 
The 1841 census came after the Population Act of 1840, which gave centralized 
authority to the Register General to conduct the census. As such, the census numbers 
include both England and Wales. Population data taken from the British government's 
Office for National Statistics. 
18 
See Brantlinger, The Reading Lesson. For a discussion of working-class literacy 
and labour activism that explores specifically gendered labour, such as drnssmaking, see 
Christine Bayles Kortsch, Dress Culture in Late Victorian Women 's Fiction: Literacy, 
Text;/es, and Act;v;sm (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009). 
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19 In this way, Stedman Jones' historical scholarship may well be indebted to 
Michel de Certeau's work in The Practice of Eve1yday L?fe, which theorizes how 
institutionalized disciplinary functions are deflected by anti-discipline practices rooted in 
daily, and individualized, life: the "'ways of operating' or doing things [that] no longer 
appear as merely the obscure background of social activity" (xi). 
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Chapter 2 
Discontent as the Condition of England: 
The Raging Philosopher and the Indignant Crowd 
The period between the 1830s and 1860s is marked by transitions, and calls for 
reform, in daily, institutional, and political life. With these changes comes the profound 
need to articulate how such transformations, for better or for worse, affected the character 
of English society. The Condition-of-England Question - a series of discussions that 
involve intense commentary on, and scrutiny of, present social and moral conditions, and 
on the state of relations between disparate groups and classed subjects -- is one that 
contains a nexus of competing and overlapping discourses. It evolves through post-
Enlightenment discourses of feeling, the political ideologies and interrogative 
methodologies of moral philosophy, Romantic idealism, political radicalism, and the 
cultural assumptions that guide literary production and consumption. W1ith Chartism and 
working-class radical movements, mid-nineteenth century culture and its public 
discourses - and this includes literary culture - were also shaped by variant demands for 
political representation from a movement that argued political exclusion to be the cause 
of current social and economic disparities. These demands became a potent symbol of the 
age, prompting writers to discuss them through novels and the periodical presses. 
Working-class radicalism - movements organized around democratic or socialist 
principles that defined their purpose through the a1ticulation of working-class ideals and 
identities - becomes subject to public scmtiny and praise. In condition-of-England 
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literature, and in public life, the working-class protagonist (or political leader) emerges as 
a figure through which representations of social identity and class re1ations can 
provisionally operate, insomuch as to document inequities and suggest solutions to 
current social ills. Using new terminologies to describe the state of English society, and 
one's position in society, and in attempting to represent (and explain) the rise of political 
radicalism, authors and journalists were also required to address working-class 
discontent. Anger - how to alleviate, avoid, utilize, and represent it - becomes a major 
preoccupation. 
The ethical imperative that drives writers to address social and political problen~s 
through the representation of feeling also impels them to confront their own antipathies 
and antisocial feelings through various interpretative frames of, and envisioned 
alternatives to, anger. Authors as diverse as Thomas Carlyle and Ernest Charles Jones 
express their sympathy with working-class suffering and class inequities. While they may 
differ in terms of political ideologies, both express and address anger in their texts and as 
part of their social critiques in the period following the passing of the Reform Act. By 
comparing Carlyle, Chartist periodicals, and Jones, this chapter explores the various 
literary and journalistic responses to Carlyle, whose influence helped shape the tone of, 
and the very phrase, the Condition-of-England Question. By the 1840s, Carlyle held the 
distinction of having novels dedicated to him and characters speaking his words, yet his 
articulation of the Condition-of-England Question, while certainly forceful and 
influential, was not necessarily unique. Rather, it was a passionately articulated synthesis 
of many forces within Victorian culture that make claims on the condition of England -
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the discourse of political economy to describe social and class relations, working-class 
radicalism, and the increasing role of fiction and journalism in activism and reform. 
The assertion that discontent comes from the current political and economic 
system becomes the moral imperative of condition-of-England writings, both by Chartists 
and their opponents. The increasingly political role that discontent plays in the public 
arena of politics, journalism, and literature compels authors such as Carlyle and Jones to 
envision more productive means of discussing emotional expression and social change: 
despite their opposing views, both authors must negotiate a place for the expression of 
anger and its implications. In Chartism ( 1839), Carlyle discusses the movement as a 
"delusion" or sickness (SW 182-83), a rhetorical description that both dehumanizes and 
pathologizes working-class expression as much as it corresponds to Victorian concerns 
around the expression of strong feeling. Yet Carlyle's own choleric tone instills urgency 
in his message on the state of feeling in England, and in this respect, Carlyle, as the 
Jeremiah figure assessing and railing against the discontented "spirit of the age," 
expresses anger in deliberate ways. 
Carlyle's style, and the rhetoric he uses to articulate his anger at the Chartist 
movement and Chartists themselves, inform his identity as prophetic commentator on the 
condition of England. It seems fitting, then, that Carlyle asks the question, "Why are the 
Working Classes discontented?" (SW 156), since the very fact (and threat) of 
discontentment also provoke Carlyle's angry attempts to answer his framing question. 
His oppositional feelings of sympathy and anger towards the labouring poor and 
working-class radicals, respectively, become mediated through his intellectual (and 
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ostensibly autonomous) position as author. For Carlyle, radicalism and class discontent 
are understandable, but given the enervated spiritual mindset of England, he argues, they 
are ultimately destructive. 
Like Carlyle, Chartist writers, among them Jones, also use anger strategically, and 
this chapter argues that anger and indignation become an intrinsic part of what social 
historian E. P. Thompson calls "the moral economy" of working-class radicals: a means 
of community building and political campaigning around shared ideals and shared 
expressions of feeling. 1 Within this "moral economy," feelings, particularly those 
associated with anger or indignation, become integral to the constitution of political 
identity, as much as they become the means of describing current social relations and 
political injustices. Chartism requires, and produces, sanctioned examples of anger. It 
also requires its authors to discredit charges of angry revolution or angry disposition. Yet 
this is not solely as a means of social or disciplinary control, but as part of articulating 
shared feeling as social protest and community building. Like Carlyle, Chartists represent 
anger as a rhetorical means of organizing social commenta1y and framing alternatives to 
existing models of power. 
As early as the mid-l 820s, radicals such as William Cobbett stated that the lack of 
feeling between "masters and men," the ve1y set of industrial relations that holds 
connotations of strnggle or hostility, was the principle reason for class conflict (Briggs 
6). The condition of England as one of feeling was a discourse not just of Carlyle's 
making, or for conservative (or middle-class) thinkers to make class-based arguments as 
to who should control their emotions, and how. This chapter argues that feeling and its 
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expression are vital to the formation of class-consciousness, identity, and agency. Within 
literature, they can be used to address and motivate a readership - linking the act of 
reading to a capacity or desire for future political or social action. 
The emotional reactions of individuals and groups have provoked mid-nineteenth-
century authors to make moral distinctions from class-based ideals through feeling and its 
expression. As many contemporary scholars have noted, these distinctions have been 
used to disparage or discipline groups of people according to class, race, and gender, as 
well as to service middle-class ideologies. Yet, feeling also becomes tht: means to discuss 
shared experiences and interests and envision political alternatives to the existing 
structures of power in the mid-nineteenth century. One of the basic requirements of 
feeling, as a means of articulating shared identities, is that it must be expressed and made 
legible. For political purposes, it must be expressed in a way that asserts a space in the 
public discourse, however big or small. John Plotz has noted, for instance, that the British 
public sphere in the first half of the century was a site of discursive and ideological 
conflicts that aimed to validate what could be considered public speech, performance, and 
sentiment ( 10). Chartism emerged as the mobilization of individuals around a nexus of 
issues - unstamped press agitation, factory legislation, New Poor Law repeal, unionism, 
and of course, the call for universal male suffrage. The imperative for unification was 
both politically expedient and necessary, and one that evolved beyond strictly class-based 
interests. 
In discussing the language of Chartism, Gareth Stedman Jones argues that the 
focus in Chartist writings was less on class distinctions and more on the language of 
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political exclusion (34), yet I would suggest that the concern over strong or negative 
feeling, and the collective expression of such feeling, become a means of consensus-
building that included political exclusion. Within Chartist discourses, discontent becomes 
a collective responsibility - "the duty of discontent," as the phrase taken from an 1853 
lecture by Thomas Cooper affirms. Indeed, the language of community that Chartists 
evoke through the representation of strong, negative feeling becomes vital for mobilizing 
people for collective political action. 
I. The Raging Philosopher: 
Carlyle and the Shaping of the Condition-of-England Question 
In the mid-nineteenth century, the widening material and ideological gulfs 
between the working classes and the middle and upper classes - between the toiling and 
untoiling, workers and masters, poor and rich - become a11iculated not solely in terms of 
geographical or spatial separation (the demarcated spaces of the city or the factory that 
perpetuate class inequities), but also in terms of a separation of feeling: whereby bonds of 
affection (or benevolence) from paternalistic structures become increasingly replaced by 
hostility among differing classes in an industrial system of production (Briggs 20). 
Similarly, Harold James Perkin discusses the modern class strncture as one of "horizontal 
solidarities" between members of the same class, as opposed to the hierarchical 
("vertical") relations of dependency and patronage (x). The economic dependency that 
paternalistic bonds fostered prevented hostilities: "Resentment had therefore to be 
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swallowed, or sublimated in religious dissent, or, when pressed beyond endurance, it 
exploded in outbursts of desperate violence" (Perkin 37). In pre-industrial England, 
argues Perkin, distinctions of rank produced little antipathy because they were viewed as 
either "accidental" or inevitable (25). These new solidarities, forged around class 
identities and also kinds of work (such as the factory) and specific skills, provided the 
impetus for "comradeship and social action," as well as the articulation of hostilities and 
newly unencumbered resentment (Perkin 158). 
It seems fitting, then, that Carlyle starts Chartism with the very object of inquiry 
and contention: "A feeling very generally exists that the condition and disposition of the 
Working Classes is a rather ominous matter at present; that something ought to be said, 
something ought to be done, in regard to it" (SW 151, emphasis added). The existence 
and "ominous" quality of this "general feeling" become the impetus for writing Chartism. 
For Carlyle to be able to exhibit and represent anger, while chiding Cha11ists for their 
own discontent, he must establish himself as the individual who "ought to" articulate 
such feelings and provide some respite from them. 
By highlighting this discussion as being primarily one of feeling, Carlyle makes 
certain assumptions. Firstly, that the condition of England, like the formation of class-
based ideals, depends not on material wants or needs, but rather, on the restoration of 
virtues within individuals and groups; herein lies Carlyle's attention to the disposition of 
the Chartists rather than their political demands. Secondly, this remedy can occur 
through an attention to feeling, a solution that lies outside of the means and power of 
current government and legislation; thus, it is a radical notion in itself. Historian 
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Gertmde Himmelfarb suggests that Carlyle's radicalism lies not in his message per se, 
but in his ability to use strong feeling to motivate his readers: 
Carlyle's radicalism consisted not in the answers he gave to the condition-
of-England question but in putting the question itself, and in putting it in 
such a form that it raised the most fundamental doubts about the 
legitimacy of the prevailing doctrines and class relations. Nothing is more 
banal than the idea that England, that any country, is divided into an upper 
and lower class, into rich and poor. What Carlyle did was raise the idea of 
class to a new level of consciousness by giving it a new moral urgency. 
(260) 
Himmelfarb's observation is apt, yet for other scholars, Carlyle's emotive tone was an 
object of critique. 
In his introduction to Carlyle's Selected Works, Alan Shelston attributes the 
"uneven" quality of Chartism to Carlyle's ambivalence: Carlyle's sympathy for the 
working classes and labouring poor is inadequately reconciled with his implied resolution 
to social and political problems through authoritarian means of governance ( 149). In less 
conciliatory terms, Patrick Brantlinger describes Carlyle's work as being "highly 
inflammatory," and Carlyle's solutions to radical dissent - universal education and 
emigration - as shortsighted and politically evasive (71, 81). Yet Carlyle's temper also 
incited criticism from his contemporaries and later nineteenth-century critics, a fact that 
is often overlooked in contemporary critiques and analyses of Chartism. Reflecting back 
on Carlyle and his influence in 1885, author and journalist Standish 0 'Grady argues that 
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while Carlyle's works may have produced a temporary "moral exaltation" on the part of 
the reader - a phrase that anticipates Himmelfarb's "moral urgency" - his "discordant 
and seemingly self-destrnctive utterances" make him a poor model for an influential 
political teacher or leader (517). Similar to the critiques of contemporary scholars, 
O'Grady's argument implies that Carlyle's work affords the reader a momentary, if not 
smug, sense of self-constitution as moral subject, rather than any sustajning political 
effect. Carlyle's commentaries on English culture and society are, according to O'Grady, 
for the benefit of Carlyle himself, and for his readership to feel as if they have 
contributed to social change from the passive act of reading rather than direct action. 
Carlyle's ambivalent sympathy towards working-class radicals (sympathy for 
their material conditions, anger at their politics) highlights a quintessentially Smithian 
paradigm: the prevailing contradictions between the disposition to be benevolent and the 
disposition to be self-interested. While he acknowledges sympathy as a socializing force, 
Smith must also take into account that sympathy is only as effective as the inclination to 
be social - that is, to be "bound together by agreeable bands of love and affection" (TMS 
I. ii. III. 1 ). These "bands" (or bonds) must be mutual and reciprocal, but just as 
"members of human society stand in need of each others assistance," they are "likewise 
exposed to mutual injuries" which, in tum, test such affinities in human nature (TMS I. ii. 
III. 1 ). Smith explains the inevitability of antisocial feelings and behaviours by arguing 
that hostilities, or "unsocial passions," generally arise from an "undisciplined nature," a 
flaw in the individual more so than a flaw in human nature (TMS I. ii. III. 1). Carlyle's 
description of Chartists adheres to this model. 
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Sympathetic to the plight of the labouring poor, and to the social and spiritual 
problems associated with industrial labour and production, Carlyle mounts, in Char/ism .. 
an impassioned call for more amicable feeling between groups or classes, and he 
reconciles his anger at Chartists' political demands by concentrating on their "nature" or 
temperament. Chartism is, for Carlyle, "bitter discontent grown fierce and mad, the 
wrong condition therefore or the wrong disposition, of the Working Classes of England" 
(SW 151 ). His reaction to class hostilities resonates as an ethical assessment of their 
sociability rather than an evaluation of political demands. Yet Carlyle's tone is vital to 
how he conceptualizes sociability, discontent and the act of authorship; it is his anger, 
rather than his sympathy, that enables Carlyle to constitute his own identity as author. 
Further, by envisioning the condition of England foremost as a moral (rather than 
material) condition, Carlyle enacts and revises the role of the moral philosopher 
concerned about the sociability and benevolence of the public. In doing so, he justifies his 
own use of anger at the same time as he degrades the anger of political radicals. Granted, 
Carlyle's harangues in Char/ism are hard to envision as political solutions, and my 
intention is not to affirm them as such. Carlyle's anger is also rhetorical.: as such, it is 
requisite to how he articulates and shapes the condition of England discussion. 
In the wake of the French Revolution and Romanticism Victorians display certain 
suspicions towards sentiment and sensibility; concerns over "emotional extravagance," 
disorderly feelings or "strange fits of passion," also pervade novels and philosophical 
treatises in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (Pinch 4). Carlyle's critique of 
Chartism and the general condition of England, however, seems to evoke~ just such 
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emotional excessiveness: he does not pity or weep; he rages. In Char/ism, Europe is 
likened to a "frenzied giant" who tramps "stormfully." On a smaller scale, Chartist 
radicals are characterized by their "ina11iculate cries as of a dumb creature in rage and 
pain," and the Irish labourers are "noisy" and "vehement" (SW 183; 189; 172). If Carlyle 
opposes anger, he certainly uses it as his impetus: in Chartism, anger exists as both a 
literal and figurative force. As Europe and England storms and stamps, so does Carlyle, 
and his personifications and hyperboles, while discrediting or avoiding the arguments of 
Chartism, become instances of the seemingly articulate language of anger as moral 
critique or outrage. As the raging philosopher, Carlyle likens Chartism, and more 
generally, materialism, to a sickness in the body politic. This analogy of the diseased 
body, as in Burke's writings against the French Revolution, is a trope oHen used by 
conservative thinkers fearful of populist revolution or insurrection.2 It is. important to 
note, however, that in Chartism this literal and figurative sickness extends to include 
dumbness and incoherence, and as such, articulates very specific concerns over 
expression, which is crncial to how Carlyle demarcates his anger from Chartist anger. 
Like Himmelfarb, Carlyle's own contemporaries praise his tone, contending that 
it, rather than his message, is the edifying force behind many of his early writings. In an 
1840 review of Char/ism, published in the British and Foreign Review, the author 
applauds Carlyle's forceful manner: 
But the power of painting, the vividness with which each separate element 
is worked up into the general picture, the brilliancy of colouring, and the 
force with which the whole view is made to strike the imagination, are 
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exactly such as we have been accustomed to admire in Mr. Carlyle's 
writings. We look upon this little book therefore, appearing at such a time 
as this, to be a very valuable one~ not because it gives us views or 
information which we were absolutely without before, but because it 
combines the whole subject into a living form, and graphically as well as 
forcibly places it before our eyes. ("Article I" 2) 
For the reviewer, Carlyle's style - the presentation of his argument - is not angry; 
instead, it is described through the actions of "painting" or "colouring,''' the creative act of 
the artist and author rather than the result of a faulty temperament or disposition. Like 
Carlyle, the reviewer describes Chartism as "the disordered state of the lower and 
working classes, the unjust situation in which the course of modern civilization has 
placed them, the bitter feelings ofresentment which this injustice calls forth" ( 4). The 
cause of these "bitter feelings" is two-fold: the general state (or disposition) of the 
working classes (a premise that equates anger with "disorder"), and the flagrant social 
injustices of present-day society. Of the latter, the reviewer purposely avoids attributing 
blame, citing, instead, "modern civilization" in general rather than the middle and upper 
classes who profit from these social injustices. 
Considering this further, Carlyle's concern with a faulty temper, with a disordered 
(and delusional) populace, implies an attempt to classify feeling (and social identity) by 
way of disorder and order, excess and restraint. Joel Faflak and Julia M. Wright argue 
that such a categorization of feeling becomes an indicative Victorian response to 
Romanticism; Victorian writers socialize and internalize potentially-destmctive feeling in 
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order to make legitimizing claims for literature and its potential to produce social change 
(9). In this context, Romanticism becomes identified with either alienated (apolitical) 
individualism, or an excessive capacity for feeling. Ultimately, Faflak and Wright argue 
that these conceptions of the Romantic organize and situate the Victorian subject as being 
"properly feeling" (7). The urgency to which both Him.melfarb and the reviewer of the 
British and Foreign Review allude - what makes Carlyle's social vision so powerful -
implies a purposeful avoidance of anger; neither writer charges Carlyle, or his prose, with 
being angry. Carlyle's "forceful" tone, then, must originate as something other than the 
"wrong disposition" or wrong feeling. His mixture of vehemence and sympathy, of 
spiritual remedy and scathing critique, is instructive; Carlyle is the "man of feeling," 
whose refined sensibility (and ability) infom1s his social and moral vision. 3 
In treating the divide between the "Two Nations" as a failed process of 
interpretation - between the indifferent rich and the "inarticulate" poor (SW 155) - which 
in tum perpetuates this disorderly resentment, Carlyle stands as a mediatory and prophet 
who provides a diagnosis of current ills and offers spiritual solutions. Calling Chartism 
the "general madness of discontent" (SW 154), Carlyle also opposes the stoicism of 
statistical evidence, which ostensibly ignores or obscures this discontent: 'The labourer's 
feelings, his notion of being justly dealt with or unjustly; his wholesome composure, 
fmgality, prosperity in the one case, his acrid unrest, recklessness, gin-drinking, and 
gradual ruin in the other, - how shall figures of arithmetic represent all this?" (SW 159-
60). Despite his sustained dehumanization of Chartists, Carlyle attempts to draw a fuller 
picture of English labourers - the "wholesome" and the "acrid" - in order to demonstrate 
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the futility of using statistical data to represent social and economic re.lations. This 
impetus to "represent all" must include feeling, not simply calculations or numbers (SW 
160). In offering up a corrective vision, and in representing his own feeling as counter to 
such (short-sighted) statistical evidence, Carlyle - the vehement but wise forebearer of 
sage-writing in the Victorian period (Holloway 4) - evokes a demonstrable sanction for 
his expression of negative feeling. 
To describe Carlyle's anger as prophetic, as I view it to be, is to emphasize certain 
characteristics of both style and content in his early writings and to make certain 
assumptions about the constmction of his authorial identity. George P. Landow has noted 
that as a non-fictional literary mode, prophetic writing is characterized by its tone of 
castigation and by its intended purpose of both diagnosing the condition of an age and 
predicting its future (18). Usually, this diagnosis refers to the present condition as one 
caused by some erosion or neglect of "God's law," which unless rectified, promises 
further miseries or grievances (Landow 26). The "sharp rebukes" of the prophetic author 
(Landow 26) are part of the moral urgency that Himmelfarb and Carlyle s contemporaries 
praise in Carlyle's writings. The "attack upon the audience" that Landow notes in 
prophetic writing becomes the means by which the author asserts his "superiority" over 
(or at least, his separateness from) the audience (35) and, in Char/ism, from the objects of 
his scmtiny. Carlyle's invectives are directed towards political radicals, but also the more 
general readership of England. As prophetic author, Carlyle takes a position of 
"conscious opposition" in order to call attention to present ills and establish his ethos as 
keen moral thinker and competent wordsmith (Landow 51, 132). The "idealized version 
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of the author" that Landow argues prophetic writing affirms ( 162) can also present an 
idealized form of feelings that were heretofore clothed in pejorative connotations. 
Carlyle's anger leads to his verbosity and becomes anger-as-expression, providing moral 
credence as evidence of his elevated insight. 
Historically, this relationship has long been legitimized: classical writers have 
praised the rhetorical potential of anger. Anger-as-expression, often framed as righteous 
indignation, endures as a means of mediated artistic expression on the present condition 
of things; it is evoked as a powerful force in the satirical works of Juvenal (as indignatio), 
and in the writings of Aristotle and Cicero.4 Within Victorian contexts, Bain's systematic 
psychological study of the emotions implies a similar division between emotions 
portrayed in the arts, such as literature, and in the world. Bain' s "noble rage" is one of 
artistic merit, whose very energy becomes the motivating factor behind its expression 
(EW 180-82). The "irascible emotion" is of artistic interest because it enables consumers 
of such works - readers and critics alike - to engage with their own reactions to the 
emotions represented (EW 257). As such, it has the potential to clarify misunderstanding, 
and even perpetuate meaningful change. 
As a rhetorical mode, indignation is predicated on the assumption of authorial 
control and intention, which, ostensibly, separates it from anger as a destructive, 
disordered, or deluded form of expression. As indignation becomes framed on behalf of 
others, opposed to selfishly delusional anger, it becomes morally conceptualized as a 
selfless expression that addresses perceived wrongs. Thus, Carlyle's anger becomes 
evidence of a benevolent desire to address present crises, while Chartist anger becomes 
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the potentially violent result of both avaricious excess and material want. For Carlyle, 
"properly feeling" anger addresses and attempts to correct a perceived wrong, or at the 
very least, articulates this wrong in order for others to perceive it, while destructive anger 
attempts to inflict pain or punishment. Carlyle associates the latter with Chartism by 
severing Chartist anger from abstract conceptions of just.ice and self-assertion. For 
Carlyle, what separates the anger of the Chartists from his own is their inability to use it 
for socially productive (selfless) means. Despite their calls for justice, Chartists speak "a 
most loud and inarticulate language" (SW 180). For Carlyle, anger-as-expression, which 
is the anger of the prophet-author, differs from anger-as-disposition. By delineating 
Chartism, and political anger, by way of a faulty disposition, Carlyle grandly implies that 
Chartist readership or authorship cannot evoke anger-as-expression; thus, his comments 
speak as much to the literary capacities of classed subjects as to the nature of political 
radicalism i tse 1f.5 
In discussing the political and ethical implications of anger as indignation, 
Andrew Stauffer explains that this rhetorical demarcation constructs the emotion as one 
that is not personal - that is, not linked to personal (faulty) disposition or ideology. 
''Anger-that-is-not-mine" is purposeful, "a scapegoat emotion to be cast out in favour of a 
form of indignation or a wrath - even a vengefulness - that the author uses to perfom1 a 
certain kind of work (be it moral, political, or aesthetic)" ( 164). Stauffer asserts, 
however, that as French revolutionary and Napoleonic conflicts started to diminish, so 
did the need to address anger in the political and public sphere: "Choosing a path towards 
slow reform, England could afford to relax its attitude towards anger and its 
102 
Revolutionary associations" (164). Stauffer's work provides a pertinent connection 
between Romantic conceptions of, and Victorian reactions to, the epistemology of 
feeling, although Carlyle's own anger, as well as the hostile feelings that prompt writers 
to address the condition of England, demonstrate that Stauffer's assertion of a less 
troubled relationship with anger in post-Revolutionary contexts is short-lived. Indeed, 
the urgency that Carlyle's angry tone embodies stands as a decided contradiction to 
Stauffer's point Existing as a potentially corrective call for attention, anger is essential 
for the formation of collective identities based on class or political beliefs, and as such, 
remains pertinent to Victorian debates of political refom1 and representation. 
II. The Indignant Crowd: 
Chartism, "The People," and the Political Role of Indignation 
In September 1853, cotton workers in Preston, Lancashire asked for a ten percent 
wage increase and threatened to strike. Mill owners responded by imposing a general 
lock out so as to circumvent the "wages movement," a cooperative activist tactic that saw 
labouring workers in some operating mills supporting their fellow strikers (Carnall 32). 
The strike commenced and lasted until April of 1854. It was significant not solely 
because of its duration (seven months), or the amount of people who were out of work as 
a result (Carnall approximates the number to be more than 20,000), but for the large 
amount of public support and sympathy that it garnered. While mill owners attempted to 
bring in outside labourers and tried to have the strike leaders arrested, contributions for 
103 
the strikers came from other towns in Lancashire and from all over the count1y. 
Operatives raised £3,000 a week to assist strikers, and a benefit performance in London 
was organized to raise further funds (Dutton and King 2). From all over England, 
newspapers sent reporters to report on events and meetings; the strike leaders, George 
Cowell and Mortimer Grimshaw became political celebrities. The strike also had an 
influence on the industrial fiction of Charles Dickens and Elizabeth Gaskell - Hard 
Times (1854) and North and South (1855), respectively- and Dickens traveled to Preston 
to write about the strike for Household Words (11Febrnary1854). 6 
In a Daily News article, a journalist reports the annotmcement of the strike's 
resolution to a large group of labourers, and the controlled resolve of the workers is 
likened to an aesthetic moment: "There is something almost sublime in the spectacle of 
so many thousands of human beings, actuated more or less by angry feelings, waiting 
quietly while their cause was being decided" ("London, Wednesday, May 3" 4). If this 
moment is sublime, then it is a Burkean sublime, in which t11e awe of such strong feeling 
is always pointedly connected to a certain fear over the power of politically-motivated 
feeling. The scene is not beautiful, but tenuous, and it is this uncertainty that holds the 
journalist captive. Of aesthetic interest, then, is the potential for control or the lack of 
control - the angry crowd frozen in quiet apprehension may just as easily be, mere 
moments later, the angry mob stiffed to destrnctive action. This underlying woffy 
pervades much condition of England writing, as one sees in Carlyle's Chartism, and is 
one that should be considered in the context of an increasing (and increasingly 
politicized) readership. 
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Dickens' journalistic (and novelistic) interest in this labour dismption is 
significant, for it shows the increasing role that the periodical presses had in mid-
nineteenth century political culture, as well as the acknowledged role of the public in 
literary and social commentary. Kate Flint and Joseph Butwin make compelling 
arguments for how mid-nineteenth century novels address a public readership 
increasingly responsive to and familiar with journalism.7 It seems fitting, then, that in 
Signs of the Times, Carlyle makes the observation that "the trne Church of England, at the 
moment, lies in the Editors of its Newspapers" (SW 80) - his comment acknowledges the 
immense influence that periodicals (and periodical literature) have on public opinion. 
Butwin indicates that the wider relationship between journalism, literature, and reform is 
one intimately concerned with audience and readership: "The novel of social reform 
exists in continuum with journalism and defines its audience within the general public 
rather than among the community of 'ideal readers' of fiction whose response justifies 
most literary criticism" ( 167). 
Half a century earlier, Jacobin radicalism afforded writers and editors with a 
distinct "vocabulary of grievance" (G. S. Jones 102) and the pivotal rok of the radical 
presses was to "establish the right of an outraged people to redress" (Stauffer 1 ). In 
Chartist discourses and in radical newspapers of the mid-nineteenth century, the 
acknowledged readership, or "general public," becomes cmcial to the call for collective 
political action. For Chartists, the radical newspapers were tools for fighting against 
oppression, and in 1840, Fergus O'Connor boldly declared that the press could destroy 
parliament (Jones, "Chartist Journalism" 5), a comment that intentionally points to 
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conflicts between radical newspapers and governmental authority. The force that 
O'Connor ascribes to newspapers is one that exists through continued appeals and 
addresses to 'The People," as the collective and politically mobilized readership. By 
making such populist appeals, newspapers magnified the public discourse over feelings 
such as anger and provided the scope and tone for discussions of class relations. As such, 
they were an intrinsic part of the Condition-of-England Question. 
The designation of "the People" conventionally implies a collective or group of 
individuals, usually connected by a shared purpose or goal, and the latter quality is what 
makes the People a distinctly political formation. In 1818, William Hazlitt, the critic and 
essayist who, like Carlyle, comments on "the spirit of the age," defined the People as: 
''Millions of men, like you, with hearts beating in their bosoms, with thoughts stirring in 
their minds, with the blood circulating in their veins, with wants and appetites, and 
passions and anxious cares, and busy purposes and affections for others and a respect for 
themselves, and a desire of happiness and a right to freedom, and a will to be free" 
("What is the People?" 307). This description is significant since it directly addresses the 
presumed reader - "millions of men, like you" (emphasis added) - and describes the 
various motivations that bind people to a cause. Desires, convictions, and above all, 
feeling - "passions" and "affections" - are also, according to Hazlitt's description, linked 
to physiological states (of hearts beating and blood pumping), and all drive the 
overarching goal or purpose, which in Hazlitt's case is the cause of freedom. 
Hazlitt's works typify the relationship between literature and politics in the 
decades following the French Revolution, as well as the "dissent, the restlessness, and the 
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idealism of English and European Romanticism" (Mahoney, Romantics and Renegades 
1). As such, they provide a palpable link between post-Revolutionary contexts and 
revolutionary anxieties of the mid-nineteenth century. Given Hazlitt's philosophic roots 
in the eighteenth century, and his preoccupation with feelings and the imagination, it is 
tmderstandable that he validates emotional responses, particularly in art and political 
life.8 Feeling, in its expression and in its empirical origins, may be the common bridge 
between disparate groups of individuals. In "On Gusto" (1816), Hazlitt argues for the 
emotional strength of a work and suggests that passionate (and energetic) responses to an 
artwork are proof of its greatness (21-22). While largely discussing gusto in the visual 
arts, Hazlitt also provides literary examples: gusto is not a discursive power but an 
imaginative attachment to the subject and the words used to describe the subject (''On 
Gusto" 26-27). 
In The Logic of Passion, John L. Mahoney discusses the role of emotional "gusto" 
in Hazlitt's criticism in a way that links the possession and expression of stalwart feeling 
to humanity itself: "To rob a man of strong feeling, [Hazlitt] contended, is to rob him of 
all that transcends the immediate objects of experience and the artificial ways in which 
men deal with them and to reduce him to an automaton" (64). Hazlitt's "blustery and 
flamboyant" style and persona epitomizes this "gusto," explains Mahoney (Logic I). 
"Gusto" also creates a prominent link between literature and politics implicit in literaty 
addresses to "the People": emotions bind groups of people to a political cause - they are 
motivating forces for political commitment and engagement, and are integral to the 
formation of critical judgments. 
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In the period sunounding the reform acts - with its sustained focus on the 
enfranchisement of the populace - Chartists needed to conceptualize strong feelings such 
as anger or indignation en rnasse. Indeed, "the People" becomes, jn Chartist discourses, 
not only a distinct rallying cry, but also a designation around which political identity and 
commitment can be codified. For moral-force Chartists leaders such as William Lovett, 
the designation of "The People" is a purposeful distinction from "the masses" and from 
the pejorative connotations of populism and potential insurrection. Lovett makes an 
evaluative distinction between the "passions" and the "sentiments," a division that 
implies the reasoned and socializing quality of the latter. Those who ignore the "elevating 
sentiments" appeal, instead, to the "passions and prejudices of the multitude" (7). 
For physical-force leaders such as Fergus O'Connor, violence may be the only 
effective means of redress against an already physical-force government: military and 
police officials who stand against the efforts of "the People" ("O'Connor Upon Physical 
Force" 7). Physical-force Chartism is, for O'Connor, a necessity borne out of the miseries 
and oppression perpetuated by the current political system. Appealing to the "fustian 
jackets" of the north - factory workers - 0 'Connor cautions against alliances with the 
middle classes. The interests between masters and men, argues O'Connor, are at odds, 
and those in the service of existing powers, such as shopkeepers and overseers, serve only 
middle-class interests. Evoking the language of class solidarity, 0 'Connor calls the 
People "the legitimate source of all power" and rallies a decisive call: "No Union with 
the enemy; no surrender!" ("To the Fustian Jackets" 7). In the face of "legislative 
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oppression and tyranny," physical force is, according to O'Connor, righteous and 
honourable: 
You see, my view is that man is born with propensities which may be 
nourished into virtues, or thwarted into vices, according to the training; 
that persuasion is better than compulsion, that naturally, man loves virtue 
more than vice; but that artificially, he has been compelled to apply vice to 
vice to preserve even an existence upon earth. ("O'Connor Upon Physical 
Force" 7). 
By way of deft rhetorical displacements, physical force becomes re-conceptualized as 
virtue and necessity rather than a character defect. The right to assembly, the right to 
express discontent collectively, and the right to address wrongs through force become 
reified as "the best safeguards against oppression and misrule" ("O'Connor Upon 
Physical Force" 7). Although leaders such as Lovett and O'Connor may differ as to the 
means by which they would enforce political change, what is contiguous between them is 
the similar addresses to the collective: "the People" becomes a crowd organized by a 
distinct political purpose and moral imperative and, like in Hazlitt's designation, shared 
feeling. 
Making appeals to the People also holds threatening linkages with that of the 
crowd, or the mob, but my contention is that the crowd, the literal embodiment of the 
People, becomes a distinct force in Chartist discourses that affinns the discontent of the 
time. After the French Revolution, the crowd emerges as a significant trope for Victorian 
anxieties surrounding strong feeling and its expression as a modern "emption of power" 
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(Canetti 54-55). For Gustave Le Bon, the crowd provides a potent model for human 
psychology and an explanation of social behaviour.9 In the cultural imagination of the 
nineteenth century, the anxiety provoked by the crowd, and which pervades descriptions 
of the crowd, has been its threat to authority, and consequently, its claims for recognition 
in the public arena. Plotz makes the apt point that by the 1840s, Cha11ist meetings and 
demonstrations were often called crowds by those unwilling to grant such collective 
organization political status ( 1 ). The British public sphere from 1800 to 1850 was, argues 
Plotz, "the subject of a violent contest to determine what sources of discourses would 
count as central to public speech and performance" (10). As such, the literature of that 
period becomes intimately concerned with its public role, a fact made evident by the 
proliferation of condition-of-England novels (or "novels with a purposen) in that period. 
Chartist demonstrations, or crowds, become new fonns of public speech, and in this 
respect, Plotz interprets Carlyle's Chartism as·tacitly acknowledging this discursive 
competition in the public sphere (131, 137). 
As literal symbols of dissent, crowds amplify the object of scmtiny while 
expressing discontent with a current system of authority. In the history o:f labour activism 
and trade unionism, worker combinations emerged in the late eighteenth century as a 
potent means to coalesce around a shared identity - one informed by shared labour - and 
to air grievances and make negotiations with employers. Motivated by a collective belief 
or assertion, crowds, by virtue of their composition, embody a consensus between 
individuals, and as such, a legitimacy to express fellow-feeling. The right to articulate 
outrage or grievance becomes, argues E. P Thompson, part of the "moral economy" of 
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the poor (79). Thompson's observations on direct popular action can be applied to the 
Chartist crowd, spurred by political beliefs and like-minded feelings. Like Carlyle's 
anger in Char/ism, the indignation of the Chartist crowd has the specific rhetorical 
function of establishing credibility. Yet the expression of anger in distinctly political 
contexts is an act of defiance in the face of censure laws that forbid language which could 
incite hostility or be seditious; for many Chartists, this meant the subsequent threat of 
. . 10 impnsonment. 
Anger can also be symptomatic of a judgment that one has been unjustly 
wronged, and, in this respect, anger (often rhetorically, indignation) functions as a 
temporary means of adjusting social relations and obligations (A verill-1-01 ). Like 
Carlyle's prophetic anger, it can facilitate or express a unique position and insight that 
demands political and cultural attention. As a collective assertion, a declaration that a 
particular group or identity has been wronged, it is a highly politicized version of what 
Barbara Rosenwein has tem1ed an "emotional community," which exists in tandem with 
other communities in the polity. Rosenwein defines emotional communities as groups 
who "adhere to the same norms of emotional expression and value - or devalue - the 
same or related emotions" (2). Such groups of people, sharing some judgment or 
approbation, demonstrate the sociability of antipathies~ anger, and variously, indignation, 
assumed increasing political significance in the mid-nineteenth century when expressed 
collectively. 
The early and mid-nineteenth-century saw the flourishing of "indignation 
meetings," both in Victorian England and America, as types of collective assemblies and 
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emotional communities. Examining the role of indignation in American antebellum 
politics, Michael Woods describes the indignation meeting, quite rightly, as a "political 
ritual" that provided an opportunity for the ''communal cultivation and expression of 
indignation"; its aim was to assemble "like-minded" (and like-feeling) individuals 
together to discuss practical responses to political issues (v). Woods's historical research 
explores the public reaction to the May 1856 caning of Charles Sumner at the hands of 
South Carolina congressman Preston S. Brooks, which galvanized northern antagonism to 
the South and drew much support for the Republicans. The outrage expressed at 
indignation meetings, argues Wood, granted public outrage with what he calls "moral 
nobility" (vi). Woods's assertion is not unlike Bain's discussion of anger's ethical and 
aesthetic rendering in literature and the arts (EW 14, 57). 
In England, indignation meetings were often announced in periodicals such as the 
Poor Man 's Guardian or The Northern Star. They provided the opportunity for working 
classes to convene to discuss grievances, share ideas, and articulate responses or 
redresses. The goal of such meetings was not solely to express feeling, but also to discuss 
tangible political results; as organized events, they "ritualized the cultivation and 
expression of politically-relevant emotions, and they brought like-minded citizens 
together in a venue which facilitated the formulation of practical responses to all manner 
of 'public abuses'" (Woods 14). In both Britain and across the Atlantic, indignation 
meetings became part of the moral economies of the working classes, but also of 
reformist and political groups wanting to call attention to slavery (and abolition), political 
representation and exclusion, and systemic bmtality or oppression. 
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Indignation, like sympathy, is an integral part of "rhetoric of the marginalized" 
(Engbers 307) and takes on connotations in both working- and middle-class contexts of 
Christian, civic, and political duty. Repeated insult, explains one Nor/hem Siar editor, 
flushes the cheek with indignation and "produces a resolve" to correct injustice in the 
"Spirit of the People" ("The Spirit of the People" 4). Writing in 1816, the philologist, 
George Crabb (1778-1851) distinguished indignation from the baser emotions such as 
rage or wrath: indignation is motivated by the "atrocious conduct of others" and as such, 
it is aligned with "the temper of a Christian" (118). Moral indignation and anger can exist 
simultaneously, but the former was necessary to judgment: "it also fulfilled a unique role 
in assisting individuals in making moral evaluations. Unlike resentment, indignation 
responded to the moral aspect of a given situation, concerning itself with abstract 
judgments of right and wrong" (Woods 23). Nineteenth-century historians and 
politicians, explains Woods, viewed indignation as a "politically efficacious emotion," 
one best felt and expressed collectively (10). Making direct addresses to the political 
power of "popular" or ~'public" indignation enables writers to situate emotions into the 
realm of the politically possible. By articulating discontent publically and mobilizing 
around its expression, Victorian activism - variously abolition, suffrage, and labour and 
trade unionism - understood, in no small way, the public role of strong feeling. 
Consequently, the argument that existing powers should do so too, also persists: Jean-
Pierre Reed, for example, suggests that along with the sentiment of hope, moral outrage 
serves as a "revolutionary accelerator" in modern historical conflict (655). 
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In designating an organizational purpose to the crowd, Chartists can make appeals 
to the People - an idealized group or readership that stands as a legitimate alternative to 
the mob or riot. If one considers this attribution alongside Carlyle ,s version of Chartism, 
the People can also stand in competition with the solitary author or critic, the well-read 
"man of feeling." For Chartist radicals, the crowd, like periodicals, can give vent to 
grievance or disillusionment with the political and social system. Plotz argues for the 
crowd's political importance by ascribing a specific agency to its formation: despite any 
pejorative connotations, the crowd was "evidence of both a city's diversity and 
uniformity, of both public disorder and new sorts of claim-making" (2). 
Surprisingly, Chartist historians have paid little attention to the political practice 
of indignation meetings: P. W. Slosson mentions only in passing "the vast indignation 
meetings which met all over England to denounce the New Poor Law of 1834" (171). For 
Slosson, Chartism's effectiveness as an organized movement, and thus, the object of 
historical interest, was its ability to incorporate the political agenda of multiple working-
class movements. Slosson' s emphasis on collectivity ignores the role of feeling in the 
mobilization of individuals into groups. For John Garrard, public indignation meetings 
were merely "unnerving fom1[s]" of discontent, designed for intimidation rather than 
articulation (150). Yet Chartist indignation meetings, along with other forms of 
combination such as torchlight meetings or the Chartist petitions and marches, are 
symbolic acts - of literacy, as Brantlinger argues (The Reading Lesson 93), and as 
embodied political or social discontent. Crowds, their foimation and their representation, 
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are cultural signifying practices in the polity, in Chartism, and in working-class identity 
formation. 
If the crowd is important to Chartists as a potential locus of authority, then like 
the crowd, the readership - a sympathetic and informed collective - bE~comes vital to how 
Chartists conceptualize their political platform and identity. In litera1y culture, and as part 
of appeals to the People, the expression of feeling can make assurances of class-based 
merits that can mobilize individuals to a platform or course of action. As an organized 
movement (both regionally and nationally), Chartism develops alongside working-class 
literature of the period. Chartist poets such as Thomas Cooper, Ernest Charles Jones, and 
W. J. Linton employ both the rhetoric of Romantic radicalism - a declaration of 
individual rights and liberties - and its lyrical and conventional forms. Stauffer explains 
that the "democratization of anger" by the Romantics allowed writers to posit anger as a 
just reaction to the violation of personal rights ( 1-2), and it is from this political and 
intellectual tradition that Chartist literature emerges. 
Encouraging a recognizable literary culture becomes crucial to Chartists' 
expression of political ideals. Anne F. Janowitz emphasizes, for instance, that the 
political aim of Chartism, "full civic subjectivity through the objective demand for the 
franchise," is formulated through a distinct Chartist poetics (28). Yet from the 1830s to 
the middle of the century, Chartist and working-class literature in general undergoes a 
change in literary models or influences: from Romantic poetic discourse to prose forms, 
and specifically, the novelistic conventions of melodrama. In her discussion of working-
class literature, Martha Vicinus notes that the mid-l 840s to the mid-l 850s was the most 
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productive period for Chartist (and working-class) fiction as it developed from this poetic 
tradition. For Vicinus, the change to prose emerges out of a concern over the role of 
fiction in working-class life - whether it should be, like early Chartist literature, 
"exhortative and inspirational" so as to motivate individuals to political and labour 
activism, or whether it should provide for its readers "a soothing escape from this life or a 
foretaste of a better life" (95). Ultimately, explains Vicinus, the aim of Chartist fiction 
during this period is to spark political activity, and Chartist authors do so by combining 
"the idealism of poetry with the attractive plotting and characterization of fiction" (95). 
The onus on fiction also allows authors to consider the purposeful selection and 
representation of the literary protagonist. For Chartist and working-class writers, the 
working-class protagonist becomes part of the "obligation to portray their class" (Vicinus 
97), but also as a figure around which emergent discourses of class identity and class-
based feeling could be affirmed or contested. 
Similarly, Sally Ledger attributes this transfom1ation in Chartist literature to a 
newly emerging relationship between "populism and radicalism." The change, argues 
Ledger, demonstrates an acknowledgement of the popular presses and anticipates, as well 
as requires, an evolving mass readership (32). In suggesting that Chartist periodicals were 
consciously (and discursively) battling government and conservative opposition, and 
competing with popular periodicals that offered "salacious and titillating fare" (42), 
Ledger implies, like Plotz, that populist literary fonns are a means of "claim-making" in 
mid-nineteenth century politics and literary production. Increasingly directed towards a 
working-class readership, the conventions of melodrama provoke the exJploration of class 
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conflict and political and economic inequalities (Ledger 35). The melding of radical 
politics with popular fictional forms means a marked attention to affective experiences of 
reading, and the tacit acknowledgment that feelings motivate actions and exist, like the 
crowd, as a potentially potent political force. 
To be sure, industrial novels at the time attempt to imbue the implied audience 
with a sense of moral imperative or duty, which should, ostensibly, prompt some sort of 
ameliorative action. Hard Times, a novel inspired by Dickens's visit to Preston and his 
reportage on a strike delegates' meeting (and more implicitly, working-dass expression), 
is a well-noted example of such an appeal: the "Dear reader! It rests with you and me" 
(298) that starts the novel's concluding paragraph plays the same rhetorical role as 
appealing to "The People," a call for collective action. Yet what is specific to Chartist 
fiction is its ability to both express and attempt to inspire strong feelings such as anger or 
indignation. Anger and its ilk are not only represented in the story, but Chartist authors 
also insist that they be manifested in readers as well. Authors such as Thomas Cooper and 
Ernest Charles Jones admonish the political and economic authorities of the time, while 
also directing blame or some form of chastisement at readers. Such reprimands could, at 
the very least, cause readers to reexamine their own political allegiances and moral 
attitudes - in tum, inspiring them to participate in a movement aimed at alleviating both 
the grievances and miseries presented in the fictional world, and the world beyond the 
pages of the book or periodical. 
Published almost ten years prior to Hard Times, Thomas Cooper's short story, 
"Merrie England - No More!" ( 1845), contains a very similar direct address to the reader, 
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although differing, importantly, in tone. The story, written while Cooper was in Stafford 
Gaol and published in a collection entitled Old-Fashioned Stories, is set during 1842, a 
peak moment of Chartist political activity and labour strikes. It provides a brief sketch of 
a group of labourers who help a destitute father after his sixteen-year-old son is 
persuaded by a recrniter to join the army in exchange for money. The story contains 
many of the characteristic tropes found in Chartist narratives: the narration of poverty and 
misery; the railing against an unjust order (commonly, military and government officials 
as the agents of state oppression); a stark contrast between rich and poor; and moments of 
solidarity and sympathy between labourers. The story, modeled largely as a conversation 
among members of a small group of labourers, provides ample opportunity for the main 
points of the Chartist platform to be delivered predominately through oratory (the 
personalized voices of the characters) rather than the extradiegetic narrator. Particularly 
distinct, however, is Cooper's concluding paragraph, which, like Hard Times, uses this 
narrator to address the reader directly: 
There is no "tale" to finish about John or his lad, or Jem and his wife. They went 
on starving, - begging, - receiving threats of imprisonment, - tried the "Bastille" 
for a few weeks, - came out and had a little work, - starved again: and they are 
still going the same miserable round, like thousands in "merrie England." What are 
your thoughts, reader? (59) 
Cooper's stark refusal of narrative resolution is, according to Ian Haywood, the story's 
most radical and remarkable aspect, and Haywood connects this formal rejection of 
closure directly to Cooper's political outlook: "Having stressed the veracity of his story 
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('these conversations are real; they are no coinages') [Cooper] cannot impose a 
resolution while the struggle was still taking place." Thus, Haywood explains, "Cooper's 
achievement mirrored Chartism 's political goal, which aimed at undermining the 
dominant means of political representation" (The Literature of Struggle 9). 
Cooper's tone also affects how the information is presented to the reader, 
especially in contrast to Dickens' final paragraph. While the address to the reader in Hard 
Times ends with the potentially placating domestic image of the hearth, Cooper's 
admonition does the opposite: the narrator's calm but scathing tone - his presentation of 
the fates of his characters as an impersonal list and inevitable cycle - does not, and 
cannot, mollify his readers. It is not enough that readers are to sympathize with John, 
Jem, or their unnamed wives; sympathy (and feeling in general) are not enough if they do 
not motivate political action. Cooper's final address refuses to conjure any obfuscating, 
tidy conclusion. Instead, it relies on the measured expression of the narrator as a means to 
stir strong feeling in his readers. 
Like Cooper, Jones also shifted creative and political focus from poetry to prose, 
publishing in his short-lived periodical, Notes to the People ( 1851-52). Ledger cites Jones 
as the quintessential example of Chartist writers' turn to fiction and, specifically, populist 
melodrama. This transformation was politically astute, explains Ledger=, since melodrama 
is a "politically adaptable rather than a politically inflected genre," and as such, can serve 
as a formidable "aesthetic of protest" ( 49, 46). Yet Jones, as Ledger and others have 
pointed out, was ambivalent about populist appeals. In "Words to the Reader," the 
preface to his first volume of Notes to the People, Jones introduces his publication by 
119 
way of a collective address to the readership. He acknowledges that he is starting this 
periodical "at a time of peculiar political and social apathy" (iii), and as such, positions 
his newly-established publication as a deliberate reaction (and ostensible antidote) to 
such a lack of feeling. Jones provides a mandate for Notes: "They were started with a 
detem1ination not to pander to the sensuality of the public by meretricious writing - not 
to degrade the literature of democracy to the level of the street-walker':' (iii). In answer to 
the rejoinder that one must "sugar the pill" of instructional literature, Jones argues that 
democratic principles are too important to be "coupled with anything so impure" and 
asserts his belief in "the virtue and highmindedness of the people" (iii). Jones' address to 
his implied readers is telling in what it says about the public role of literature, his 
conceptions of the People, and finally, his means of representing working-class industrial 
suffering. 
Jones attempts to establish a purpose for populist fiction beyond mere 
entertainment, and his collective appeals to the People as an imagined group of readers, 
are meant to incite political action by pointing out the ostensible flaws of the populace. 
The public's desire to be moved by feelings should not be, argues Jones, sated by the 
consumption of melodrama or sensation fiction, but by the just pursuit of democracy, and 
more specifically, political representation. Jones' serialized fiction enables him to direct 
anger at this mass readership, admonishing readers for their apathy and for their 
preoccupation with the vulgar and trivial. In this respect, Jones avows that an elevated 
and deeply feeling readership, rather than an apathetic one, is essential in radical politics. 
Additionally, by equating populist literature with the "level of a streetwalker," Jones 
120 
renders the female body as the grounds of working-class suffering and 
disenfranchisement. This equation is demonstratively ambivalent: Jones may well be 
sympathetic to the double victimization of women - economic and sexual - in industrial 
capitalism, a point he makes clear in his compilation of short stories entitled Woman's 
Wrongs (1852), but the prostitute analogy is ultimately used as disparagement, to signify 
the commodification of literature and the compromise of "pure" ideals. 
Like Victorian melodrama, Woman's Wrongs contains stock characters: orphans, 
vulnerable single women, and villains. By employing familiar plots of crime (Newgate) 
fiction, as well as seduction plots, Jones exposes these conventions in order to "maximize 
their radical political affects" (Ledger 50-51 ). Their familiarity enables Jones to focus on 
the actions and motivations of his characters, rather than the plot. His refusal of 
conventional forms of closure is also, like Cooper's short story, politically efficient. 
Vicinus argues, for instance, that such closure requires that class antagonism and hostility 
be resolved or displaced from the demands of the plot (114). In Woman ''s Wrongs, the 
death, seduction, or imprisonment of Jones' protagonists become the likely consequences 
of political and social inequality and oppression. 
As in the "street-walker" analogy, Jones calls attention to the social and economic 
exploitation, particularly of women. In the Introduction to Woman's Wrongs this 
imperative includes Jones' anticipation ofreaders' reactions: "Ifl draw pictures at which 
you shudder -if I reveal that at which your heart revolts - I cannot help it - it is truth 
- such is the world that surrounds you - such is the world that made you - such is the 
world you help to make - go! Try to alter it, and BEGIN AT HOME" (2). For Jones, the 
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fate of his protagonists is harsh but necessarily instructive, and his fiction is aimed at 
rousing his predominantly working-class readership both by his subject matter -
subjugation and hardship - and his admonishments for the role of readers in maintaining 
the existing world and all its inequities. In Woma11 's Wrongs, anger motivates many of 
Jones' characters to action, whether good or bad; it is, ostensibly, what should also drive 
readers, as the People, to action. 
The presentation of each female protagonist, and her grim fate, is calculated and 
systematic: Jones' collection of stories includes women from all classes, from the poor to 
the "Lady of Title," and the title of each narrative defines the protagonist by her specific 
"work" or labour (Haywood, Chartist Fiction xxiii). The first story, 'The Working Man's 
Wife," ends with the· public execution of the protagonist, Margaret Haspen. From the 
onset of the story, which starts with Margaret in childbirth, her husband is sullen and 
angry (WW 3). The narrator maintains, however, that Haspen "was not by nature a bad 
man": "he was capable of a sudden generous impulse, though devoid of that gentleness 
and feeling which smoothes the intercourse of the home, and wins domestic sympathy" 
(WW 4). Although Haspen may not be a paragon of fatherly and conjugal feeling, his 
surliness and resentment stem from financial concerns rather than inner defect, as he is 
wary of having another mouth to feed. Upon finding out that the new addition to the 
Haspen family is a girl, his reaction typifies the inequality between the sexes from the 
very start of life: "'Curse it, a girl!' cried the husband, dashing his pipe to pieces in anger. 
'A girl!' moaned the sufferer, 'all that pain, and then to have a girl!' Such is the child-bed 
of the poor- so the poor man's child was born: a curse and a sigh welcomed it into life" 
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(WW 4). Any hope of "domestic sympathy" between the Ha.spens is further dissolved 
when Haspen's employer, Barrowson, cuts his workers' wages. Haspen initially resists; 
when he finally recants and asks for his job back, willing to work at the artificially 
lowered wage, Barrowson refuses to re-hire him. Unemployed and desperate, Haspen 
devolves from an ill-tempered poor man, worried about providing for his family, to a 
desperate thief, and finally, to a vengeful murderer. 
The Haspens decline both financially and morally; Margaret, initially her 
husband's social superior (WW 5), also sinks into a brutishness - one borne out of 
financial desperation as well as a sense of maternal protection. In a memorable passage, 
she attacks her husband with a hatchet after he fails to help their youngest child when she 
falls into the (literal) fire of their rapidly deteriorating domestic hearth: 
[T]he mother's eyes wandered round in search of something: she stretched 
her hands - stooped- and suddenly rising- the husband felt the sharp 
cold blow of a hatchet strike his cheek, and glide off upon his shoulder. 
Pain made him utter an oath - he was a.bout to dart on Margaret, but with 
the agility of a tigress, she had already darted into the darkest comer of the 
room, her child in one arm, the hatchet in her hand. The gleam of her 
hatchet and of her angry eyes was alone visible in the darkness - the 
hoarse sound of her quick breath was alone audible in the silence. The 
man paused suddenly before the fury of the tigress defending its young -
he felt fear. (WW 11) 
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The scene is highly stylized in its portrayal of anger and in Margaret's deliberate actions. 
Significantly, there is no dialogue between the Haspens, who are not referred to as 
husband and wife, nor John and Margaret, but as .. the man" and "the mother." Anger is 
not divorced from its potential for violence: the gleam of the hatchet and Margaret's 
angry eyes are chilling reminders of anger's possible escalation into violence and murder. 
Referring twice to Margaret as a protective "tigress," the narrator does not outwardly 
condemn Margaret's action, but does provide a motive that would gain some sympathy 
with Victorian readers - instead of the "angel in the house," a domestic: virtue later made 
popular with Coventry Patmore's poem (1854), Margaret Haspen stands as the avenging 
angel, ready to protect her unfortunate daughter. 
Yet Margaret's maternal gesture, however extreme, becomes insufficient in the 
plot of Jones' short fiction. After her husband is transported for his theft, Margaret and 
her daughters endure further degradation at the hands of Barrowson, who seduces 
Catherine, the oldest, and then, being "a most punctilious observer of the decencies" of 
the time, sends her off to a village outside of town. Margaret is now resolutely 
submissive: "She uttered no reproaches - she knew they would be laughed at - but she 
detennined in forthwith quitting the neighbourhood, and going somewhere where her 
misfortunes would not taunt her in the public street" (WW25). The narrator's prosaic 
tone recounting Margaret's submission (a tone replicated in the narration of her 
execution) is telling: such a predicament is common in the current condition of England. 
Margaret has been wronged, to be sure - and in harbouring her husband after he murders 
Barrowson, she has done wrong also - but Jones points out that her fate is inextricably 
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tied to these men by way of inevitable (and exploitive) sexual and economic relations. 
For Jones, it is the "brute force" of the existing laws (of politics and political economy) 
and the "moral force" of marriage and gender inequality that cause Margaret, among 
others, to "suffer at her own home-hearth" ("Introduction" 2) 
Margaret is punished as an accomplice to her husband's crime, and her execution 
takes place in front of a boisterous but generally unfeeling crowd. In the description of 
the execution scene there is a disjunction between the events as they ceremoniously 
unfold and the narrative voice: 
An execution was to take place at Newgate. It had been announced long 
beforehand, as an instructive and national solemnity. The press had been 
pointing attention to it, day by day. Before daybreak, the people began to 
assemble - the people, so anxious for anything that will tear them out of 
the dull monotony of their cheerless,-routine life! They came, as they 
would to a public-house, seeking something to drown thought for a few 
hours. They came, as they had gone the previous evening to the playhouse, 
to get the amusement of one excitement more! (WW 3 7) 
The boisterous mood of the crowd is the antithesis of "solemnity"; the assembly of 
spectators around the gallows, eager to escape routine drudge1y (another inevitability) for 
a small part of the day, is likened to the crowds that frequent the public house or the 
playhouse - notorious places of working-class entertainment. By introducing the scene in 
this way, the narrator underscores the incongrnity between the occasion and the feelings 
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(or lack thereof) of the public, and ultimately, displays an irony to be understood by the 
reader. 
As a writer of fiction, Jones would certainly sympathize with the desire for 
working-class men and women to seek entertainment, yet Jones' concern is with the 
kinds of popular entertainment available to the people, and their effects. Public-houses, 
playhouses, and a sensationalized press imply, in Jones' story, an avoidance of political 
responsibility (and by extension, moral responsibility) for the singular pursuit of self-
interested pleasure. Jones' message explicitly connects to his admonishments in "Words 
to the Reader," and in Woman's Wrongs: daily misery and subjugation :is a fact, the result 
of an exploitive system. For Jones, one cannot escape oppression and subjugation (and 
suffering or misery) without political action. The Haspens may rage, and they may well 
be punished, but the narrator's ire is reserved for the spectators, who do not feel enough 
for the inevitabilities that led to Margaret's execution in the first place. 
In the execution scene, the designation of "the People" holds little symbolic 
value; this is an unfeeling and unorganized crowd, ultimately apathetic and apolitical. As 
the impatient crowd finally watches the execution, what follows are three separate scenes 
and paragraphs. The first, highlights Margaret's gentleness towards her youngest 
daughter: '"Hush! - Mary! - Don't cry so, Mary!' And the soft cajoling tenderness of the 
mother turned her chocking tones into angelic music" (WW 39). In this scene, Margaret 
turns from tigress to angel, a transformation that harkens back to the hatchet scene. The 
second is a stark departure from the first: Margaret's "lifeless corpse" dangles before "the 
careless myriad of spectators." The next scene describes the immediate aftermath: "A 
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thick soft rain was now falling - the crowd dispersed rapidly in all directions. The busy 
monotony of life began to ring on every side: every one went his own way on his 
business, few caring for God, and still fewer for their neighbour" (WW 37). The 
progression of scenes alternates between deliberate contrasts: from the emotional leave-
taking scene, to the terse but macabre climax, and finally, to the dispersion of the 
dispassionate and callous crowd, a scene in which the prosaic description of the narrator 
negates the more melodramatic elements of the plot. Margaret's dangling body, "a 
strange fruit, a symbol of grotesque attraction and repulsion, is oscillating signifier of 
social and sexual subjection" (Haywood, Chartist Fiction xxiii). 11 Jones offers it up to the 
readers only to disparage their passive consumption of it. Drawing upon the public's 
fascination with Newgate fiction, Jones criticizes the lack of political feeling behind this 
predilection. The narrator's own anger is saved not for those who exhibit strong, even 
brutal feeling - since the characters in the story, and indeed, the entire collection of 
stories, exhibit anger, rage and vengeance - but directed towards those who exhibit no 
feeling, whether sympathy or outrage. 
Thus, like the condition of England writer, Jones' narrator addresses the lack of 
feeling and sympathy in the world outside the pages of fiction. The appeal to feeling in 
Chartist periodicals such as Notes to the People assumes that lack of feeling (apathy or 
indifference) for the miseries and injustices perpetuated upon people like Margaret 
Haspen and her two daughters are tantamount to submission and even approbation. In this 
respect, feeling becomes the very grounds for the radical interrogation of existing 
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authority. Jones' instmctive fiction is aimed at rousing his predominantly working-class 
readership to respond to the systems of inequalities that victimize his characters. 
Jones' arrangement of stories, which follows women of different social 
stratifications, also implies a calculated swipe at singularly deterministic conceptions of 
working-class disposition or character: the narrative assemblage implicitly suggests that 
discontentment and selfishness exist as all levels of society. In Woman's Wrongs, both 
men and women bmtalize each other; some take advantage of the injustices afforded by a 
cormpt political and economic system, while others do so with little thought or effort. In 
this sense, the fatalism of "The Working Man's Wife," which Haywood rightly points out 
anticipates the naturalistic slum fiction of Gissing (Chartist Fiction xx), is extended to 
other walks of life. Jones' stories warn that anger and rage are consequences of current 
economic and political realities, as are other base feelings such as envy and covetousness. 
Although Jones advocates strong feelings in his audience, he is aware of their 
destmctive potential, and there is a distinction between the crowd with political 
conviction, the People, and the self-gratifying (or entertainment-seeking) crowd that 
gathers around Margaret Haspen (or the penny dreadful or stage melodrama) and then 
quickly disperses. Speaking at a public meeting at the Literary Institute in London a week 
before the 1848 Chartist Convention, Jones declared that while strength is necessa1y to 
mitigate the unfair exercise of power, physical force is not a carte blanche for 
spontaneous rage or vengeance: "Because there is power in your arm, you wouldn't 
knock the first man down you meet, but it is as well to have that power if he strikes you. 
Well then, therefore I advocate organization. Without it, a people is a mob; but with it, it 
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becomes an anny" ("On Moral and Physical Force" 96). In his speech, Jones 
distinguishes between a deliberate anger and one born out of rashness or solely prone to 
violence, a distinction that respectively applies to the political crowd, ais a Chartist 
vehicle for the expression of grievance, and more pejorative connotations of the mob or 
riot. For Jones, the former is both an articulate and "organized" force (the people), and a 
formidable, and if need be, physical, opponent (an army). As a sanctioned outlet for anger 
or indignation, the political crowd and the politicized readership are poilnts of articulation 
for working-class identity and Chartist politics. 
In Carlyle's Chartism, the "right" to articulate anger is a dangerous and 
misguided "might" in the hands of Chartists. Conscious opposition to, and anger with, 
the present condition of England is, instead, the perquisite of the author-·prophet and his 
keen political insight. Given Jones' attendant political engagement (and imprisonment), 
the author does not necessarily have to stand separate or superior to his object of scrutiny 
in order to maintain such insight. Indeed, as the conclusion to "The Tradesman's 
Daughter" makes clear, the author may well be complicit in economic exploitation. 
In "The Tradesman's Daughter," Jones' scathing narrator draws attention to, and 
critiques, the elevated status of literary labour and the devalued status of domestic labour. 
Like Margaret Haspen, the protagonist, Laura Trenton, is bound to an exploitive domestic 
situation, and to her father, an "honourable man of business" (WW 71 ). Unlike Has pen, 
Mr. Trenton never loses his temper, yet Laura's subjugation is equally insidious. In her 
"genteel exploitation" (Haywood, Chartist Fiction xxiv), Laura is figuratively chained to 
her clerk's desk and her ledgers in the counting house until she is expediently married off 
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to her father's business partner. Laura's cousin and love interest, Edward Trenton, 
dismisses Laura as a calculating machine: 
"As to my cousin Laura, I'll say nothing - that's all one can say of her. 
Just fancy a pale young girl, with large blue eyes, and false over-sleeves of 
green cotton, to prevent her gown being soiled - and gloves upon her 
hands to keep her fingers from being inked! She keeps the day-book -
enters orders - scores up accounts - writes a fine Itahan hand - and -
that's all." (WW71) 
Edward himself is the other extreme of a London tradesman: as a Romantic and aspiring 
author, Edward remarks on his inability to be like his uncle; his dismissal of Laura is 
based on the faulty assumption that, like her father, she is suited for such cold and 
calculating labour, not that it is extracted from her (WW71). He assumes, nai:Vely, the 
superiority of his own, less mechanical literary pursuits, connecting them to his superior 
disposition and elevated means of feeling: "'I look to the paths of literature - my heart 
beats when I see a new work. I don't know how it is, but I don't hear of a new author 
without feeling almost angry - for it appears, that, while I wait, my place is being 
forestalled"' (WW72, original emphasis). Edward's acknowledged "almost" anger is the 
result of his artistic potential and of a supposedly elevated disposition. Yet for all his self-
glorifying soliloquies, and for a man claiming a refinement off eeling, Edward is either 
horribly indifferent or cruel to Laura: she balances his accounts for him and receives only 
his scorn at her willingness to continue her "monotonous, withering and horrid" life; 
when she attempts to talk to Edward about literature, he recoils at her lack of knowledge 
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(WW 7 4-7 5). Emotional clod that he is, Edward assumes that Laura's coldness towards 
her opportune marriage is further proof of her emotional inferiority, rather than, as the 
title of the story suggests, her dutiful commitment to her father's wishes. 
In contrast to the monotony of the counting house, Edward's intellectual labour 
takes place after business hours, when he retires to his garret to read and write, and evoke 
"dreams of literary fame" (WW 77). While the now-married Laura has since moved to the 
country, Edward returns to London to become a vocational man of letters, only to learn 
that the reality of the literary profession is one of both physical and mental toil, equally 
menial: 
Edward soon began to discover that literature was a monopoly among a 
privileged oligarchy of letters, that its humbler walks are so overstocked 
with surplus labour, that few have the change of employment, and that 
none can obtain and keep employment unless they sell their honor, their 
brain, and their independence into the lowest grades of a debasing wage 
slavery. (WW90) 
The inversion between Laura and Edward is purposefully instmctive and underscores 
Edward's folly; like in the factory or the counting house, Edward's once handsome figure 
is transformed, through his exploitative literary labour, into a "gaunt, thin, skeleton-like, 
attenuated frame" (WW90). When Edward appeals to a "celebrated author," the aptly 
named Mr. Sucknoodle, 12 for an interview, the meeting eventually seals his fate. 
Sucknoodle, as his name suggests, is a "literary vampire" who steals Edward's works and 
publishes them as his own (WW92). Edward's discovery of this perfidy is ostensibly 
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directed towards the reader rather than towards the dying and ineffectual Edward. The 
narrator sums up Edward's case as being simply one of many: "Thus, nine-tenths of our 
cheap literature is concocted by vampires living on the most dastard robbery!" (WW 92, 
emphasis added). By moving from the third-person pronoun to the collective address, the 
narrator refers to the corresponding reality outside of the fictional world; Edward's fate is 
actually all too common, and this diminishes the potential pathos of his demise. 
Moreover, the use of the collective pronoun explicitly connects Edward's mistake, and 
death, to the reader, disparaging the reader as a participant in this exploitive set of 
practices. The final injustice occurs after Edward's death, and thus, is maintained solely 
for the reader: upon hearjng of Edward's death, Sucknoodle publishes a fictitious letter 
from Edward citing him as the patron and friend and requesting him to publish his final 
works. Banking on the commercial merit of an untimely death, "Sucknoodle gathered a 
golden harvest, and golden opinions also for his noble act of disinterested generosity" 
(WW99). The finely bound copy of Edward's work, grossly deemed the product of 
sympathetic patronage, provides, as in "The Working Man's Wife," much dramatic irony 
for the reader. 
Read against Carlyle's own angry assertions, Jones' story negates a singularly 
prophetic position. Literature, as labour, is subject to the same faults within the capitalist 
system of callous indifference, competition, and (considering popular literature) the 
desire for entertainment. Mr. Sucknoodle' s success is based on his willingness to exploit, 
rather than an inherent ability; it does not rely on an elevated or refined disposition or 
sense of feeling, since it is Mr. Sucknoodle' s lack offeeling that allows him, like Mr. 
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Trenton, to succeed in business - in this case, the business of literature. Jones argues that 
it is the privilege of money and social position, rather than an artistic or intellectual 
insight, that secures success - an accomplishment that requires the devaluation and 
exploitation of other forms of labour, such as the domestic, and the exploitation of 
individuals. 
Although Jones does not necessarily come to mind when discussing sage writing 
and prophetic authorship - designations used when referring to the writings of Carlyle, 
Mathew Arnold, John Ruskin, and Henry David Thoreau in the nineteenth century- his 
periodical fiction follows the "prophetic pattern" that Landow identifies: an attack upon 
the audience, a warning, and a "visionary promise" (27). Indeed, in Woman's Wrongs, 
Jones' narrator recurrently points blame at readers and more generally, a mass public. 
Jones' warning to this working-class crowd is that these "wrongs" may affect any one of 
them: destitution and exploitation could well follow. Yet Jones' "visionary promise" 
depends upon responsive readers, and requires, above all, the conviction that the 
unfeeling crowd can (and will), through its inherent "virtue and highmindedness," evolve 
into the political crowd, one unwilling to let such systematic exploitation and political 
exclusion to continue ("Words to the Reader" iii). In this respect, anger is not the 
property (and proof) of the prophetic author, but for Jones, a mindful reaction to the 
attendant miseries of political disenfranchisement. 
It is on this point that I discern a significant difference between Carlyle's 
condition-of-England writing and Chartist writing, and subsequently, their uses of anger: 
Carlyle's anger does not come buttressed to the same validations of the working-class 
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public that Jones' anger seems to imply. For Carlyle, the crowd is discordant and 
inarticulate, a "distracted incoherent embodiment" of political principles and calls for 
representation, and he cites "thuggery, political or union-driven meetings by torchlight, 
secret pacts and assassinations, riots" as examples of these crowd-driven excesses (SW 
152). Carlyle's vision requires, instead, a virtuous hierarchical authority, rather than a 
public one. In Chartism, the "bellowings" and "inarticulate cries" serve as proof that the 
working-class public, a "dumb creature in rage and pain," is asking to be governed (SW 
189-90); in Woman's Wrongs, the working-class public can govern themselves through 
political engagement and mobilization prompted by sympathy and anger. 
III. Carlyle and Jones in a "Model Prison": 
Subjectivity, Authorship, and Political Engagement 
In Past and Present (1843), Carlyle begins his historical and social commentary 
with an objection to the proclivity of condition-of-England publications: 
The condition of England, on which many pamphlets are now in the 
course of publication, and many thoughts unpublished are going on in 
every reflective head, is justly regarded as one of the most ominous, and 
withal one of the strangest, ever seen in this world. England is full of 
wealth, of multifarious produce, supply for human want in every kind; yet 
England is dying of inanition. ( 1) 
The question as to the current state and future of England was one that Carlyle, years 
earlier, had prophetically coined and shaped, yet he is quick to disengage his contribution 
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from the numerous and ostensibly ineffective publications currently in print and being 
circulated in public discourses. His opening observation implies that the frequency of 
these publications seems to have little effect on the actual state of England~ despite the 
appetite to print such literature (and presumably to read it), and England's economic 
prosperity notwithstanding, the country is undernourished. For Carlyle, demand and 
opportunity, along with a promised readership, do not necessarily imply a necessary 
social and moral improvement. 
In this sense, the condition-of-England author, as much as the present condition of 
the country, becomes the object of scrutiny. Carlyle's objection to the proliferation of 
condition-of-England writings implies his cogent acknowledgment that literature and 
criticism of the time - the right to express an opinion on the condition of England, and 
discontent at the present conditions - are part of a discursive battle for public attention 
and readership; they must also contend with the "dismal sciences" of political economy 
and statistical studies, as well as with working-class literary culture and the language of 
radicalism. Carlyle's consistent exaggeration and hyperbole in Chartism, his descriptions 
of Chartists as "wild, inarticulate souls" (SW 155), becomes critical to his commentary: 
an idealized (and highly stylized) anger that castigates his readers and implies a critical 
and ideological distance between the populace (variously the crowd and Carlyle's 
readership) and Carlyle himself This distance enables Carlyle to position himself 
discursively as the credible and competent articulator of the "present grit:vous condition" 
(Landow 26) and forecaster of future woes. 
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Moreover, Carlyle's prophetic anger enacts his moral outrage at what he deems 
the age of "barren self-worship" and machinery (SW224), and it implies an urgency to 
mitigate such conditions. His prescribed solutions to Chartism - education and 
emigration - have been criticized as apolitical anodynes that avoid the causes of radical 
unrest in the first place, but for Carlyle, the solution has more to do with a transfonnation 
in feeling, which will, in tum, guide interpersonal relations and inspire the reevaluation of 
principles and practices. Carlyle's anger may well be the vehicle for his social critique, 
but as moral outrage, it also affirms his meditative vision. 
If one considers Christopher Lane's discussion of anti-sociability in nineteenth-
century fiction, Carlyle's anger functions as a proof of his "thwarted subjectivity" (72), 
the result of his inability to reconcile his affection for society with his censure. Lane 
explains anti-sociability, and its attendant antipathies, as the expression of contradictory 
and unresolved forces: a concern over the social body (and social problems) and their 
improvement, and a pervading misanthropy (34). Anti-social behaviour, argues Lane, is 
marked by a disdain for "conformity" and manifests into a nostalgia or elevation of the 
past (28, xviii) - criteria that certainly call to mind Carlyle as the raging philosopher and 
commentator on present social ills. Ultimately, however, Carlyle relates authorship to a 
profoundly ethical concern; his discussion of the man of letters in On Heroes, Hero-
Worship and the Heroic in Hist01y (1841), which will be discussed in the subsequent 
chapter, demonstrates the high regard he has for the vocation of (non-fiction) writing. 
Part of Carlyle's need to concentrate on the social and emotional characteristics of 
Chartism, rather than the movement's political program, may well be his. inadvertent 
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delineation between intellectual exploration and political loyalties - in Bourdieu 's tem1s, 
between "the obligatory alternative between autonomy and commitment, between pure 
culture and politics" (340). Philip Rosenberg argues, for instance, that for Carlyle, action 
and understanding are mutually exclusive, and as such, Carlyle is unable to consolidate 
his own conception of political action with the symbolic and historical forces that he 
envisions as shaping society (vii). Ultimately, Rosenberg believes that Carlyle chooses 
"the idea of [political] action over action itself' ( 143 ), a position that seems to imply that 
Carlyle's anger is a result of a personal crisis over his role in the cultural fields of 
Victorian authorship and literary production. 13 
The historical connection between Jones and Carlyle in "Model Prisons" (1850) is 
particularly illuminating as to how Carlyle distinguishes literary work and identity from 
the competing discourse of political radicalism. Carlyle's essay, a critique of liberal 
prison reform, describes visits to various prisons, one of them presumably Tothill Fields 
Prison, Westminster, where Jones was imprisoned on a two-year sentence for sedition. 14 
Carlyle mentions Jones as an inmate, not by name but by the moniker "Chartist 
Notability." His depiction of Jones is, unsurprisingly, critical, but what makes it 
interesting is that Carlyle's focus falls not on Jones' politics, but on his credibility and 
reputation as a literary author: 
Notability Second, a philosophic and literary Cha11ist, walking rapidly to 
and fro in his private court, a clean, high-walled place~ the world and its 
cares quite excluded, for some months to come: master of his own time 
and spiritual resources to, as I supposed, a real enviable extent. What 
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"literary man" to an equal extent! I fancied I, for my own part, so left with 
paper and ink, and all taxes and botherations shut-out from me, could have 
written such a Book as no reader here will ever get of me. ("Model 
Prisons" 69) 
Carlyle's self-proclaimed envy is mocking, but it underscores a nuanced competition with 
literary radicalism over readership - indeed, the tem1 "notability" implies a kind of 
celebrity that requires a large and ardent readership. Carlyle constructs Jones as 
ultimately detached from the world and its responsibilities, but it is an indulgent break 
rather than a position of critical insight and meditation. Implicitly, Carlyle's taunt 
implies that the indignation that Jones displays in his own writings is not the product of 
this insight, but rather, something feigned or self-interested. The sage of Chelsea's 
mocking invective caused Jones to defend himself in the Red Republican ( 10 August 
1850). In the editorial, Jones proclaims that having been denied ink and paper in prison 
he wrote his books with "the aid of blood and memory" ("Ernest Jones to the People" 
64), an assertion that attempts to regain his credibility as a dedicated author as much as a 
dedicated political leader. 
Carlyle's comment implies suspicion of Jones' motivations for his political 
engagement, one that plagues nineteenth-century radical leaders, 15 but it also suggests 
that as a credible (as opposed to notable) writer, one must live in the alb~~it faulty world, 
with all its "taxes and botherations." Carlyle implies that he, as opposed to Jones, does 
just that. Carlyle may rage against the signs of the time and the present condition of 
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England, but his anger also functions rhetorically, as proof of his engagement and his 
credibility, as much as it drives his genuine moral outrage. 
The rise of the radical periodical presses and Chartist fiction demonstrates that 
feelings, particularly those of anger, are a significant component of political mobilization. 
In studying the connections between political movements, revolutions, and feeling, Reed 
trenchantly argues that the "political is emotional" ( 655). Politics necessarily involve 
interpersonal relationships, judgments of the actions of others, and the fashioning and 
maintenance of collective identities: social and cognitive endeavours in which emotions 
have a pivotal role in political decision-making. Like Carlyle, Chartists use anger 
rhetorically to make judgments and critiques of society in general, and society as an 
association of actual, rather than idealized, readers. 
Jones equates anger with political conviction, which is required for organized 
protest, and this further unsettles the distinction between rational (political) action and the 
ostensible irrationality or disorder of anger. With direct addresses to their readers, 
Chartist writers such as Jones and Cooper envision the act of reading not as passive 
reception (or consumption), but a means of rousing a (potentially) political force. This 
call to action, explains Butwin, is largely linked to the influence of journalism in the mid-
nineteenth century, whereby reading becomes the motivator of a "multitude of acts that 
may include the joining of societies and the writing of checks" ( 167). The authors 
presented in this chapter all ultimately desire that their readers - as potential political and 
moral agents, and agitators, of change - both read and feel in a way that will ameliorate 
current hostilities and apathies. Admonishments to their respective audiences reaffirm 
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Haywood's point radical politics are "explicitly characterized in terms of writing and 
reading" (Chartist Fiction xv). 
Chapter Three will continue with a discussion of Carlyle, given his prominent 
influence on the Condition-of-England Question, but will consider his later work, On 
Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in Hist01y, by exploring examples of "right" 
feeling and "right" disposition that Carlyle provides by way of heroic figures. For 
Carlyle, heroism - the elevation of historical (and mythological) individuals as models of 
conduct and feeling - may well serve as potential nullifiers to what he rages against in 
Chartism: a lack of viable political leaders and leadership. Considering these models of 
conduct, the following chapter will also discuss concomitant concerns of social reform: 
education and self-help as the means of social and individual progress. I contend that the 
pursuit of knowledge and self-improvement, popularized in the period between the two 
reform acts, are symptomatic of a profound anxiety over sociability (and its antitheses) in 
the public sphere. 
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Endnotes 
1 Thompson's "moral economy" specifically applies to the eighteenth-century food 
riot, but he asserts that the crowd functions as part of a "moral economy" that legitimizes 
their organization. Thompson explains this legitimization as follows: "men and women in 
the crowd were infom1ed by the belief that they were defending traditional rights or 
customs; and, in general, that they were supported by the wider consensus of the 
community" ("The Moral Economy" 78). Although Thompson considers the food riot as 
not being political, he also makes the point that it cannot be described as an apolitical 
phenomenon. My use of the term in the context of Chartism affirms that the "moral 
economy" of the nineteenth-centmy crowd is decidedly political. 
2 See Brantligner, Reading Lesson, 55. In "Dyspeptic Reactions: Thomas Carlyle 
and the Byronic Temper," Kristen Guest provides an interesting argmnent for Carlyle's 
use of the body-politic metaphor, and his "Byronic temper," by linking it to his 
dyspepsia. Carlyle articulates his own physiological and emotional temper with Romantic 
excess, explains Guest, and contrasts it against the seemingly '•healthy" or robust 
progress of materialist society. See Nervous Reactions: Victorian Recollections of 
Romanticism. 141 -61. 
3 
"Man of feeling" is taken from Henry Mackenzie's The Man of Feeling (1771), 
which preceded the interest in the sensitive male figure in Romantic novels. One could 
argue that the moral vignettes of Mackenzie's sentimental novel envision the sentiment 
(and feeling) of this figure to be exemplary, part of a unique disposition and perspective. 
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4 
Stauffer makes a similar point in his discussion of anger as a "primary tool of 
aitistic communication" (28) in classical works by Juvenal and Longinus, providing a 
persuasive link between indignatio, sublimity, and the Romantic tradition. See Stauffer, 
Chapter 1. 
5 
This could also be applied to condition-of-England novels written after 
Chartism, such as Kingsley's Alton Locke, in which angry and potentially destructive 
political expression becomes pitted against literary indignation. 
6 
For a more in-depth discussion of the Preston strike and its literary influences on 
Dickens and Gaskell, see Carnall. 
7 See Butwin, 173, and Flint's introduction to Hard Times. 
8 
Roy Park provides a major sh1dy of Hazlitt's criticism in connection to the fine 
arts and poetry in Hazlitt and the Spirit of the Age: Abstraction and Critical The01y 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1971). 
9 See Le Bon' s The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind ( 1896). 
10 
"Two Bills" of 1795, or the "The Gagging Acts," and the Seditious Meetings 
and Treasonable Practices Bills, forbade large meetings and political lect11res. 
Nineteenth-century legislation continued in the form of The Six Acts (1819) and the 
Combinations Act ( 1825). 
11 
The description of "strange fruit" used by Haywood also evokes the lynching of 
African Americans in the American south. 
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12 Haywood makes the argument, based on biographical details, that Sucknoodle 
may be modeled on G. W. M. Reynolds (xviii), the British popular fiction writer, 
journalist, Chartist leader, and the founder of Reynolds Weekly, a radical newspaper in 
Jones' time. When Reynolds accused Jones of embezzling Chartist funds for his own 
means, Jones brought,· and won, a libel action against Reynolds. 
13 Claire Williams argues that Carlyle's separation of labour (as an ideal) from 
economic production (as a reality) becomes a poignant means of strnggling with his 
"phantasmal sense of subjectivity" ( 171 ). 
14 Jules Seigel also discusses this visit, and affirms its historical accuracy, 81-83. 
15 Partly responding to the ideal of the self-made man, critics of political 
radicalism assumed that working-class radical leaders, despite their denouncements of the 
middle classes and middle-class cooperation, used politics as a means of social mobility, 
and as such, were motivated by self interest rather than heartfelt political vision. This was 
a charge leveled against Thomas Cooper and Fergus O'Connor, among others. 
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Chapter Three 
Heroism and the Education of :Feelings: 
Moral Philosophy and Victorian Models of Conduct 
I shall begin by a portrait or two; they are simpler than large pictures, and 
they speak of real men and women who once lived on this earth of ours -
generally of remarkable and noble men - and man should always be 
interesting to man. 
- Charles Kingsley, Politics for the People (1848) 
Do not Books still accomplish miracles, as Runes were fabled to do? 
They persuade men. 
--Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes (1841) 
For David Hume, nothing is more active than the imagination, yet because ideas 
and perceptions cannot be combined by imagination alone, Hume's moral philosophy 
attempts to provide reasons behind patterns of human action. The impulse to act comes 
from feeling (or "passion"), which in turn comes from associating experiences to those 
feelings in the first place. In A Treatise of Human Nature ( 1739-40), Hume explores how 
experiences produce recognizable feelings that can motivate similar behaviours, 
specifically through the laws of association, and through what Hume conceives as the 
abiding characteristics of the human disposition: the tendency towards sympathy and 
comparison. The disposition to sympathize and the disposition to compare are therefore 
both at work whenever one feels something akin to respect or contempt (Treatise II. ii. X. 
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389-391 ). As an intersubjective process, sympathy enables individuals to make moral 
judgments of one another, and the tendency to compare implies the requirement of a 
model- another individual to which one can measure one's own feelings and actions. 
This comparison may well cause averse feelings, such as pride or envy, but Hume notes 
''in the greatest part of men, it rests at respect and esteem" (Treatise III. iii. II. 595). 
Humankind's imaginative capacity- to sympathize and to compare -has enduring 
implications for conceptualizing Victorian models of conduct. It would be beneficial, 
first, to explore the place of sympathy and comparison in Hume's own discussion of 
social interaction. 
Hume implies that the communication of feeling ensures a varying effect between 
people, but an effect nevertheless: 
So close and intimate is the coITesponclence of human souls, that no 
sooner any person approaches me, then he diffuses on me all his opinions, 
and draws along my judgment in a greater or lesser degree. And tho', on 
many occasions, my sympathy with him goes not so far as entirely to 
change my sentiments, and way of thinking; yet it seldom is so weak as 
not to disturb the easy course of my thought, and give an authority to that 
opinion, which is recommended to me by his assent and approbation. 
(Treatise III. iii. II. 592) 
At best, sympathy can alter one's opinions or feelings; at the very least, it produces a kind 
of intersubjective "authority" that creates either agreement or disagreement between 
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individuals. As a fundamental characteristic of human nature, sympathy does not imply 
acquiescence, as one may still be sympathetic even when in opposition. 1 For Hume, the 
sentiments of others affect us insofar as they become our own, "in which case they 
operate upon us, by opposing or en creasing [sic] our passions, in the very same manners, 
as if they have been originally deriv'd from our own temper and disposition" (Treatise 
III. iii. II. 593). Negative feelings one may experience upon comparison are unavoidable 
- for Hume insists that such feelings are "requisite" in human nature - yet the force of 
sympathy, as well as the "laws of good breeding," hold them in check (Treatise III. iii. II. 
597). Thus, Hume's discussion of sympathy, and its inevitability in interpersonal 
relations, argues that some form of "good breeding" - variously conceptualized in both 
eighteenth and nineteenth cenhlfies as manners, conduct, and refinement - provides a 
necessary limitation to possible hostilities. 
Considered by Hume to be an artificial (and thus, social) virtue, good breeding 
works to limit the expression of self-interested feeling and guide it into d1e bounds of 
sociable conduct: 
We have, all of us, a wonderful partiality for ourselves, and were we 
always to give vent to our sentiments in this particular, we shou 'd mutually 
cause the greatest indignation in each other, not only by the immediate 
presence of so disagreeable a subject of comparison, but also by the 
contrariety of our judgments. In like manner, therefore, as we establish the 
laws of nature, in order to secure property in society, and prevent the 
opposition of self-interest; we establish the rules c?f good-breeding, in order 
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to prevent the opposition of men's pride and render conversations 
agreeable and inoffensive. (Treatise III. iii. II 597, original emphasis) 
Hume's mention of good breeding seems fleeting (even digressive to his larger theory of 
sympathy), which may explain why so few scholars have discussed its importance and 
purpose. Yet considering the philosopher's considerable attention to the artificial virtues,2 
one can consider his mention of good breeding as part of this category: created by society 
to ensure its proper functioning. For Hume, good breeding saves individuals from the 
"disagreeable" effects of pride, and as such, ameliorates conflicts that may arise between 
groups or individuals (Treatise III. iii. II. 597). More specifically, it provides a necessary 
check to the "indignation" that may arise from competing or contradictory interests and 
enables the establishment of common rules that make sociability possible. The moral 
philosophy of Hume, argues Dabney Townsend, recognizes the need for this legibility: 
"When the passions are unstable and unable to provide social norms, they become a form 
of madness" (35) 
Importantly, Hume's use of the term "good breeding" only briefly asserts the 
"deference and mutual submission" individuals (must) make according to customs of 
rank. For Hume, rank and station are fixed by birth and fortune, so to extend the 
applicability of good breeding he also includes the possibilities of "employments, talents 
or reputation" (Treatise III. iii. II. 598-99), which suggest the possibility of mobility or 
personal improvement. In "Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences" (1753), 
Hume extends this social vision by including politeness and respect (or at least the 
appearance of these) as virtues for conduct required in civility. Like good breeding, these 
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artificial virtues can be taught to ensure the civil functioning of society, and in this 
respect, Hume's discussion of human nahire is, according to Susan James, organized 
around a set of principles common in eighteenth-century moral philosophy, of which "the 
most fundamental is the idea that passions are manifestations of a striving that is an 
essential feature of all human life" (56). Jan1es explains the centrality of feeling in the 
works of eighteenth-century philosophers such as Hobbes, Malebranche, and Hume in 
this manner: "As individuals, and arguably also as groups, human beings try not only to 
keep themselves alive, but also to improve their condition, and their passions function as 
guides in this process" (56). In Victorian culture the principles of self-improvement and 
education, as a means of social and moral betterment, are, arguably, expressions and 
outcomes of this desire to improve. 
Hume's emphasis on the regulatory nature of good breeding provides an 
important bridge between eighteenth-century moral philosophy and nineteenth-century 
social and political thought. In Treatise and in his political essays, good breeding helps to 
control the passions (especially those related to the self) so as to maintain civility with 
others.3 In "Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences," civility is also related to a 
free and democratic government, since the arts and sciences require effort and freedom 
and cannot, therefore, flourish in "despotic governments" (Essays 118). In this respect, 
Hume's good breeding is more than a concern over etiquette; in connection to artistic 
developments and scientific endeavours, it emerges as a kind of knowledge (or pursuit of 
knowledge) about the world. Good breeding also designates the concerted effort to 
maintain civility by regulating self-interested passions through custom - a kind of 
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training that produces "facility" and tendency (or inclination) towards certain thoughts 
and action (Treatise 2.3.5 422). 
In Victorian contexts, refinement and manners take on distinctly more self-
conscious purposes: as a means of social mobility and as markers of respectability that 
could ostensibly signify privilege and class. Yet as part of mid-nineteenth century social 
reform (and as part of the political strategies of educational Chartists), knowledge and 
conduct are a means of both personal self-improvement and social progress. The period's 
zeal for scientific and mechanical advancements is concomitant with its zeal for 
addressing and mitigating social ills. Alan Rauch explains how such sentiment is not 
designated to strict academic or professional disciplines, but part of public sentiment as 
well: "The most prominent disciplines of knowledge production - science and technology 
- had already found their way into the increasingly industrialized provinces, and having 
done so, moved into the realms of popular discourse" (2). Popularizers of science, and 
more generally, knowledge, envision its dissemination as part of social and self-
improvement. 4 Rauch explains this pursuit of know ledge as one that can be traced to the 
empiricist thinking of the Scottish Enlightemnent, in which "knowledge stood apart from 
mere belief or opinion and somehow had validity grom1ded in the actual world." Rule-
govemed practices enable, argues Rauch, the pursuit and accumulation of knowledge not 
as an "aggregate of facts or information," but a systematic inquiry into the world that 
opens up wider discussion as to what does and does not count as "useful" (14). This 
pursuit, then, affords a wider civic role of knowledge and education. 
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As part of its cultural value, knowledge and conduct increasingly become coupled 
with the idea of progress and correspond to what Rauch aptly calls the "need for socially 
responsible individuals in the world" (16). In much reformist discourse, knowledge -
whether institutionally afforded or self-motivated - emerges as a restorative to multiple 
social issues: the general erosion of morality, the imperative to find models of good 
governance and leadership, and as a curative to bad habits and lack of good breeding. 
The writers discussed in this chapter all attempt to explain knowledge and 
conduct as part of the project of sociability and as part of their commentary on the 
condition of England. Charles Bray, Thomas Carlyle, and Charles Kingsley impart 
paradigms of conduct for both social and self-improvement; they do so by proposing 
models of feeling and action that are (radically) ameliorative or transfom1ative on a 
larger, political scale. The arguments that they present are varied, yet all three writers 
attempt to bridge the acquisition of knowledge (through self-improvement and training) 
to embodied examples: derived from daily and domestic life, as in the case of Bray; from 
history and even mythology, as in Carlyle's discussion of heroes; and through fictional 
protagonists (and a pseudo-autobiographical subject) that bear resemblances to actual 
literary and political figures, as in the case of Kingsley. 
The emphasis on feelings, here, is of particular interest, since these three authors 
confront the issue of how to take the potential and intensity of strong feelings and utilize 
them for social good rather than simply personal assertion. The models of conduct 
discussed in this chapter are manifestations of a "striving" (to use James' term) that are 
based, in various degrees, on the inter-social effects of comparison and sympathy- upon 
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which Hume's epistemology of feeling rests. Models of conduct provide an imperative 
for readers: they demonstrate patterns of behaviour that take into account the sociability 
of feeling, and present to readers an ideal to which they can aspire to improve their own 
conditions. Providing examples that the reading public can emulate is part of the 
"Education of the Feelings," a doctrine that attempts to explain the connections between 
feeling, thought, and action. Given the reality of social and class conflict of the mid-
nineteenth century, these authors also attempt to understand unsocial feeling and 
categorize it into the realm of sociability. In this way, the "Education of the Feelings" is a 
series of instructive (and corrective) strategies for individual conduct that posit feeling as 
the basis for thought and action and define proper and improper models of conduct. My 
argument here is not that these authors are explicitly drawing from the work of Hume -
indeed, in "Signs of the Time'' (1829), Carlyle mentions Hume only to disparage his 
skepticism and its inability to mitigate the problems of the age (SW 68). Carlyle's critique 
implies, however, that the tribulations of Hume's time are those that still must be 
addressed in present (Victorian) society; in this respect, the principles of moral 
philosophy, and its philosophical thinkers, are not only culturally familiar, but also 
relevant. 
Crucially, the right measures of cultivation and training of the feelings become a 
necessary step towards improving the conditions of individuals, and each major work 
discussed in this chapter stands as a kind of "knowledge text" (Rauch 2) ·- it attempts to 
impart information that can be useful to the present condition of things and their 
subsequent amelioration. Bray's educational treatises, The Education of the Body, An 
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Address to the Working Classes (1836) and The Education of the Feelings (1838), are 
most self-consciously "knowledge texts," purposefully directed to a growing readership 
of literate labourers and artisans - the working classes that predominantly comprised the 
Chartist movement - and incorporating the possibility of both political commitment and 
personal improvement. For Bray, the expression of feeling is crucial to how people 
communicate with each other, yet ultimately, feeling should be mediated rather than 
strictly controlled or repressed. Thus, the Education of the Feelings is an attempt to 
espouse a "systematic treatment" of how feelings "are to be trained and cultivated" (EF i) 
-an announcement that evokes Hume's "science of human nature" and Bain's 
"systematic exposition of the human mind" as the ostensible purpose and scope of 
Treatise and The Emotions and the Will, respectively. This approach requires Bray to 
express a means of negotiating antisocial or angry feeling and to understand the place of 
such feeling in the context of sociability and class identity. 
In The Education of the Feelings, Bray aims at mediating fears over emotional 
expression, especially expression among the working classes, by emphasizing the 
importance of appropriate educators and role models. This education must start in 
childhood and Bray's treatise contains many examples of how to properly rear children 
that will, in turn, grow to be pragmatic and yet feeling subjects. In this n~spect, Bray's 
treatise grants women a central role in ameliorating societal as well as domestic 
problems. Bray does not construct a potentially repressive view of feeling - an approach 
that has often provoked pointed disparagements towards the emotional dispositions of 
marginalized groups such as the working classes and women - but an inclusive one, 
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whereby the communication of feeling - even strong and negative feelings such as anger 
- has a social objective. 
Carlyle's On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in HistOJy ( 1841) provides a 
series of lectures on a group of "Great Men" to which individuals can compare 
themselves and against whom they can evaluate their present leaders. Disparaging the 
thinking of the Mechanical Age in "Signs of the Time" (a kind of thinking that, for 
Carlyle, has its basis in eighteenth-century empiricism), Carlyle's discussion of heroes 
and hero-worship provides a set of exemplary figures and subsequent spiritual ideals. 
These figures provide patterns of conduct and most importantly, leadership, which can 
ultimately guide or affect broad social change. Within Carlylean heroism is a profound 
attention to the emotional capacities of hero figures, and the primary markers of 
Carlylean heroism are sincerity (the genuineness of feeling) and sympathy (the 
communication of feeling). My examination of Carly lean heroism considers how heroism 
and hero-worship are composite oflarger concerns over the merit of political leaders and 
the role of fiction in enacting change. These anxieties also dominate much of Kingsley's 
novel, Alton Locke, Tailor and Poet: An Autobiography ( 1850), and his essays and 
lectures on social and sanitary reform. For Carlyle, books, like heroes, persuade 
individuals, guiding feeling and altering thinking and action (On Heroes 160), and 
Kingsley's novel provides its own means of instmction. His social and political 
commentary serves as an important an1algamation of Bray and Carlyle's respective 
theories of education and heroism. 
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In Alton Locke, Kingsley provides his own "Education of the Feelings" through a 
fictional autobiography of the eponymous protagonist during the Hungry Forties. From 
childhood to early adulthood, Alton Locke is instructed by different role models (or 
heroes) with their own pointed visions of social problems. Locke continually stumbles as 
he relies on a contrasting set of political and literary models for comparison and 
emulation. Yet despite his failures, it is through Locke's capacity for hero-worship that 
Kingsley manages to impart his vision of Christian Socialism as the means to overcome 
class apathy or anger. 
Given Kingsley's assertion that "men should always be interesting to men," 
quoted in the epigraph, it seems appropriate that Kingsley presents this sustained literary 
portrait of the development and progress of an impassioned, albeit flawed, individual and 
poet This "portrait" becomes the means to explore the larger scope of the condition of 
England. Kingsley's statement presents another interrelated assumption: that ifreaders 
should be interested in "remarkable and noble" individuals, it is imperative that people 
know who those individuals are, or at least ought to be, in an effort to find adequate 
political leaders as opposed to demagogues or agitators. In attempting to provide 
appropriate models of both spiritual and political leadership, Kingsley affirms the moral 
and intellectual capabilities of working-class radicals and intellectuals, yet questions the 
potentially alienating effects of class divisions and loyalties. 
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I. Anger and its "reasonable limits": 
Self-Improvement, Social Action, and the Working Classes 
Eighteenth-century conduct books were a popular literary form before the 
dominance of the novel, and as Gregory Sill has argued, "the reformation of the passions" 
also become part of the development of the emergent fictional form. Novels of manners, 
such as those by Francis Burney or Charlotte Lennox, demonstrate "the importance of 
subordinating passions to manners" (Sill 2). By subjecting the passions to a set of 
disciplinary codes of manners or conduct, one could prohibit them or they could assume a 
certain benevolence or utility in the novel forn1, which, in hlm, can moderate the passions 
of readers (Sill 11 ). 
Early and mid-nineteenth-cenh1ry desires for social refonn articulated a social 
need for mass education and knowledge, and this was reflected in the societies, 
publications and periodicals of the period. The establishment of educational movements, 
groups, and institutions - lending libraries, discussion groups, educational Chartism, 
Mechanics' Institutes - were also directed towards the self-improvement of the middle 
and working classes. By the 1840s, educational journals such as Eliza Cook's Journal 
(1849-54), The Family Economist (1848-60), and The Family Friend (1849-1921) aimed 
to teach daily practices of self-education. Founded largely by religious organizations, 
these journals appealed to "better-educated working families who saw their interests as 
divergent from the poorer members of the working class" (Vicinus 117-J 8). Penny 
magazines, radical periodicals, Working-Man's Companions, and compendim11s of 
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"useful" knowledge all helped "institutionalize a genre of cheap and accessible 
knowledge texts" (Rauch 41 ). 
The major premise of programs aimed at self-improvement was that individual 
enhancement would ultimately strengthen relations between the classes. Edwin 
Chadwick's influential Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of 
Great Britain (1842), for instance, attempts to inform a largely middle-class audience of 
the financial and social separation between the middle and lower classes, and to impart 
know ledge as to the way the other "nation" lived. Chadwick presents his information 
through a variety of methods: through the seemingly objective collection of data, through 
the insistence of a "common moral culture" so as to minimize material differences, and 
through shared standards of "moral judgment and beliefs" (Childers 125). In Chadwick's 
report, as in the writings of Kingsley, the need to improve sanitary conditions and moral 
education coincides, whereby the rates of disease and descriptions of sJums function in 
tandem with sermons and appeals for right conduct. Alongside the obvious calls to 
improve sanitary conditions (such as concentrated disposal, the clean-up of refuse, and 
the improvement of water supplies), Chadwick stresses a "refinement in manners," the 
purpose of which is to elevate the moral as well as physical conditions of the working 
classes ( 425). 
To be sure, the political implications of this movement were complex. Rauch 
points out that many working-class groups "believed that knowledge was foisted by the 
powerful and the wealthy on the working classes in order to indoctrinate them into a 
culture where knowledge validated a simple work ethic" (23). In commenting on the 
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physical and moral conditions of England's labouring population, reports such as those 
by Edwin Chadwick or James Kay-Shuttlew011h also address the possibility and fear of 
social upheaval that such conditions produce. In 17ie Moral and Physical Condition of the 
Working Classes Employed In the Cotton Manufacture in Manchester ( 1832), Kay-
Shuttleworth cautions that when the labouring poor inevitably comparn their squalid 
surroundings with those of the middle and upper classes (as in Hume's dictum they are 
disposed to do), the "wealth and splendour, the refinement and luxury of the superior 
classes might provoke the wild inroads of a marauding force" (71). Mary Poovey notes 
that Kay-Shuttleworth's acknowledgement and proposed amelioration of moral and 
physical conditions rests on the middle-class domestic ideal (62). 
In response, working-class radicals advocate their own educational texts, ones that 
ostensibly serve working-class life and ideals. Radical strategies attempting to unite the 
working classes through education and improvement is also part of the Chartist platform, 
which includes finding suitable and ennobling literature for the mass readership. In a 
series ofletters address specifically "To the Young Men of the Working Classes," 
Thomas Cooper advocates education and the creation of a distinctly working-class 
literary tradition and culture, which would elevate conduct and "respect" amongst the 
literate working classes. Oratorical, like his fiction, Eight Letters to the Young Men of the 
Working Classes ( 1851) incorporates direct addresses to a specified readership and 
stresses the importance of education as part of Cha11ism's political goals.: 
What shall we do, - do you say, - to prove that we are animated by these 
high, but rational emotions? I answer - strive, in spite of all difficulties 
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and deprivations, and with the cheering faith that they.for you are but 
temporary, to raise yourselves morally and intellectually, - and so, shame 
those who say you are not fit for the franchise into the perception that you 
deserve it better, perhaps, than themselves, and that you must and will 
have it. ( 4, original emphasis) 
Stressing the pedagogical and moral benefits of writing poetry, Cooper encourages, as 
part of this education, fellow labourers to write verse as a means of self-reflection and 
self-improvement (Eight Letters 17-18). 
For Bray, social progress functions along a similar trajectory that links an 
improvement in outward action and manners to an elevated inner condition. Like 
Chadwick, Bray's goal is to educate or infonn his readership: not through statistical or 
documentary details, however, but through a series of pragmatic lessons or examples that 
position the working classes not as objects of study but as subjects of progress. In this 
sense, Bray's Education of the Feelings takes the fom1at of Harriet Ma11ineau's 
Illustrations of Political Economy (1832), which provides a series of lessons about 
political economy directed to the literate working classes. Both Martim:au and Bray 
provide a clearly topical discussion along with a case study or example that serves as the 
illustration: Martineau's examples employ fictional modes, such as the development of 
individuated characters and the mechanisms of plot, to provide lessons on subjects related 
to labour and wages; Bray provides examples of how properly to rear children, the future 
inheritors (and mediators) of social divisions and problems. Illustrations consists of 
individual short stories followed by a summary of a particular principle. Bray's 
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organizational stmcture in The Education of the F eeli11gs appears pedagogically similar: 
Chapter 1 sets out his categorization of propensities, sentiments, and faculties; Chapter 2, 
titled "Example," provides the illustrative consequences of having improper educational 
models of feeling. By Chapter 4, Bray starts to discuss feelings individually, and each 
categorical subsection provides a definition of the feeling, its origins, and its effects on 
others, as well as its application to daily life through an example. 
As a ribbon manufacturer, Bray had a familiar understanding of social and labour 
issues and established numerous programs of education for industrialists and labourers: 
he helped establish nonsectarian public schools; by 1872, Education of the Feelings was 
abridged and used as a textbook for secular schools; and he campaigned for the 
legalization of trade unions and other cooperative labour projects. Bray also wrote 
extensively on labour issues,5 and in 1843, he helped establish the Covent1y Labourers & 
Artisans Co-operative Society. Throughout the 1840s, Bray was a manager of the 
Coventry Mechanics' Institute and the Coventry Provident Dispensary. As an Owenite, 
he was markedly influenced by the socialist philosophy of Robert Owen ( 1771-1858), 
who also proclaimed education as a means of individual and collective improvement and 
a way for individuals to escape deterministic conditions. 
For Bray, education was essential not only for the middle classes, and their 
children, but also for the children of educated industrial labourers and at1isans. 6 In his 
preface to The Education of the Body, Bray offers his definition of education: "It is 
generally thought to mean learning from books, being taught to read, to write, and to cast 
accounts; but this is a very confined sense of the term, and does not include one-third of 
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what ought to be included when we speak of Education" (EB 5). Bray" s definition 
assumes education to be a general striving for improvement through diligent attention to 
interrelated concerns: "Education, in its proper sense, is that kind of treatment 
commencing at birth, and therefore not necessarily confined to school, by which the 
body, the feelings, and the mind or intellect, can, by perseverance, be brought to the 
highest perfection of which our nature is capable in this world" (EB 5, original emphasis). 
A comprehensive term, education for Bray consists of the training of the body, the 
feelings, and the intellect, and he makes explicit the connection between the physical 
body and the mind by declaring that the "health of the brain depends on the health of the 
body" (EB 6). 
The mediation of the feelings is one-third of this curriculum, and Bray shows 
these components of education as ultimately complementary, since "[t]he cultivation of 
the feelings, or moral training, bears the same relation to happiness, which the observance 
of the laws for the due regulation of the body, does to health" (EF 4). Bray also illustrates 
the physical and cognitive connections between mind, body, and feeling in his later work, 
The Philosophy of Necessity ( 1841 ):"The abuse of the propensities, or these feelings in 
excess, constitute envy, hatred, malice, jealousy, anger, fear; and all act injuriously on the 
bodily system" (341 ). 
Bray categorizes feelings into two basic groups, which he refers to as genera: 7 
propensities (those related to the instincts of humans and animals), and sentiments 
(divided among those shared by animals and those relating to humans in particular) (EF 
7-8). The division between propensities and sentiments is distinct; the propensities relate 
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to one's own "preservation" - an impulse or instinct - while the sentiments are 44those 
feelings which have reference to the opinion of others" (EF 12). Thus, while propensities 
are related to the self, sentiments are ultimately related to others, and are integral to 
interrelations and sociability. Furthermore, Bray makes the distinction between two 
orders: feelings (which includes both propensities and sentiments) and the intellectual 
faculties (EF 10-11). For Bray, the intellectual faculties are mediators: they "direct the 
propensities and sentiments to their legitimate object and mode of gratification" (EF 13). 
The regulation of instinct and the cultivation of the sentiments and intellectual faculties 
are necessa1y, explains Bray, insomuch as both feeling and reason require each other for 
progress and improvement (EF 16-17). 
Training requires, firstly, a systematic understanding and categorization of 
feeling, and Bray again uses the analogy of the physical body: "For the proper 
management of the feelings and dispositions, it is quite as necessary to know what they 
are, as it is to know the functions of the different organs of the body; and it is as 
important to treat each mental faculty separately, as it is that we should not apply 
remedies to the lungs, when the stomach is the organ requiring regulation" (EF 4). With 
this recurring comparison, it seems probable that Bray is considering, foremost, the same 
readership of his earlier treatise on the body: the literate working classes, specifically 
labourers and artisans. Bray's involvement with working-class education and cooperative 
programs makes this seem likely, yet the omission of a direct address to the working 
classes - such as the one found in the full title of The Education of the Body, An Address 
to the Working Classes - seems significant. I suggest that in The Education of the 
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Feelings, Bray expands his scope. By arguing that such education or training should 
begin in childhood, Bray is not only directing his text to labourers and artisans, the 
members of Mechanics' Institutes set up for adult education, but is also implicitly 
addressing women, the primary care-givers. Given that Bray's examples of proper rearing 
includes comments on the conduct of servants or governesses, this implies a expanded 
readership: working-class women employed in domestic service, and possibly, the 
middling classes in the industrial economy - public servants and clerks, merchants - who 
could feasibly have the income to employ domestic servants. Bray's attention to daily 
(domestic) life is significant: in this respect, domesticity becomes, not the idealized 
alternative to an angry or dissatisfied (work) "force," but a necessary sphere of influence 
and education. 8 
Bray's emphasis on training means that the cautionary moral tone that prevails in 
many reports on social and sanitary conditions, such as those by Chadwick and Kay-
Shuttleworth, is largely absent. For instance, Bray commences Chapter Four, in which he 
categorizes separate feelings and their social consequences, with the propensity of 
"appetite," which Bray variously discusses as both "gluttony" and "drunkenness" (EF 
32). Predominantly, Bray conceives of appetite as a physical rather than moral concern, 
and as something that develops from childhood; in this respect, the propensity of appetite 
is discussed on the practical basis of nutrition rather than restraint. Accordingly, Bray 
gives examples of how to ensure a healthy appetite in children and suggests ways to 
gratify appetite without encouraging abuses such as gluttony. Through the exercise and 
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training of such a propensity, Bray's ultimate result is to teach children "to judge wisely 
for themselves, rather than by restricting them to a certain allowance" (EF 33-34 ). 
Bray continually critiques strictly prohibitive injunctions by parents and care-
givers towards children; for instance, that "many parents seem to think it sufficient to tell 
their children that they ought not to feel and act, so and so, without taking pains to direct 
each feeling to the legitimate mode in which it may be indulged" (EF 26, emphasis in 
original). Multiple examples of both proper and improper ways of dealing with those 
feelings most experienced in childhood are provided, and Bray briefly cites the 
consequences for adulthood if such practices continue completely unchecked. Of Bray's 
introductory example of appetite, it seems significant that he only briefly mentions adult 
forms of intemperance, such as drnnkenness, without sufficient expansion, since it 
implies decidedly more serious consequences than a penchant for "sweetmeats and other 
delicacies" (EF 3 7). In social and sanitary reports by Chadwick and Kay-Shuttleworth, 
intemperance becomes the culprit for the large-scale moral and physical deterioration of 
the working classes. Alongside warnings about "dnmkenness," for instance, Chadwick 
provides a series of decidedly more extreme examples of alcohol-induced '~violent 
deaths.'' Bray may well be acknowledging conventionally class-based representations of 
"appetite," but he chooses to focus, instead, on the genesis of this propensity, as it 
manifests itself in the daily lives of children. 
In considering the consequences of having improper educational models for 
children, Bray explicitly considers how women are reared or educated: "frequently do we 
find, that a girl, unfit for any other occupation, is placed as the companion and guardian 
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of a child" (EF 21 ). His recurring critique of "ignorant" and "selfish" nursemaids or other 
female care-givers (and here he includes mothers as well as paid guardians) is a larger 
critique of the status of feminized education and conduct: '"Engaged in the frivolous 
pursuits of the world, introduced in society at an early age, dressing, dancing, visiting -
when they are called to the most momentous duties, they are obligated to rely upon an 
ignorant nurse, to trust old wives tales, for what ought to have been correct knowledge" 
(EF 21-22). According to Bray, children who are reared by indifferent or ignorant 
guardians or mothers cannot be expected to '~feel properly," for at best:, such rearing is 
more about restraint than moral direction (EF 23, emphasis in original). 
Bray's attention to personal conduct and training coincides with a larger 
imperative of working-class radical texts that attempt to regulate the propensities of 
individuals as a means to raise the quality (and reputation) of working-class life. 
Increasingly in the 1830s and 1840s, Chartist organizations and periodicals emphasized 
the importance of temperance or restraint, not only in discourses of personal conduct, but 
also in politics, whereby the control of this propensity becomes in itself a political 
activity. If the goal of universal male suffrage was to become a reality, Chartists 
promoted spending less time in gin houses and more time pursuing self~education and 
self-improvement.9 Anna Clark explains that as part of their political campaign, Chartists 
tried to transform "the old masculine plebian public of beershops and workshops into a 
more integrated, disciplined public sphere" (221 ). I would add that this public sphere 
includes a readership, and in this sense, Chartist fiction, with its direct addresses to 
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readers, advocates for the improvement of populace literature and more politically 
engaged readers. 
Emphasizing temperance was not limited to working-class radicalism alone -
women's movements also appealed to similar doctrines of respectability and self-
restraint. Yet Bray's opening treatment of appetite, in eschewing a didactic tone and 
refusing to rely on stark or extreme examples to mark its import, sets the pattern for the 
crnx of his arguments and concerns: that one must continue to regulate and exercise 
propensities and feelings in order to establish "reasonable limits" rather than rely on 
repressive (and class-based) injunctions to establish order and proper conduct. For Bray, 
the scope of the education of the feelings is to "restrain and regulate the selfish 
propensities, so that they may be exercised only in accordance with the dictates of the 
moral feelings and intellect; to strengthen the moral feelings, and to direct each feeling, 
both selfish and moral, to its proper objects, and mode of gratification" (EF 25). His 
focus on the cultivation of feeling, as opposed to strict repression, is best exemplified by 
his discussion of negative feelings. 
With this in mind, it is interesting that Bray does not include a section titled 
"Anger" in his categorical breakdown of individual feelings; the word anger is used 
sparingly, appearing only four times in The Education of the Feelings. Instead, Bray 
chooses to describe various kinds of anger, which he separates into categories such as 
"combativeness" or "oppositiveness" (EF 54-60) and ··destructiveness" (EF 60-65) -
distinguishing the forms by their potential physiological effect, their object or mode of 
gratification, as well as their social utility. This approach significantly anticipates neuro-
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anatomical theories of anger that describe the feeling as something necessary, even 
skillful. A. D. Craig explains that historically, "from Darwin on, [anger] has been 
associated with a unique cognitive capacity~" it is both a facial and bodily response 
"designed to overcome an obstacle" (273). In discussing anger's connection between 
mind and body, Craig squarely (and correctly) attributes this change in thinking to 
Darwin's work on emotion. In this respect, Bray's own philosophical (and pre-neuro-
anatomical) treatment of anger is an important predecessor. His definition of 
"combativeness" is strikingly similar: the "feeling of opposition which rises, in the mind, 
when any obstacle presents itself to its desires" (EF 54). 
Anger is a felt response, and Bray's two treatises explicitly make this connection 
between emotion and the body. To designate anger as being bodily has., historically, been 
used to denounce its expression; similarly, the body in the mid-nineteenth century 
becomes a "site for the contestation and resolution of socio-political conflicts" (Hall 5). 
Donald E. Hall observes that the physical body functions as a model, or metaphor, for the 
present conflict: the threat from the "lower" body of the radical working classes (and the 
potential diseases of the urban slum and the Great Unwashed), and as a "site" upon which 
classist, racist, and imperial beliefs are inscribed (6). Bray's valuation of the body, as a 
site of regulation connected to the intellect and the emotions, links the body directly to 
social reform and the spirit of self-improvement; as such, the body exists simultaneously 
as a site of regulation and agency. Conscious exercises and routines of the body can have 
an impact on one's interior condition - intellectual, as in the case of Bray, or spiritual, as 
in the case of Kingsley's Muscular Christianity. 
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Attributing to anger a social function and effect also enables Bray to discuss the 
feeling beyond strictly repressive or negative parameters. For Bray, anger "requires 
directing rather than restraining; for "its active exercise is necessary to eminence in any 
pursuit" (EF 54). To the "judicious trainer of the feelings," combativeness has the 
capacity to motivate individuals and groups, providing necessary stimuli, the "energy and 
power to overcome" difficulties or problems (EF 54 ). 
If individuals are predisposed to the communication of feeling, then it is through 
this disposition that Bray establishes the "reasonable limits" of combativeness. The 
"manifestation of the feeling in one individual rouses it immediately in others," which is 
why, insists Bray, "the more tenacious the one may be of the point in dispute, the less 
will the other be disposed to give it up" (EF 55). In this sense, while combativeness may 
provide the motivation for an individual to overcome an obstacle, within interpersonal 
exchanges, it may lead to a kind of obstacle (or impasse) itself. In addition, the tendency 
to exert authority with "a sharp angry tone" can be injurious to those subjected to that 
authority, who are then motivated to act, or avoid undesirable actions, out of a sense of 
fear (EF 56-57). There are, then, significant qualifications for the sociability of anger. 
Bray provides, however, a condition for the rightful exercise of combativeness: "the 
disposition to contend and dispute should never arise, without the voice of conscience 
urging the question, 'Is it consistent with the rights of others, with trnth and justice, to 
contend this point?"' (EF 59). So stipulated, Bray assumes that feelings of combativeness 
can be in accord with necessary and practical applications, rather than solely with self-
interested aims. By aligning it with the concepts of "truth and justice," Bray envisions 
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that the pursuit of contention can instigate or stimulate the process to overcome obstacles 
and injustices. 
Like combativeness, Bray considers the ominously-coined "destructiveness" in a 
similar (potentially necessary) light, since "nature bestows no qualities which are not 
intended to conduce to the good of the individual to whom they belong, or his fellow-
beings" (EF 60). Destructiveness "in its right application exerts a beneficial effect upon 
the character and conduct of man." Rather than simply destroy for one's own sake, the 
feeling involves "the power and energy to inflict pain for wise and benevolent purposes" 
(EF 61 ), and this designation implies an inter-social objective outside of personal feeling 
or gratification. In this light, destmction for the purpose of noble or "benevolent 
purposes" has the potential to be radically ameliorative: "As, in this world, we must cut 
down the briars and thorns before we can plant the flowers and fmit - as we must often 
probe the wound we wish to heal" (EF 61). The natural analogy that Bray uses to 
describe a benevolent (and ultimately just) anger implies that destructiveness has a 
natural place in the world - and the recurring image of Nature as a self-regulating force is 
one that Bray consistently uses as his ideal exemplar. Within the "limits of benevolence," 
destructiveness evokes the attributes required for interrogation of unjust authority or 
conditions and their removal. In this respect, Shuttleworth' s "marauding force" has been 
divested of its pejorative (and self-gratifying) connotations. 
Bray's claim for the usefulness of destmction and contention is made possible by 
the establishment of "reasonable limits" - the parameters that guide one's conduct by 
demarcating action motivated by self-interested feeling and that which is designated for 
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benevolent aims. These aims are variously described as the collective moral aspirations 
of social progress and improvement: Bray's destmctive individual has the potential to 
guide action and lead by example, and, to return to Bray's potent analogy, to "cut down 
briars and thorns" to make way for new possibilities and new growth - a suitable analogy 
in the context of Bray's own political progressivism. When personal feelings such as 
anger are properly trained or cultivated, by proper guardians or care-givers, and when 
they are directed at proper objects, they are able to move beyond strictly individualistic 
purposes of self-gratification or pleasure, operating, .instead, through principles of 
cooperation and benevolence. This provides the potential for a more nuanced discussion 
of political radicalism that goes beyond the middle- and upper-class fear of riots and mob 
violence; moreover, it is not divergent from Chartist claims over the necessity of anger as 
both a literal and rhetorical force in politics. 10 
Bray's emphasis on regulation, like Bain's systematic study of the emotions and 
the will, implies a series of checks and balances between feeling and its mediation, 
something that also becomes apparent in Carlyle's vision of heroism. Despite his earlier 
disparagements of Chartists and other political radicals, Carlyle designates the hero as 
having "wild feelings" coupled with an "iron restraint" (Heroes 48), and much of his own 
lectures on heroism attempts to strike a balance between such conflicting forces. 
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II. Carlyle's Heroism as a Model of Conduct 
For Carlyle, the "prime characteristic of a Hero" is sincerity, and this implies the 
possession and expression of genuine feeling (011 Heroes 147). Like Bray's emphasis on 
proper guardians, Carlyle's lectures on heroism articulate a set of criteria for 
representative models of leadership and conduct. As a historical and moral principle, 
Victorian heroism encompasses both personal and collective action: how one should act, 
or what should motivate one to act, is a direct reflection on the given time, and thus, has 
historical significance. The representation of heroism also becomes the impetus by which 
to comment on the necessity of political and social change and reform, and how such 
change should occur. Richard Salmon notes that Carlylean heroism is spurred by "a 
rationalist disenchantment of religion and an irrational worship of new gods" - a dialectic 
between idolatry and idoloclasm (2-3). For Carlyle, heroes are the "leaders of men," and 
this ambiguous designation enables him to draw from a divergent rota of figures: from 
Mohammed to Napoleon, from deities and clerics to authors. 
The common nineteenth-century critique of On Heroes and Hero Worship was 
that Carlyle's choice of examples followed no discemable logic. More 
contemporaneously, Salmon notes the "secular drift of Carly lean idolatry" (2) - and the 
designation of "drift" implies a kind of meandering lack of order. Reviewing the book for 
The Christian Remembrancer in 1843, the Anglican priest William Thomson argues that 
Carlyle's selection of heroes includes a puzzling mixture of "real and mythic persons, 
sane and crazy, moral and immoral, honoured and execrated, self-restraining and wildly 
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self-indulgent" (126). In a letter written to the same periodical, F. D. Maurice, author, 
theologian, and a leader of the Christian Socialist movement, comments on the anti-
ecclesiastical "tendency" of Carlyle's writings. Maurice argues that Carlyle only looks to 
the past to find suitable spiritual models, and for Maurice, this was proof of Carlyle's 
underlying belief that religious and political "forefathers" were "better and truer men" 
then the leaders of the present ( 452). By accusing Carlyle of a kind of nostalgia for past 
leaders, Maurice expressively links heroism and hero-worship to the political discourses 
of the present. 
Maurice's criticism deals with a presumed exigency of the era - an eagerness to 
find recognizable (and present day) models for conduct and leadership. For many, the 
Reform Act of 1832, and the ascension of the young (and unmarried) Queen Victoria to 
the throne in 183 7, meant that the country lacked viable authority figures in a period of 
transition. 11 Carlyle's lectures on heroism are indicative of a wider imperative to find 
suitable models of conduct and leadership, and Maurice's charge of nostalgia is one that 
can be widened to include Victorian discussions of heroism in general, since they often 
entail a kind of lamenting for a lost or past leader. In his poem "The Lost Leader" ( 1845), 
Robert Browning both critiques and laments W ordswo1th 's later conservatism and 
desertion of radical views~ Victorian heroism becomes the search for and confirmation of 
an immortalized and public individual, whose actions and ideals form the:: "pattern [by 
which] to live and to die." Inspiring such devotion, Browning's (lost) leader must, like 
Carlyle's hero, be moved to act by a sincerity of feeling and purpose - motivated by a 
conviction of larger ideals and causes, rather than "a handful of silver" and personal gain. 
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For many Victorian authors, the qualities of the hero are those 1:hat may be 
missing in present-day society. Discussing the possibilities of Victorian heroism in 
authors as varied as Mill, Carlyle, and Arnold, George Levine explains that heroism and 
hero-worship fulfilled multiple purposes; above all, it was a recognition of "stale 
conformity" and a declaration that one must transcend not only the self (and self-interest), 
but also the daily world ( 49-50). Herein lies the central paradox of heroism: in providing 
models for individual identity and action, heroism ultimately relies on a transcendence of 
self and material conditions. It requires, as Levine notes, a deliberation on the self, and 
yet the impulse to "obliterate selfhood" (50). For Levine, this "paradigmatic progress" is 
embodied in Carlyle's Teufelsdrockh, whose moments of suicidal despair are overcome 
by his spiritual journey into the "Everlasting Yea." Teufelsdrockh's progress relies on 
emotional crisis and catharsis to understand, ultimately, that one is more than the sum of 
one's sensations, desires, and feelings (Levine 64). 
Victorian heroism also follows the intellectual tradition of Romanticism and the 
cultural emergence of the Romantic hero, whose moral values centre on feeling, 
sentiment, and sensibility (Peckham 11 ). The Romantic hero eschews the conventional; 
he strives, instead, for the singular, and in this sense, emerges as the quintessential 
exemplar of strong-willed individualism. Importantly~ however, Carlyle also stresses the 
practice of hero-worship - the need to find these "patterns" of feeling and action - as a 
means of social recove1y. Hero-worship provides an opportunity for Carlyle to illustrate 
and assess suitable and unsuitable leaders in history, and the historical (and biographical) 
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figures whom he employs as models demonstrate an important aspect of his contribution 
to the critique of existing political and social systems. 
In Carlylean philosophy, heroic duty is directly opposed to the largely empirical 
theory of action argued by Bentham, which assumes that human behaviour is motivated 
by the individual pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. For Carlyle, duty evokes 
a higher principle of motivation beyond that of self-interest; sincerity of feeling is that 
which inspires a person to act beyond (or in spite of) the goal of achieving pleasure and 
avoiding pain. Dutiful action may be painful or costly to oneself, according to Carlyle, 
and herein lies its importance. In this respect, Carlyle's version of heroism, like Bray's 
treatises, assumes that for feelings to be socially valuable, they must move beyond their 
origins in the self (and utilitarian egoism). Carlylean heroism requires both a 
consideration of individual feeling, as a marker of heroism, and heroic feeling as it affects 
or motivates others. 
From the very first lecture, which describes the hero as a divinity, Carlyle 
presents a theory of individual motivation: 
But the thing a man does practically believe (and this is often enough 
without asserting it even to himself, much less to others); the thing a man 
does practically lay to heart, and know for certain, concerning his vital 
relations to this mysterious Universe, and his duty and destiny there, that 
is in all cases the primary thing for him, and creatively determines all the 
rest. That is his religion; or, it may be, his mere skepticism and no-
religion: the manner it is in which he feels himself to be spiritually related 
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to the Unseen World or No-World~ and I say, if you tell me what that is, 
you tell me to a very great extent what the man is, what the kind of things 
he will do is. (On Heroes 2-3, emphasis in the original) 
For Carlyle, personal belief12 may not be acknowledged or even articulated, but it is, 
foremost, felt. Thus, personal belief is, above all, a question of sincerity - of "laying to 
heart" - that goes beyond "profession and assertion" (On Heroes 2), and this is what 
motivates action as opposed to affirmed allegiance to an organized movement or cause. It 
is presumably this contention that roused Maurice's criticism over Carlyle's tendency to 
disregard present-day ecclesiastical authorities. 
Carlyle's selection of heroes follows what he sees as the social and cultural 
progression (and transformation) of authority and power, distinguishing how heroic 
individuals gain influence (and thus, hero-worshipers). Given this trajectory, the hero as a 
divinity, being "the oldest primary fonn of Heroism," gives way to the hero, not as a god, 
but as "God-inspired" (On Heroes 3, 42). As his lectures progress, Carlyle extends his 
discussion of heroism and hero worship beyond religious leadership, and to other leaders 
that shape social thought: writers (poets and men of letters), military leaders, and kings. 
These leaders, spiritual and secular, have the ability to inspire hero-worship and thus, 
influence large-scale change; their emotional dispositions become the requisite objects of 
influence. In describing Mohammed as a hero-prophet, for instance, Carlyle distinguishes 
the religious leader as having both "wild strong feelings" and an "iron restraint" over 
them, and he asserts that in this combination lies "the characteristic of noblemindness, of 
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genius" (On Heroes 48). The hero must have strong feeling, but Carlyle qualifies that the 
hero must not be guided by feeling alone. 
Restraint does not minimize or thwart one's vision; rather, it allows the hero to 
focus his energies and understand, clearly, the object of his passion. "I know nothing so 
intense as Dante," declares Carlyle, yet for all his intensity, Dante "has a great power of 
vision; seizes the very type of a thing; presents that and nothing more" (On Heroes 92). 
This balance between feeling and precision is what makes Dante a heroic example, a 
balance that requires both the communication and sincerity of feeling: '''In the first place, 
he could not have discerned the object at all, or seen the vital type of it, unless he had, 
what we may call, sympathized with it, - had sympathy in him to bestow on objects. He 
must have been sincere about it too; sincere and sympathetic: a man without worth 
cannot give you the likeness of any object" (On Heroes 93, original emphasis). Feeling 
becomes the grounds for a focused insight, an epistemology and a moral ability that 
Carlyle designates as heroic: "[A] thoroughly immoral man could not know anything at 
all! To know a thing, what we can call knowledge, a man must first love the thing, 
sympathize with it; that is be virtuously related to it. If he has not the justice to put down 
his own selfishness at every turn, the courage to stand by the dangerous-tme at every 
turn, how shall he know?" (On Heroes 107, original emphasis). 
In the cash-nexus, Carlyle's heroes - and later, his Captains of Indust1y- replace 
"relations of monetary exchange with relations of love" (Garafalo 293). Carlyle's 
inclusion of widely divergent figures signals a kind of availability of heroism to those in 
the actual world - not simply those long dead or long glorified. By discussing Robert 
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Burns, explains Salmon, "Carlyle signaled the availability of the category of 'hero' to a 
much wider population than was customary of the time" ('"The Unaccredited Hero"' 
177). In this respect, one can more closely tie the idealism of Carly lean heroism to a 
deliberate comment on the age and on the need for social and self-improvement. The 
Carlylean hero, whether monarch or poet, influences others and as such, Carlyle's 
conceptualization of heroism requires the practice of hero-worship alongside the 
exemplary conduct of heroes: as society develops, and heroes evolve, they are 
nevertheless united by "the transcendent admiration of a Great Man" (On Heroes 11). 
Given the calls for political reform and for changes in political leadership during 
the early and mid- nineteenth century, Carlyle's heroic exemplars strikingly demonstrate 
the difficulty in situating themselves within the period that has created and even 
worshipped them - as Carlyle's discussion of the literary lionization of Robert Burns 
demonstrates. They also pose a particular problem: using historical examples of "great 
men" to help inspire change in a period so different from their own. Thus, the difficulty 
that Carlyle faces when envisioning heroism is how to posit the hero as being both 
superior to demagogues (or "quackeries," a recurring term in On Heroes), yet still the 
product of his time. For Carlyle, the hero's leadership provides the model for generations 
to come, but his "outward shape" is determined by the "time and the environment he 
finds himself in" (On Heroes 115). It is unsurprising, then, that in the midst of what 
Carlyle calls the "social pestilences" - dominant schools of thought such as Benthamism, 
Chartism, and more generally, the "Gospel of Mammonism" - heroism becomes more 
necessary, albeit more difficult (On Heroes 170-175). In Alton Locke, Kingsley takes up 
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this very concern and incorporates a search for viable heroic models as the principle 
motive of his narrative. This search becomes, for readers, its own education of the 
feelings, one conducted through the merits and failures of the eponymous protagonist. 
III. Hero-Worship as the Education of the Feelings: Kingsley's Alton Locke 
As the exemplar of right conduct and selfless duty, the Carlylean hero provides 
the leadership necessary to a time in want of guidance. Significantly, Carlyle attributes 
the same function to (great) books as he does to (great) people: both persuade others 
towards right duty and conduct. This is most strikingly manifested in Carlyle's chapter on 
the Hero as a Man of Letters, which provides a modem model for litera1y commentary 
and vision. The nineteenth-century preoccupation with hero.ism, particularly within the 
works of both Carlyle and Kingsley, indicates larger concerns regarding the merit of 
political leaders, how individuals should act in an increasingly fragmented (and 
antagonistic) society, and finally, the role of fiction in enacting change. In his own lecture 
on "Heroism," written in 1850 and later published in SanitCIT)l and Social Lectures 
(1880), Kingsley argues that readers turn to fiction for "the study of human nature" and to 
find heroes for the present age, one he deems, like Carlyle, to be unheroic (SSL 225-228). 
Kingsley couples his comment on the lack of leadership and guidance with 
observations on the status of fiction. Regarding the popularity of sensation fiction, he 
points out that it provides an outlet for readers' own unrealized capabilities for feeling 
and action: "conscious, poor souls, of capacities in themselves of passion and action for 
good and evil, for which their frivolous humdrum daily life gives no room, no vent" (SSL 
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227). Ultimately, it is the "humdrnm" of daily life in a mechanical age (a quintessentially 
Carlylean assertion) that thwarts heroic potential, and present-day individuals must turn 
to fiction to explore heroic "passion and action." Kingsley's hero is anyone who stands 
"superior to his or her fellow creatures," someone who does not squander capabilities for 
feeling and action (SSL 229, emphasis added). One of the most obvious differences 
between Carlyle and Kingsley's heroism is the latter's refusal to distinguish sex as a 
marker of the heroic. Carlyle's heroism depends on the designation of "great men," and a 
kind of sensibility of both "passion" and "restraint" typified as masculine. Kingsley's 
vision of heroism, however, like Bray's treatise, includes a consideration of women as 
viable models and leaders. 
Advancing the condition of England requires, for Kingsley, addressing an 
increasingly divided audience in order to instill the importance of proper forms of 
guidance that can bridge divisions between different classes of reader. Kingsley's desire 
to consider a varied readership has been attributed as a novelistic failing on his part. 
Catherine Gallagher has discussed the divided narratorial voice in Alton Locke as the 
product of two contrary philosophical states: Kingsley's Coleridgean Romanticism and 
the empirical determinism that dictates his ideas surrounding social reform. Gallagher 
describes Kingsley's novel as a faltering attempt to create a cohesive format for the 
emergent social fonn of the novel, a text that must depict a society that is, itself, divided 
(109). Lee Louise describes the novel similarly: "The quest for social cohesion results in 
a nervous, twitchy text as Kingsley makes constant, self-correcting attempts to state and 
re-state his position, in order it appears, to propitiate as many readers as possible" (6). As 
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a "hopeful authorial amalgam, the novel is not, according to its critics, fully determined 
(Lee 2); rather, it absorbs the literary forms, ideologies, and the "knowledge texts" of 
period: the industrial or social problem novel, the bildungsroma11, the 
(pseudo )autobiography, the political manifesto, the educational treatise, and the social 
and sanitary report. 
The novel's generic hybridity demonstrates how ardently Kingsley tries to appeal 
to different readers (as do the varying responses from Kingsley's contemporaries). A 
reviewer from Fraser's pronounces the novel an essay on political economy covertly 
written under the guise of fictional entertainment. For this reviewer, readers of novels 
should expect "pleasure, with, perhaps, a few wholesome tmths scatternd amongst the 
leaves" ("A Triad of Novels" 575). Kingsley's novel is both entertainment and education, 
yet for others reviewers, it is a brand of "Revolutionary Literature" under the guise of 
philanthropy and concern for the conditions of the working classes (Crocker 490). By 
attempting to sympathize with the eponymous hero - a working-class poet, intellectual, 
and political radical - and encouraging his readers to do so, Kingsley provides, 
ostensibly, a tacit approval of radicalism. Kingsley's attempts to address everyone, so to 
speak - an attempt that undermines the narrative cohesion of the novel -- create, instead, 
an uncertainty about political allegiances that manifests itself through a suspicion of 
Kingsley's sympathy. 
Self-consciously labeling the novel an "autobiography" also implies a certain 
discomfort with fiction or novel reading and writing (Childers 140). Kingsley seems 
unclear as to the purpose of his novel - whether to educate or to entertain - and this 
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partly explains its mixed reception. Considering the claim made by the reviewer in 
Fraser's about the pleasure of novel reading, Kingsley's text offers to the reader a new 
set of criteria in order to distinguish the social problem or condition-of-England novel as 
its own distinct form. Childers explains the establishment of the social problem novel as 
something deliberately opposing entertainment and pleasure: "Reading a social-problem 
novel should not be 'agreeable'; quite to the contrary, if the novel is a success as social 
criticism, reading it should have been one of the most disagreeable of occupations for the 
Victorian reader" (141). Childers' claim implies a fmitful connection to Carlylean 
heroism: the act of reading the condition-of-England novel is a selfless act, and the 
"disagreeable" effects that Childers describes become proof of this sincerity. The grim 
urgency of the condition-of-England novel is intentional, a means to create an affective 
reading experience beyond that of entertainment. 
Moreover, Kingsley's use of fictional autobiography brings to mind Carlyle's 
Sartor Resartus (1833-34) and the "revelatory potential of autobiographical narrative" 
(Fleishman 33). For Avrom Fleishman, the autobiographical mode enables Teufelsdrockh 
(or Carlyle) to face the object of his scrutiny, society itself: "the would-be social reformer 
must communicate his radical, if not revolutiona1y, critique to the very society he finds 
blind and com1pt; the pharmacist-physician of social disease must adjust his prescriptions 
to the clap-trap of political shibboleths" (33). Teufelsdrockh's "progress" is, importantly, 
both an interior and spiritual journey, whereby the spiritual autobiography becomes the 
appropriate medimn for this constructed persona. 13 Kingsley chooses to discuss the 
development of Alton Locke through a similar fonn, and by making Locke a tailor, 
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Kingsley conceives of him as the literal embodiment of Carlyle's clothing philosophy, 
whereby clothes represent the symbolic stmctures and beliefs that govern society. As a 
tailor, Locke must sbtch his failures and successes together into a coherent 
autobiographical narrative, which becomes, like in Sartor Resartus, a traditionally 
introspective mode of self-development and formation. 
Despite its obvious indebtedness to Carlyle, Locke's narrative is also, as Salmon 
notes, "a conscious simulation of a textual object which had already begun to proliferate 
in authentic form by the 1840s: the narrative of working-class self-development" ("'The 
Unaccredited Hero"' 167). Autobiographies such as those by John Bethune, Alexander 
Sommerville, and later, Thomas Cooper, helped perpetuate the Bumsian mythos of the 
working-class poet and intellectual (On Heroes 185-194)- one that established a 
cautionary discourse, variously advocating class loyalty and warning of the ill-effects of 
literary lionization that continues in Kingsley's novel. 14 
Kingsley's own awareness of the separation and division of the classes (and on a 
more microcosmic level, his readership) largely contributes to the ''diagrammatic" and 
didactic quality of the novel (Cripps xvii). There are, for instance, frequent pauses in the 
story's action to make comments on or provide statistics about the working conditions of 
tailors or needlewomen in London, about popular working-class reading material; these 
exist alongside summaries of the daily routines and habits of Cambridge undergraduates. 
Other times, Locke apologizes to his "high-born" or "aristocratic readers" for recording 
the vulgar speeches that take place in the workroom (AL 19-20~ 27). Yet similar to 
Bray's example of "gluttony" in Education of the Feelings, these apologies operate less 
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as invectives against the cmdity of labourers and more as a means to elaborate on the 
importance of education. As Locke notes early on in his life's narrative, manners and 
personal conduct differ greatly between those in higher or lower ranks, but the well-
educated poor person can still make "a fit companion for dukes and princes" (AL 21 ). 
Commenting on his own lack of education as well as that of his fellow labourers, Locke 
explains that the "difference in income, as you go lower, makes more and more 
difference in the supply of the common necessaries of life: and worse - in education and 
manners, in all which polishes the man" (AL 21 ). Locke's observation explicitly assumes 
the importance of education and conduct to sociability. 
This marked attention to a divided readership is most evident in Kingsley's two 
Prefaces to the novel, published in separate editions: "Preface Addressed to the Working 
Men of Great Britain" (1856) and "Preface to the Undergraduates of Cambridge" (1862). 
In the 1856 Preface, Kingsley discusses the nature of demagoguism: of having false 
models of conduct for political action, and the folly of trusting improper leaders or 
heroes. Kingsley's tone, however, is optimistic, almost congratulatory, as he asserts that 
demagoguism, as well as the mle of the "mob orator," is no longer a prevalent force 
("Preface Addressed to the Working Men of Great Britain" 16). For Kingsley, this 
change from revolutionary sentiment is followed by a more collective public sentiment, 
whereby social cooperation and the right of political representation function along the 
axis of self-sacrifice and self-control: "Remember always that Democracy means a 
government not merely by numbers of isolated individuals, but by a Demos - by men 
accustomed to live in Demoi, or corporate bodies, and accustomed, therefore, to the self-
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control, obedience to law, and self-sacrificing public spirit, without which a corporate 
body cannot exist" (19). Like Bray's destmctive individual or Carlyles passionate hero, 
this newfound public spirit is marked by a social commitment or action not guided by 
self-interest or personal assertion. 
Kingsley's reminder about the days of mob rnle and mob orators in his 1856 
Preface also conjures up a formative childhood memory. In his lecture "Great Cities and 
the Influence for Good and Evil" (1857) he recounts, as a boy, seeing the new gaol on 
fire in the midst of political riots. Kingsley describes the memory as the moment he 
discovered "the dangerous classes" and how he initially "loathed" them (SSL 190). As an 
adult, however, Kingsley explains that he considers these to be moments "not of 
decrepitude, but of youth; not as the expiring convulsion of sinking humanity, but as 
upward struggles" (SSL 189). Memory and reflection prompt a kind of social epiphany 
about collective movements and their great strides and potential for missteps. For 
Kingsley, the raucous mob may initially breed hostility, and as such, is not the right 
course of action, yet it may also count as the growing pains of a new movement - a kind 
of action that, despite its failings, has its place in the evolution of political progress and 
social consciousness. His concern over the development of this unruly discontent into a 
campaign of just social and political cause is similar to his concern over the development 
of his eponymous protagonist. 
In the same way, the emotional capabilities or deficiencies of characters in Alton 
Locke, their ability or inability to control their passions and actions, are equally 
necessary; they dictate the course of political action and make political action possible. 
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Locke's autobiographical narrative provides an account of both his political and litera1y 
development as he attempts to discern proper role models for his political and spiritual 
views - and as a Christian Socialist, Kingsley sees these as intimately connected - and 
for his aspirations of becoming a poet and author. Salmon argues that Kingsley's 
application of Carlylean heroism was one profoundly concerned with d.emagoguism: 
"Nowhere is Kingsley's indebtedness to Carlyle more evident than in the novel's 
relentless pursuit and zealous unmasking, of the false ideals of heroism into which its 
narrator and protagonist frequently stumbles. Idolatry is unquestionably Alton's besetting 
sin, castigated on numerous occasions throughout the text" ('"The Unaccredited Hero"' 
173). Yet Salmon also notes that "the capacity for hero-worship" - that is, the worship of 
appropriate models as opposed to demagogues - is pivotal to the Carly] ean argument that 
"hero-worship is an essential predicate of true heroism" ("~The Unaccredited Hero"' 
174). This pursuit, variously idolatry and hero-worship, has implications for narrative 
coherence, however, and in the same way that Carlyle's series oflectures were criticized 
for their lack of logic, Kingsley's novel suffers a similar charge: Gallagher suggests that 
the idolatrous Locke exists in the narrative not as a coherent identity, but as a series of 
"indeterminate selves" (99). Gallagher's observation is apt, since it points to the pitfall of 
extreme sympathetic (or intersubjective) identification - the possible loss of individual 
identity rather than a kind of self-reification often discussed by contemporary scholarship 
on sympathy. Yet, I suggest there is a purposeful order to be had in Locke's capacity for 
idolatry or hero-worship: Kingsley's novel is strnctured around a series of lessons in how 
to interpret representations of political and spiritual conduct appropriately. 
184 
Locke's capacity for feeling is what drives his capacity for hero-worship. It is also 
what initially sets him apart as he narrates his childhood and his strict Calvinist 
upbringing by his mother and her priestly confidants. Initially, he feigns a tone of 
resignation to his mother's views of Providence, representing it as a kind of class loyalty 
akin to religious faith: "I do not complain that I am a Cockney. That, too, is God's gift. 
He made me one, that I might learn to feel for the poor wretches who sit stifled in reeking 
garrets and workrooms, drinking disease with every breath" (AL 5-6). Locke's early 
attempts at self-education and self-expression are thwarted by his mother's emotional and 
intellectual repression, which entails a type of innocence and lack of understanding; 
feelings are to be distrnsted because his mother decrees that "· [ t ]he heart of man is, and 
ever was, equally at enmity with God"' (AL 17). Locke reflects on the effects of his 
mother's education as a kind of sheltered inexperience, one that positions him as "a lamb 
in the midst of wolves" when he starts his apprenticeship in a workshop (AL 21 ). 
In sharp contrast to the often-silent austerity of his mother's house, the workshop 
is filled with lively banter, rhymes, and chants, yet Locke recoils from what he calls the 
"ribaldry" of the workers, and is drawn, instead, to Crosswaithe, an avowed Chartist (AL 
27). Crosswaithe inspires an interesting combination of hatred and respect from his 
fellow workers. He is "[s]ilent, moody, and pre-occupied," and it is this combination of 
restraint and thoughtfulness that initially draws Locke to him. The presence of 
Crosswaithe in the workroom provokes a kind of authoritative tonic to the doggerel 
verses and indelicacy that Locke reports to his implied readers. The presence of 
Crosswaithe in the narrative also implies an important qualification: that even in the 
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midst of such expressions, the pursuit of self-improvement comes not from the masters, 
but from working-class individuals themselves (AL 27). Crosswaithe is one 
representation of working-class conduct~ in comparing him with the other workers, 
Kingsley also implicitly points out that rather than "an ideal theoretical construct" (Clark 
1 77), the designation of "working class" encompasses a breadth of people, and 
subsequently, a range of manners and codes of conduct. 
Locke's dissatisfaction with both the "moral tone" of the workroom and his 
mother's religious education is what initially causes him to look elsewhere for 
appropriate models or "guides" (AL 28, 30), and he finds these in the form of 
Crosswaithe and the Scottish bookshop owner, Mackaye. Yet, as educational guides or 
models, the two men differ greatly on the very topic of education: Crosswaithe is a 
Chartist and Mackaye is a "literary portrait" of Carlyle himself ("'The Unaccredited 
Hero'" 175). Mackaye advocates self-education - '"who'll teach a man anything except 
himsel'?" he asks Locke (AL 35) - and for the Carlylean pedagogue, liberal education is a 
kind of thoughtless privilege rather than sincere form of moral or intellectual 
improvement: '"It's only gentlefolks and puir aristocrat bodies that go to be spoilt wi' 
tutors and pedagogues, cramming and loading them wi' knowledge, as ye'd load a gun, to 
shoot it all out again, just as it went down, in a college examination, and forget all aboot 
it after"' (AL 35). Mackaye's words conjure up the example of Locke's middle-class 
cousin, George, whose Cambridge education does little to install any conviction outside 
of the decorous and self-interested. 15 Crossthwaite, on the other hand, espousing the 
politically radical cause of liberty, envisions education as a right and expresses outrage at 
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Locke's wasted genius: '"The form of the brain alone, and not the possession of the vile 
gauds of wealth and rank, constitute man's only right to education - to the glories of art 
and science"' (AL 48). For Crossthwaite, Locke's attempts at reading and writing mean 
little in the c1ment political system that thwarts his potential. When the owner of their 
tailor shop decides to switch production to home piecemeal work, Crossthwaite cautions 
Locke: '"Little time, or heart, or strength, will you have to study, when you are making 
the same coats you make now, at half the price"' (AL 106). According to his new 
pedagogue, Crossthwaite, the personal liberty that Locke craves can only be realized 
through political enfranchisement and class fidelity. 
When Locke finally approaches Crosswaithe for advice, he gets his first lesson by 
way of a heated confrontation between Crosswaithe and a soldier. Locke insists that the 
soldier is only following orders - "And what business have they to let themselves be 
ordered?" retorts his new mentor (AL 45). Through Crosswaithe's angry outburst at the 
officer, Locke learns that his radical pedagogue resents blind obedience 1to governmental 
and religious authority- the powers that he explains are responsible for social 
inequalities - and this begins Locke's progression into radical politics. In this exchange, 
class loyalty is expressed through, and akin to, a kind of anger, one that continues to 
grow as Locke matures: 
Above all, that I had known it on that night, when first the burning thought 
arose in my heart, that I was unjustly used~ that society had not given me 
my rights. It came to me as a revelation, celestial-infernal, full of glorious 
hopes of the possible future in store for me through the perfect 
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development of all my faculties; and full, too, of fierce present rage, 
wounded vanity, bitter grudging against those most favoured than myself. 
(AL 50). 
His newly planted seed of class discontent continues to grow, particularly with his 
idolatry of the Dean's daughter, who becomes both his poetic muse and an additional 
catalyst for his increasing class hostility. Locke defends his burgeoning enmity in posing 
the question: "Why have I not as good a right to speak to her, to move in the same society 
in which she moves, as any of the fops of the day?" (77). The narratorial Locke reflects to 
the reader how young Locke's anger is manifested for his own sake - the gratification of 
possessing his love-object. As the reminiscent Locke summarizes the mistakes ·of his life, 
he nevertheless provides reasons for his own anger, as well as the anger of others of his 
class. In the ''soulless routine of mechanical labour," explains Locke, the working classes 
must "either dream or agitate" (AL 84). 
Locke's other model, Mackaye, teaches his own lesson in class fidelity, and it is 
one that emphasizes sympathy rather than alienating class hostility. In their first meeting, 
Locke accidently stumbles upon Mackaye's shop when he discovers The L?fe and Poems 
of J. Bethune on a shelf outside. Thumbing through the daily trials of the working-class 
poet, the impressionable Locke considers Bethune's experiences to be a "sad presage of 
[his] own" (AL 32). With their similar upbringings, their ambition, and their "stern battle 
with social disadvantages," Locke finds in Bethune a kindred spirit: "And tears of 
sympathy, rather than selfish fear, fell fast upon the book" (AL 32). It is this manifest 
expression of feeling that draws Mackaye to address Locke and invite him into his shop 
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in the first place. In this respect, Mackaye becomes, if not Locke's political mentor, his 
literary and moral one (for Mackaye, as for Carlyle, the two are intertwined). 
Crosswaithe's angry outburst and Locke's sympathetic reading of (and identification 
with) Bethune's life occur in respective chapters, a contrast that deliberately emphasizes 
them as related examples and experiences. 
According to Crosswaithe, Mackaye may have sympathy for the labouring poor, 
but he too contentedly '"lives by the present system of things, and he wo 't speak ill of the 
bridge which carries him over - till the time comes'" (AL 47). Sympathy is not enough in 
Crosswaithe's mind, for it alone cannot overcome the present systems or institutions that 
disadvantage the working classes. Instead, argues Crosswaithe, political involvement 
must go beyond complacency and obeying '"the powers that be"' that is taught by 
church, state, and Mackaye (AL 49). Locke acknowledges that he is "not likely to get any 
very positive ground of comfort from Crossthwaite" (AL 53), yet nevertheless, his 
newfound radicalism forces Locke to confront his mother's blind obedience to religious 
authorities and Calvinistic dogma, which culminates in his ejection from her house and 
pushes him increasingly under the influence of Mackaye. Kingsley's organization of his 
novel as a series of lessons is coupled with the equally illustrative consequences of those 
lessons, a stmcture remarkably similar to the examples in Bray's own treatise. Locke 
himself seems to imply that this series of lessons is the purpose of his autobiography: 
"But this book is the history of my mental growth; and my mistakes as well as my 
discoveries are steps in that development, and may bear a lesson in them" (AL 70). 
Importantly, Locke's personal history is one that charts the interrelated growth of his 
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literary reputation, a relationship that enables Locke, as the mouthpiece of Kingsley, to 
make statements about the role and status of literature in mediating the politically-
charged period of the 1840s. The lesson of literature - its role in mediating interpersonal 
(and inter-class) relationships and in shaping both people and public opinion - is framed 
as another series of conflicts in Locke's development. 
As an aspiring poet, Locke battles between maintaining his class fidelities and 
socially elevating himself as a published author. Indeed, Locke's divided loyalties 
demonstrate the paradox of the working-class intellectual: how does one strive for self-
improvement yet escape middle-class determinations of identity?16 In the same way that 
Locke is quick to engage in hero-worship and follow his political models and 
pedagogues, he too easily emulates his literary models. Forays into writing verse were 
initially personal pursuits, romantic escapism from his thoughts and ''private sorrows" 
(AL 84), until Mackaye furthers his lesson on class fidelity and sympathy, this time in the 
service of literary development. As a mentor, Mackaye becomes Locke's first reader and 
critic; the bookshop owner's decor resembles his own brand of literary criticism, as books 
he does not like - High Tory and Benthamite - hang "impaled through their covers, and 
suspended in all sorts of torturing attitudes" (AL 64). For Mackaye, Locke's literary 
subject matter should be his immediate world, a moral aesthetic imperative that suggests 
that poetry, like charity, begins at home (AL 88). Locke takes this lesson to heart and in 
the following chapter, entitled "Poetry and Poets," he makes explicit how he is to shape 
his craft: "My subjects were intentionally and professedly cockney ones. I had taken 
Mackaye at his word. I had made up my mind, that if I had any poetic power, I must do 
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my duty therewith in that station of life to which it had pleased god to call me, and look 
at everything simply and faithfully as a London artisan" (AL 94). Indeed, as the plot 
develops, Locke's vocational identity as a tailor becomes increasingly eclipsed by his 
development as a poet and as a Chartist; artistic achievements, rather than labour 
realities, become increasingly intertwined with political convictions. 17 
Locke's artistic development mirrors his political one as he vacillates between 
escapist and political writing (and thus, between disengagement and political 
involvement). In doing so, he must also find a balance between sympathy and anger, 
which are ultimately manifestations of class loyalty rnther than strict oppositions. In light 
of Mackaye's literary tutelage, Locke dutifully foregoes his verses, the manifestations of 
his childhood desire for personal escape of his present conditions, to write what he calls 
the poetry of "disfigurement" (AL 93). This tum to the subject matter of London's 
labouring poor instills in Locke what he calls a sense of "Werterism" (AL 95). This is 
also a Carly lean concern: named after the eponymous protagonist of Goethe's The 
Sorrows of Young Werther (1774), Werterism is defined by Carlyle as a state whereby 
"feelings which arise from passion incapable of being converted into action" (Critical 
and Miscellaneous Essays 54, original emphasis). Locke's Werterism becomes the 
unfortunate result of an undisciplined emotional engagement, a kind of sentimentalism 
and excessiveness comprised of unchecked melancholy and rage. In the Carly lean sense, 
it implies the opposite of heroism - an indolence rather than sincerity of feeling. For 
Locke, the strnggle becomes how best to represent the suffering of everyday life without 
offering up one's own sympathetic feeling as the substitute for action. The answer is one 
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that Locke increasingly finds lacking in Mackaye's mentorship (and presumably in 
Carlyle's). Consequently, Locke must search again for leaders and models that will instill 
strong feeling that leads to action. 
For Locke, the chapter that follows, "How Folks Turn Chartist,'' provides a 
solution, albeit temporary, and he turns more purposefully towards political radicalism as 
a means of mediating or bridging this divide between meaningful feeling and productive 
action. After his first Chartist meeting, Locke comments on the eloquence of the men (AL 
113). His remark overtly considers (and disclaims) Carlyle's own assessment of Chartists 
as being "inarticulate" (SW 155) and suggests a pointed ambivalence towards Carlylean 
creed. Locke's increasing radicalism proves equally limiting, however, a realization that 
comes during his employment at the Weekly Warwhoop, a newspaper nm by the fiery-
tempered O'Flynn (the literary incarnation of Fergus O'Connor). As the name of the 
paper implies, O'Flym1's newspaper panders to the "fiercest passions" (AL 247), which 
Locke admits is self-satisfying, and therein lies its appeal: "It pampered my own self-
conceit, my own discontent, while it saved me the trouble of inventing remedies" (AL 
192). Thus, if Werterism signals an indolent emotionalism which fosters the inability to 
act, then Locke's literary labour for the Wan·vhoop becomes, in itself, a kind ofradical 
Werterism, a similar personal indulgence under the guise of political discontent and class 
fidelity. 
Despite the obviously negative effect that Locke's hack writing has upon his 
temperament - "I became daily more and more cynical, fierce, reckless" (AL 190)-
Kingsley has Locke remark on the similar tactics of conservative periodicals and those 
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directed to middle- and upper-class readers. For Locke, these periodicals also express and 
provoke fierce feelings or passions. Although he may well apologize for the ribaldry in 
the tailor's workshop, in the same breath he charges these periodicals with "cowardly 
execration and ribald slander" (AL 27). Thus, Kingsley does not direct his criticism 
strictly towards Chartist periodicals, but political discourses that attempt to evoke strong 
feelings with little attempt at resolution or action. At the same time, however, in 
criticizing reckless and self-indulgent feeling, Kingsley does not advocate its antithesis, 
stark or intellectual detachment from politics and the politics of feeling. 
Just as the oppositional lessons of Mackaye and Crossthwaite s1~rve to highlight 
patterns of behaviour and conduct, Locke's indebtedness to the fiery O'Flynn becomes 
increasingly contrasted to the "peaceful intellectual luxury" of Dean Winnstay, who 
scrutinizes Locke's radicalism (AL 192). Under the literary tutelage oft11e Cambridge 
dean, Locke is advised '"to give up reading those unprincipled authors, whose aim is to 
excite the evil passions of the multitude,'" and to omit political messages from his poems, 
the former which certainly evokes Edmund Burke's conservative fears of the rioting 
masses (AL 152, 179). Like O'Flynn, the dean is a purposefully faulty figure, and Locke 
eventually realizes his new mentor and patron's shortcomings: the apolitical dean 
attempts to mould the working-class intellectual and "man of feeling" into a man of 
science by a regime of math and logic, and he persuades Locke to lessen, even delete, the 
political rhetoric of his verses (AL 165). Kingsley does not advocate for either extreme 
but for a balance, whereby the "reasonable limits" (to borrow Bray's term) of political 
anger are neither expressed for their own sake (or for profit, in the case of O'Flynn), nor 
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do they thwart action and potential change. Locke's tutelage under the dean is ultimately 
necessary: it is through his interactions with him that Locke understands that his anger at 
the upper classes is the result of misplaced class loyalty. 
By addressing and illustrating the importance of educators or heroes in one's life, 
Kingsley attempts to enlist a succession of contrasting yet illustrative models and 
educators. The ultimate lesson for Locke is "common humanity" (AL 162), the guiding 
principle of Christian Socialism. Locke's series of would-be educators, then, are a 
necessary part of this common humanity: they expose Locke to all the forces that divide 
individuals. Rather than placing faith in movements or institutions, the memoirist 
explains that he had learnt "that the only thing to regenerate the world is not more of any 
system, good or bad, but simply more of the Spirit of God" (AL 111 ). It is this desire for 
unification (one which Kingsley paradoxically expresses through a disjointed narrative 
and varying addresses to a divided readership) that reigns as Locke's cmnulative lesson, 
and it is in this lesson that links Locke's personal development to Kingsley's own 
example, Muscular Christianity. 
Like Bray's "Education of the Feelings," and Carlyle's heroism, Muscular 
Christianity is both an "ideal and a working code of conduct" (Harrington 15). To be 
sure, Locke is far from a specimen of Muscular Christianity - the narratorial Locke often 
takes great pains to describe his physical weakness. Arguably, Locke's body matters less 
because he sheds his (faulty) physical form in his evolutionary dream state, only to build 
it back up again, a fit vessel to be filled by the force of God. Locke's revelation - that 
social amelioration will come from a transcending of class divisions, from the combat of 
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personal selfishness, and from the inculcation of self-improvement and regulation - is not 
unlike the tenets of Muscular Christianity. Locke's "Spirit of God" replaces Locke's 
earlier spirit or "duty" of discontent - and the memorable mob from Kingsley's 
childhood - with another potent force to be used for social amelioration. 
Under the moral direction of Eleanor Staunton, the female embodiment of iron 
resolve, sympathy, and strong feeling, 18 Locke learns the cumulative follies of his 
"frantic and frnitless passion" (AL 357). Christian Socialism functions as the final 
mediation, the important amalgamation of all the conflicting lessons. Locke's conclusive 
lesson (and revelatory moment) occurs on his deathbed, and so it is one directed towards 
the reader; his failings as both a heroic man of letters, a working-class poet, and a 
political leader and radical are ultimately the readers' lesson, an ostensible source of both 
entertainment and instmction. 
Kingsley's literary hero and protagonist is governed by the dictates of his 
temperament (whether positively or negatively) as much as he is rnled by the 
demarcations of literary culture and class politics. Thus, Kingsley's text addresses a 
divided readership in order to show how such divisions make collective cooperation 
difficult and even breed ignorance or contempt. Like his intended reader, divided and 
estranged, Locke's own development via a series of often contrasting political and 
literary role models stretches across extremes: the apolitical intellectualism of the dean, 
Mackaye's own sympathetic and charitable class loyalty, Crosswaithe's political 
radicalism, and finally, O'Flynn's incendiary opportunism. These divisions, while 
continually provoking Locke to misguided action, culminate with the Chartist petition on 
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10 April 1848, and the underlying threat of class uprising (the result of continual social 
and political divisions). This particular moment is likened to the building of the biblical 
Tower of Babel, a project doomed from the start as it is led "by mistrust, division, 
passion, and folly" and by builders who do not speak a common language (AL 362-63). 
Kingsley and his fellow Christian Socialists, such as F. D. Maurice and J.M. Ludlow, 
were well aware of the potential for failure in political reform among divided and 
uncommunicative groups; their periodical, Politics for the People (1848-49), published 
shortly after the Chartist petition of 10 April, combines Christian principles with the aims 
and aspirations of labourers and artisans and places great importance on the 
communication between the classes. 
In its inaugural issue, Politics/or the People addresses the social differences 
between its editors and its intended readers. The opening "Prospectus" outlines the 
periodical's scope and purpose. Under the subheading of"Workmen of England" comes 
the following mandate: 
We who have started this Paper are not idlers in the land, and we have no 
great sympathy with those that are. But we do not work with our hands; 
we are not suffering hardships like many of you. Therefore you may think 
that we shall not understand you. Possibly we shall not altogether at first, 
but you can help us. Many of you write clearly and nobly; you can tell us 
what you are thinking and wherein we have mistaken you ... We, who do 
not, properly speaking, belong to your body or theirs [richer classes], shall 
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not try to make out that our interests are in common with either. 
("Workmen of England" 2) 
Common understanding and humanity requires both the articulation of differences (an 
answer to Smith's question, "what has befallen you?") and a willingness to overcome 
said differences. After expressing their sympathy with the mistreatment of workers in 
England, the editors then tum to address the "Gentlemen of England," and this begins 
with a similar assertion of commonality: "Tmth belongs to no class or party. Virtue is no 
heir-loom of the monied or titled classes. Freedom is no privilege. We say this to the 
masses, we say this to you also" ("Gentlemen of England" 2). These separate addresses 
manifest themselves again in the multiple prefaces to Alton Locke. 
Similar to the final lesson in Alton Locke, the editorial mandate of Politics for the 
People implies that social and political progress can only be achieved by common feeling 
and a common exchange of ideas - not by an ostracizing class loyalty o:r identity. 
Exclusions and differences breed strong and negative feelings (anger, melancholy) that 
can thwart action, or at least provoke misguided or ineffective means of reform and 
progress. Locke's ability to be moved greatly by emotion is necessary to poetry and 
politics, yet both require an education that is able to instill limits and checks to Locke's 
"frantic and fmitless passion" (AL 357). The insensible poet or insensible radical - one 
who does not feel strongly - is unable to exist either. Locke may ultimately fail in his 
pursuit of political and literary reputation, yet he deserves his place as the central figure 
or hero in the plot because of his capacity for feeling. 
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IV. Conclusion: Why Humans are Interesting to Humans 
In British Moralists, Being Selections from Writers Principa!Zv of the Eighteenth 
CentwT ( 1897), L. A. Shelby-Bigge explains that eighteenth-century British 
philosophers, whether moralists or skeptics, espoused a "psychology of ethics" by 
attempting to explain what motivates individuals to act and how these individuals make 
judgments between right and wrong action. In addressing the general characteristics of 
this period of moral philosophy, Shelby-Bigge summarizes the importance of its 
emphasis on benevolence as a "revolt" against the doctrine of self-interest, one 
characterized by an "appeal to the plain man's experience of disinterested benevolent 
affections (3). My contention is that this preoccupation extends well into the nineteenth 
century with the articulation of conduct, and within the project of sociability - one that 
insists, likewise, that fellow humans should be interesting to humans. It exists with 
particular urgency, especially given the alienating effects of industrialization and the 
disparities between rich and poor. 
It is significant that Shelby-Bigge emphasizes the "plain man," the ordinary 
person or citizen as opposed to the god or monarch, and the intended trajectory of 
Carlyle's heroic figure as he moves from past forms to the present. For Carlyle and 
Kingsley, heroic individuals are "remarkable and noble" ("National Gallery - No. l" 6), 
yet they are leaders who motivate ordinary individuals to right action. The concern over 
right conduct is a fundamentally political one; it coincides with the preoccupation of 
finding proper political leaders, and the consequences, real or imagined, of strong feeling 
in the realm of politics, and it extends, also, into discourses of self-help and education 
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and produces categorical imperatives in politics as well as literature. Given the political 
and social climate of the 1840s and 1850s, the consequences of improper leaders or role 
models are significant: Locke's disastrous attempt to become a political leader 
inadvertently incites a looting mob. Right leadership begins with strong feeling, which 
must, in turn, be appropriately directed or regulated to "reasonable limits." For those like 
Bray, Carlyle, and Kingsley, the nature of these limits becomes paramount. 
The chapter that follows continues with the discussion raised by Kingsley's novel 
- a divided or ambivalent sympathy towards the suffering and inequities of the labouring 
poor- by examining Elizabeth Gaskell's Mmy Barton (1848). Like Alton Locke .. 
Gaskell' s novel has been described as having a similar identity crisis. I suggest that this 
has basis in the very nature of sympathy, and in particular, sympathizing with suffering. 
As Chartists such as Jones, Cooper (and Crosswaithe) denounce the complacency and 
subsequent inaction of readers (or spectators) in the face of large-scale urban poverty, 
they necessarily point to the political dimension of sympathy with suffering: to 
sympathize with suffering requires a kind of mitigating, or even revolutionary, redress. 
As such, it requires the confrontation with, and possibility of, anger and burgeoning 
resentment. 
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Endnotes 
1 
"For it is remarkable, that when a person opposes me in anything, which I am 
strongly bent upon, and rouses up my passion by contradiction, I have always a degree of 
sympathy with him" (Treatise III. iii. II. 592). 
2 Hume's artificial virtues have far-reaching consequences for the project of 
sociability. They include: justice, modesty, national (and personal) loyalty or allegiance, 
chastity; see Treatise (III. I). 
3 Scholars have rarely discussed Hume's conception of good breeding as 
something that goes beyond a consideration of pride. Pall S. Ardal notes that pride may 
well be a kind of favourable self-evaluation, it is also an "essential feature of a man of 
honour," a socially and culturally-sanctioned individual or hero figure (388-390). For 
Hume, the "heroic virtues" of an individual include self-esteem (Treatise III. iii. II. 599-
600). For Ardal, "good-breeding prohibits boastfulness even when one is justifiably 
proud" (391). See "Hume and Davidson on Pride." Hume Society 15.2 (1989): 387-394. 
More pointedly, Hume's essay "Of Refinement in the Arts" (1752) links the development 
of the arts with refinements in customs and manners. Christopher J. Berry argues that 
Hume's connection between the arts and conduct is one that envisions a progress in 
humanity as well as manners, and as such, is important for both individuals as well as 
government leaders. See Berry's "Hume and the Customary Causes of Industry, 
Knowledge, and Humanity." Hist01y of Political Economy 38:2 (2006). 291- 317. Hume 
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himself makes the connection between refinement and social happiness by considering its 
effects on both private and public life ("Of Refinement in the Atis" 269). 
4 Rauch includes texts such as Thomas Dick's On the Improvement of Society by 
the Dif.fi1sion of Knowledge ( 1833), and cites the Society for the Diffusion of Useful 
Knowledge ( 1826-1848) as a major manifestation of the spirit of self-improvement, 
which suggests that acquired knowledge would have a moral effect on the individual. See 
Bernard Lightman's Victorian Popularizers of Science: Designing Nature for New 
Audiences for a discussion of science and scientific knowledge and its role in popular 
culture (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2007). 
5 See Bray's An Essay upon the Union of Agriculture and Mam~factures: And 
upon the Organization of lndust1y (London: Longman, Green and Co, 1844); The 
industrial employment of women: being a comparison between the condition of the 
people in the watch trade in Covent1y .. in which women are not employed, and the people 
in the ribbon trade (London: John W. Parker & Son, 1857). 
6 In Education of the Body: An Address to the Working Classes, for example, Bray 
includes a chapter on Nursery Education in which he reconunends infant schools to his 
readership. Began by Robert Owen in 1816, this system of schools promoted both moral 
and social training and physical education for children of labourers and artisans. 
7 Bray's discussion of human nature and motivation does not rest on the 
empiricist assumption that one's rational nature is what distinguishes one from animals -
in this sense, his assumptions predate Darwin's own work on emotion and heredity, 
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which claims humans share the same emotional capabilities (and physical manifestations 
of feeling) to animals. See Darwin's The Expression of Emotion ( 1872). Bray argues that 
humans have 23 instincts, and that 15 of these - and here Bray uses fedings and instincts 
interchangeably- are shared between humans and "lower animals" (EF 14). 
8 In the wake of reform measures, both working-class radicals and middle-class 
women increasingly made organized demands for political representation and critiqued 
the division of labour, albeit for different aims. While ear1y feminists and working-class 
radicals may have had similar organizational tactics, this is not to say that they were 
sympathetically aligned. Anne Clark discusses the ideological rifts between working-
class masculinity and feminist calls for equality. 
9 Most notably, this position is advocated by Chartists such as ·wmiam Lovett and 
Henry Vincent and was a topic of debate at the National Charter Association Convention 
in 1842. Chartist organization around this issue included the collective actions and 
practices: the establishment of coffee houses as meeting places (as opposed to traditional 
taverns), the marketing and selling of "Chartist Beverage" (a cheap coffee substitute), and 
public petitions and pledges, such as the Chartist Circular and Temperance Record/or 
England and Wales (1840-41). See also The Chartist Legacy, edited by Owen Ashton, 
Robert Fyson, and Stephen Roberts (Suffolk: Merlin, 1999). 
10 In this respect, Bray's discussion of anger and its variations shares some of the 
later claims by physical force Chartists, who argued that wrongs could only be addressed 
(and overcome) from a similar point of rightful destruction and cooperation. Peter 
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Murray McDouall encouraged "union, energy, perseverance, and continued agitation at 
the present crisis," a stance that emphasizes both the cooperation and motivating energy 
upon which Bray's own discussion of combativeness and destruction seems to rest. See 
P. M. McDouall, "What Have We Done, and What Are We to Do?" l\lfcDouall's Chartist 
and Republican Journal {April 24, 1841). 
11 In the context of Carlyle's (and Maurice's) urgency for heroes, the Duke of 
Wellington was, for many, the quintessential hero and leader: praised for his combination 
of duty and personal conduct. Known for his capacity to be emotionally moved by losses 
in the battlefield, Wellington was also referred to as the "Iron Duke," a moniker that 
implied his stern resolve in upholding his political principles, even in the midst of 
impeding reform. In summarizing Wellington's legacy in the mid-nineteenth century, 
Peter W. Sinnema evokes the language of Carly lean heroism: "Wellington was 
mythologized as a modem-day hero in whom traits of the great ancient warriors and 
statesmen were fused" (315). At a time when a female monarch was unlmown to many 
and anathema to some, Wellington was, for England, the "the Hero King, one of those 
Carly lean 'missionaries of Order' in whose person resided promise for the better 
management of the world" (Sinnema 319). 
12 Carlyle's conception of "belief' differs from how I use the term in my 
discussion of Hume's philosophy. Unlike Hume, Carlyle envisions belief as an a priori 
condition of human nature; it is, foremost, a (personal) moral assertion, c:~ven when not 
tied to any particular institutional (ecclesiastical) authority. 
203 
n In discussing Carlylean heroism, scholars tend to emphasize the heroic potential 
of Teufelsdrockh, the intellectual and authorial stand-in for Carlyle. It is an oversight that 
Levine, Fleishman, and Peckham's discussions of heroism and Carlyle centre on Sartor 
Resartus, and make little or no mention of On Heroes. 
14 Salmon notes how Locke makes overt literary allusions to many of these 
working-class autobiographies, as well as bildungsromanes such as Edward Bulwer 
Lytton's Ernest Maltravers (1837), Thackeray's History of Pendennis (1848-50), and 
Carlyle's Sartor Resartus (1833-34). See Salmon's '"The Unaccredited Hero'" (186). 
15 George's decisions in love, friendship, and vocation are not based on any 
sincere feeling but are guided by self-interested opportunism. It is his willingness to 
participate in a system of sweatshops and piecemeal work that literally kills him: he 
contracts typhus from his coat, custom-made by Jeremy Downes, George's working-class 
foil who also has few political and moral convictions. 
16 Scholars have discussed this tension in Kingsley's novel: see Chapter 4 of 
Gallagher~ Richard Menke, "Cultural Capital and the Scene of Rioting: Male Working-
Class Authorship in Alton Locke. '' Victorian Literature and Culture 28. l (2000): 87-108. 
17 Conveniently, this progression is reinforced by the dismissal of all the workers 
at the tailor shop for poorly-paid piecemeal work. This episode not only reveals the 
avaricious practices of greedy merchant and manufacturers, and thus demonstrates 
Kingsley's criticism oflabour and political economy, but also serves as a plot point in 
Locke's development as an author, since it provides the opportunity for him to find 
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alternate employment as a periodical writer. There is, after this turn in focus, little 
discussion of Locke's vocation as a tailor. 
18 That Locke's ultimate model or hero is female may ce11ainly suggest a final 
turning away from Carly lean doctrine in favour of Christian Socialism. 
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Chapter 4 
Resentment: A Political Response to Sympathy and SuJTering 
"Why are the rich so hard towards the poor? It is because they have no 
fear of being poor. Why does the noble have such contempt for a peasant? 
It is because he will never be a peasant. ... Do not, therefore, accustom 
your pupil to regard the sufferings of the unforttmate and the labors of the 
poor from the height of his glory; and do not hope to teach him to pity 
them if he considers them alien to him. Make him understand well that the 
fate of these unhappy people can be his." 
-- Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile (1762) 
There has been significant philosophical attention given to the subject of 
suffering; most interesting to this project are the responses to suffering, whether as 
sufferer or sympathizer. In the myriad responses, there exists an unpalatable connection 
between the witness to suffering and the negative feelings that can prece~de retribution 
towards the cause (real or imagined) of said suffering. To reiterate the words of Charles 
Taylor, "the politics of compassion" are intimately connected to the "politics of 
resentment" (99). Thus, the sympathetic representation of suffering, whether through 
visual images or discursive narratives, must take this uneasy (yet potentially productive) 
affinity into account. 
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith also makes due concessions: 
determined to make sympathy central to the project of sociability, and a means of moral 
approbation, Smith admits that individuals are more inclined to desire others to 
sympathize with their resentments than with their joys; generally, sympathy with 
suffering is more common than sympathy with joy (TMS 1.1.2.5~ 1.3.1.1). This may have 
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some relation to the fact that in Smith's moral philosophy, resentment has its own social 
function as a defense against social ills and violations: "[Resentment] is the safeguard of 
justice and the security of innocence. It prompts us to beat off the mischief which is 
attempted to be done to us, and to retaliate that which is already done" (TMS 2.2.1.4). In 
this way, the desire to have others sympathize with one's suffering is a thoroughly 
pragmatic inclination: the attending (and expectant) resentment that arises can lead to a 
kind of retaliation, or the reassertion of just conditions that may mitigate "the mischief 
which is attempted to be done to us." Smith qualifies the mitigative role he assigns to 
feelings of anger and resentment: "Before resentment, therefore, can become graceful and 
agreeable, it must be more humbled and brought down below that pitch to which it would 
naturally rise, than almost any other passion" (TMS 1.2.1 ). The subject of just how 
resentment can be "humbled" (within the bounds of sociability) is taken up by political 
radicals and authors who feel compelled to represent suffering while also acknowledging 
how sympathy with suffering can produce unsocial responses. 
Chartist discourses, in particular, characterize the experience of suffering as that 
which can be mitigated by collective political action. In this sense, resultant anger or 
resentment is not enough to inspire lasting change, but it is, nevertheless~, a potent force 
that can be channeled, whether to affirm (working-class) merits or instigate political 
actions. Writing about the role of working-class fiction in Victorian culture, Martha 
Vicinus notes that Chartist activists and writers such as Ernest Jones use feeling for both 
such ends: "Descriptions of injustice and oppression could anger workers, but appeals to 
their idealism could focus that anger and channel it towards political anger" ( 101 ). 
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In c1itiquing the existing political and economic system, Chartist periodicals also 
scmtinize two prevailing responses to suffering: apathy and complacency. Apathy 
implies a distinct absence of feeling, and by extension, a lack of interest, in the 
circumstances of the labouring poor - a state often described by many middle-class 
reformers as one based on ignorance rather than a fundamental lack of sympathetic 
virtue. Complacency, on the other hand, is not a lack of feeling but a lack of spec?fic 
feeling; the complacent individual is satisfied or content with the condition of England. 
More specifically, complacency is the distinct absence of strong and negative feelings, 
such as anger or indignation. For Chartists, it is not to be lauded for its moderation or 
restraint. Instead, a lack of strong feeling becomes a personal flaw rather than a virtue: 
those not galvanized by their witness to or experience of suffering are no better than 
those apathetic to it. Apathy and complacency signify the lack of impassioned response to 
suffering, and this distinction demonstrates how political radicals categorize feelings as 
part of public discourses and politics. 
The politics of suffering resound in industrial fiction of the 1840s and 1850s, and 
with the representation of suffering, and discussions of its alleviation, come concerns 
over its political and social consequences. Nussbaum explains that, historically, those 
advocating for more sympathy consider it necessary for "etl1ical life," while others claim 
that excessive sympathy with suffering can motivate irrational actions, and precedes the 
desire for revenge (354). This cautionary view is the tacit argument behind many modern 
instih1tions of law and political economy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
whereby "the task of a strong society is to contain and control the inclination to revenge" 
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through systematic and institutional strnctures (Nussbaum 363, 393). Thus, like other 
general discussions of anger and its effects, the emphasis in these mid--nineteenth-century 
writings, radical or otherwise, falls on the mechanisms and strategies for the mediation of 
strong (yet typical) feelings of resentment that come from experiencing suffering, 
injustice, or being sympathetic or empathetic1 to the suffering of others. 
In this respect, my final chapter will examine Cha11ist periodicals and their 
discussion of suffering, and Elizabeth Gaskell' s first novel, Mary Barton ( 1848), a text 
simultaneously praised and admonished for its portrayal of suffering among Manchester's 
labouring poor. While it garnered admiration for its sympathetic portrayal of daily 
working-class life, it was also criticized for its potential to stir antagonistic feelings 
between classes in a period already marked by revolutions across continental Europe. The 
conflicting critical reception of the novel points out the stmctural flaws in the narrative: 
the divergent political and romantic plot lines of John Barton and his daughter, Mary, 
respectively; and the novel's tidy conclusion of emigration, a much criticized solution 
also proposed by Carlyle in Chartism. At first glance, the original impetus for Gaskell' s 
novel seems to echo Carlyle's views on Chartism, particularly in the Preface, yet I intend 
to point out some fundamental philosophical and political differences. 
In Gaskell' s novel, personal narratives and moments of disclosure provide 
alternatives to strictly spectatorial perspectives of suffering (a topic under much 
discussion in contemporary Victorian scholarship), encouraging readers to consider their 
own responses to the suffering depicted in the stories, as well as their own potential for 
suffering. I want to distinguish between narratives and disclosure, for while disclosure 
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may be conveyed and understood through narrative - a representation of a sequence of 
events - it is not necessarily, in the strictest narratological sense, a narrative. Disclosure 
is an act of expression that offers some information about the self and the other, not as a 
confession of misdeeds, necessarily, but as an exposure of vulnerabilities, fears, 
sufferings that serve as realizations about oneself in relation to others. Ultimately, it is a 
reflective practice of making sense of the world (or a system).2 Within the politics of 
suffering, personal narratives and disclosure can impact interpersonal (and inter-class) 
relations by making legible the commonalities between individuals, or by envisioning 
alternatives to hegemonic discourses of difference. 
By juxtaposing Mwy Barton with Chartist writings, one can see alliances in the 
political theories of suffering between the texts, which calls into question the common 
criticism of the novel as being ultimately apolitical or overly indebted to tidy resolutions 
through feeling. Instead, Gaskell makes the argument that shared feelings, even those of 
anger, are necessary for social amelioration and the mitigation of class hostilities. Gaskell 
creates the memorable example of John Barton, her would-be eponymous hero, to 
illustrate this connection between suffering and resentment. Barton is greatly struck by 
the suffering he witnesses in the lives of his fellow workers and the suffering he 
experiences in his own life. Suffering, the novel's narrator implies, explains his turn to 
Chartism and radical politics. In this sense, the novel charts Barton's emotional 
progression as he vacillates between bitter rage and despair towards what he sees as the 
apathy of the factory owners, the complacency of his close friends, and his own moral 
and physical deterioration and failings. In this sense, Barton becomes the explanatory 
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model of Gaskell' s vision of suffering and of its ethical and social import, which like 
Rousseau's imperative in Emile, is instructional for both middle and working-class 
readers_'.' Through the complementary (rather than oppositional) plots of John and Mary 
Barton, Gaskell demonstrates how sympathy with suffering can instill a moral and 
political commitment or how, as spectacle, it can breed resentment. Despite the obvious 
political differences between Gaskell and Rousseau, Gaskell' s politics of suffering in 
MaJy Barton revisit Rousseau's lesson: responses to the suffering of others, to be truly 
sympathetic, must imagine the same suffering or "fate" could happen to the sympathizing 
subject. Otherwise, such sympathy can do little to mitigate suffering and its potential for 
perpetuating resentment or redress. 
The general consensus among post-Enlightenment philosophers and those 
studying the mutability of emotions remains that to be sympathetic to the suffering of 
another involves the following criteria: first, one must believe that the other's suffering is 
indeed serious but unwarranted; and second, the person feeling sympathy or compassion 
towards another must believe that in some respect, there is a possibility that the 
circumstances that brought on such suffering may also happen to them (J>Jussbaum 306-
07). Rousseau's question regarding the disregard of the wealthy towards the poor is 
answered in his dialogue: the division of wealth and power becomes an impediment to 
fellow-feeling, and more specifically, inspires an apathy that perpetuates suffering and 
misery (224). Thus, for Rousseau, and for many radicals after him, the compassionate 
response to suffering requires an acknowledgement that one lives in the same world, and 
as such, has the same "possibilities and vulnerabilities similar to those of the sufferer" 
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(Nussbaum 316). This criterion depends on the capacity of the imagination to extend 
these sympathies to others, yet it also must be able to overcome the very differences that 
perpetuate suffering in the first place. Nussbaum makes the point that the "recognition of 
one's related vulnerability"- the sympathetic individual's ability to put herself in 
another's proverbial shoes - is an "epistemological requirement," and t:he very basis for 
the recognition of commonality (319, 342). For Rousseau, as for ninet~~enth-century 
radicals (and by way of the above criteria, I am including Gaskell), the impediments to 
sympathy with the suffering of another are the very material distinctions of rank and 
class. In the mid-nineteenth century, Rousseau's examples of the unfeeling noble expands 
to include the emergent political and economic powers of industry - the merchant, the 
factory owner, and-even the would-be social refonner - and these figures variously 
become the agents of suffering and the objects of resentment in mid-nineteenth-century 
England. 
I. Smithian Sympathy as Spectacle, Social Difference, and Suffering 
It may seem problematic to extend Smith's examples of sympathetic feeling to 
nineteenth-century middle-class ideology and culture~ Smith, writing in the mid-
eighteenth century, cannot be answerable for a class bias that has not yet been 
institutionally established. Yet in discussing mid-nineteenth-century culture, 
contemporary scholars have relied on Smith's conception of sympathy as the grounds for 
a series of exchanges that point to wider economic, political, and moral assmnptions. 
Discussing the rhetoric of "fallenness" in Victorian culture, Amanda Anderson 
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emphasizes the middle-class assumptions inherent in sympathetic spectatorship, arguing 
that the discomfort that the middle-class spectator feels when looking upon suffering is a 
fear of a similar, social, economic (or moral) fall. In this formative moment the self 
produces a fear of its own instability, whereby "fallenness" becomes c:onstmcted as that 
which lacks coherence or autonomy in order to dispel fears about the self.4 By 
interrogating the tension between materialism and idealism in its relation to self-identity, 
Anderson's treatment of fallenness does not concentrate on one sourct: of mechanistic or 
disciplinary control, but rather, examines how such rhetoric emerges through contesting 
and contradictory forces over selfhood and intersubjective relations. 
For Anne Cvetkovich, class-based conceptions of sympathy problematize the 
claims to truth in the representation of social problems, whereby the representation of 
social problems through appeals to feeling, or resolution through feeling, underscore 
social inequalities. Cvetkovich argues that as the objects of sympathy and suffering, 
socially-marginalized figures are transformed into "exemplars of cultural value" that 
quite conveniently enable the resolution of social problems (21 ). Similarly, in Scenes of 
Sympathy, Audrey Jaffe connects sympathy with visualized representation and 
spectatorship, a relationship increasingly situated within the market of production and 
consumption, labour and capital. Jaffe 's designation of "scene" is explicit to her 
argument that sympathy is, above all, a fact of representation requiring a visual referent 
(3). Jaffe links Smithian sympathy to spectacle5 from the onset, but implies a particularly 
exemplary fonn of this relationship within Victorian social identity. It :is through 
spectacle that the Victorian middle-class subject encounters him or herself as an 
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economic subject, since the visual referents in narratives "render visible, otherwise 
invisible determinations of social identity" (8). Since Smith's conception of sympathy is 
ultimately imaginary, Jaffe argues that when the spectator and the object of sympathy are 
from different classes, what circulate in the spectator's mind are cultural fantasies of the 
other's social position: 
And it is because of the interdependence of and continual oscillation 
between images of cultural identity and degradation ... - products of the 
imagination of a spectator positioned, phantasmatically, between them -
that I consider Smith's scene of sympathy to stand both as a primal scene 
in the history of sympathetic representation and as a visual emblem of the 
structure of middle-class identity. ( 4-5) 
Jaffe's work is attentive to the material markers that were, for Victorian novelists and 
readers, vital ways to construct and maintain coherent conceptions of identity. Yet 
ultimately, scholars such as Anderson, Cvetkovich, and Jaffe articulate Smithian 
sympathy within the specifically middle-class imagination, and in the c:ase of the latter, as 
a hegemonic enterprise. Jaffe makes the important point that sympathy functions as the 
"vehicle for the circulation of effects and identities between classes" (20), and it is on this 
point that I take up my own scholarship on sympathy in the mid-nineteenth century. More 
specifically, however, my interest lies in how sympathy operates within and dictates 
relations between classes in a way that is interpersonal and social - what I see as the 
imperative of eighteenth-century philosophical benevolent theories of the moral 
sentiments - rather than self-constitutive, self-serving, or distinctly classed, and in this 
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respect, I argue that in Mmy Barton .. Gaskell uses suffering to illustra1:e this ethical 
distinction. 
In discussing middle-class identity and its formation, contemporary Victorian 
scholarship tends to criticize what they see as the inherently disciplinary nature of 
sympathy and its discourses. "Scenes of sympathy" - usually involving sights of industrial 
and urban suffering - are discussed as a series of spectatorial relationships, codified 
through visual images and material cues rendered through documentary-like details and 
descriptions, the hallmarks of Victorian realism. As constitutive exchanges, they 
privilege the position of the (middle-class) spectator, who gazes upon the sufferer, and 
are decidedly unidirectional: the affective experience is that of the spectator's rather than 
the sufferer's. At the same time, being a spectator to suffering inevitably implies that the 
suffering is a kind of performance, the conscious or unconscious organization of 
experience, which can obscure the credibility of the suffering in the first place. The scene 
of suffering, then, must be taken in by the spectator and judged accordingly by a set of 
claims or criteria that depend solely on the spectator. This same paradigm continues in 
sociological scholarship on suffering. For instance, in attempting to constrnct a genealogy 
of suffering, its theoretical and political development from the seventeenth century 
onward, Cynthia Halpern envisions the modem relationship between the spectator and the 
sufferer as one that follows this expectation of perfomrnnce, and looks to Rousseau's 
revolutionary politics: "In the public spaces created by the architectures and technologies 
of the enlightened modern world, [Rousseau] is a spectator, who judges that the suffering 
he observes in the majority of the men around him, in the masses, the poor, the 
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oppressed, is not legitimate ( 18). According to Halpern, it is Rousseau who uncovers or 
acknowledges suffering and judges it accordingly, and sufferers are, simply, cues or signs 
that give the performance its appropriate meaning. 
Given that Smith designates the sympathizing subject as the "impartial 
spectator," one could assume that Smith was endeavouring, unsuccessfully, to avoid the 
charge of self-interest. The "problematic individualism" of sympathy that Hirschmam1 
discusses is understandable, given that the tradition of philosophy was concerned with the 
determination of selfbood, but sympathy can, and should, provoke the recognition of and 
opeillless to that outside the self. Scholars who have tied humanitarian altmism to 
political theory, such as Charles Taylor or Luc Boltanski, have variously argued self-
determination (and in this case, self-constitution) can come from a moral commitment 
that transcends the egotistical ideal. Bo.ltanski contends, for instance, '':when confronted 
with suffering all moral demands converge on the single imperative of action" (xv). 
Having knowledge of suffering demands the obligation of assistance on the part of the 
spectator-turned-participant, and this commitment can be a form of self-realization. 
The prevailing view of sympathy as spectatoria.l also explains a common, but 
short-sighted, approach to theories of suffering - that the experience of suffering is 
inexpressible. Indeed, philosophical criteria of what constitutes suffering may vary across 
epistemological, political, and eudiamonistic grounds,6 but its quality of inexpressiveness 
draws considerable consensus. Halpern asserts that suffering - more specifically, the pain 
associated with suffering - is beyond representation, "an otherness that cannot be 
encapsulated or sufficiently communicated" (9). According to Halpern, "suffering always 
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exceeds expression in words and is not merely a metaphysical but rather a physical, 
bodily, and psychological, even spiritual, matter" (95). There are, as Holly Faith Nelson 
discusses, various articulations of the concept of suffering, since it "speak[s] to the 
ineffable - that which appears to transcend or operate outside of language or that which is 
challenging or impossible to represent" (xv). Similarly, in discussing the sociological 
import of suffering in modern contexts, Iain Wilkinson argues that suffering is often 
conceptualized as a "problem" - a problem of representation - for it can both evade 
articulation and leave the very sufferer inarticulate; further, the attempt to put into words 
the very experience of suffering can trivialize the experience ( 1, 18). 
To call suffering inexpressible is problematic, since it obscures the various 
social and political practices and agents that seek to, or benefit from, silence, and in doing 
so, it privileges the perspective of the spectator. Articulating the experience of suffering 
from the subject position of the sympathetic spectator can exist as a censure, or an 
insistence of illegibility, that ignores any responses from sufferers, and as such, 
potentially avoids the political and moral efficacy ofredress. Sympathy with the suffering 
and misfortune of others may well be a means of middle-class hegemony or a mechanism 
of disciplinary power, in the Foucauldian sense, as many Victorian scholars have aptly 
pointed out, but to theorize it solely as such ignores the radical potential of suffering, 
whereby the experience and spectatorship of suffering can necessitate a call to 
ameliorative action and instill a sense of moral and political commitment. 
Halpern argues that the challenge of representing suffering is a political one: it is 
tied to notions of justice~ it raises questions as to what is morally right and wrong, and it 
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questions authority, existing models of power, and conceptions of agency (10). If 
suffering is both a moral experience and a political concern, one that motivates 
individuals to articulate known causes and demand remedy or expiation from those who 
have the power to do so (Halpern 1 ), then limiting its expression to the spectator in the 
sympathetic process severely impedes its ethical potential. Responses to suffering on the 
part of the sufferer are forms of disclosure that can alter the spectatorial (and 
unidirectional) character of sympathy. They serve as intermediaries of intersubjective 
exchange, "formulated in a way which enables us to join together a description of the 
person suffering and the concern of someone informed of this suffering" (Boltanski xv). 
To be clear, speech alone does not address or redress suffering; rather., it imparts the 
knowledge of suffering that demands the obligation of assistance and commitment: "For 
speech to reduce the unfortunate's suffering, and for it to be regarded thereby as a fonn 
of action, in the sense that 'speaking is acting,' a different kind of instmment is needed: 
public opinion engaging directly with political institutions" (Boltanski 17-18, original 
emphasis). In this respect, the impetus to represent suffering, as a means to engage public 
opinion, can be a kind of pre-condition to action. 
This kind of political agency is particular to post-Enlightenment contexts. In 
early, pre-modern societies, suffering was considered inevitable, according to the will of 
a deity, and something outside of human control. The sufferer was expected to submit 
and endure. Modern-day notions of suffering, which acknowledge known or perceived 
causes that are within human power to fix, suggest an accountability that is different from 
ancient or medieval conceptions (Halpern 2). Similarly, Wilkinson explains suffering as a 
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means of acquiring agency, since responses to suffering acquire "political resonance and 
the powers to effect social change" ( 111 ). The experience of or witness to suffering not 
only binds individuals into groups, but gives these groups a common motive for reform -
the alleviation of suffering, and, as Wilkinson notes, the creation of a more humane 
society (113). 
II. "Wrongs Long Endured": Suffering, Submission, and Victorian Political 
Radicalism 
The politics of suffering that form much of Rousseau's legacy continue to inform 
the political discourses surrounding the reform acts, particularly in radical politics. In 
Victorian culture, suffering - its representation and alleviation - commands sizeable 
attention and serves a multitude of purposes. Considering the rise of investigative 
journalism, literary realism, and sanitary reform :in the early and mid-nineteenth century, 
Nancy Metz aptly describes how the "awakening of Victorian culture to suffering on an 
unknown scale was most often expressed through the motif of exploratjon and discovery" 
(72). In these cases, the suffering body - carefully detailed and documented in medical 
and social studies, periodical ai1icles, and novels by middle-class authors - stands in as a 
synecdoche for the body politic and becomes the ethical imperative for social refonn. 
Exploring the cultural and political significance of the working-class body, a 
representative figure of nineteenth-century industry and political economy, Mike Sanders 
argues that the physical toil and suffering that such a system inflicted on industrial 
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labourers was unsettling to the middle classes, whose social legitimization was predicated 
on moral respectability and "humanitarianism" (313). The humanitarian response to 
suffering, argues Sanders, was an "emphasis on the knowability and traceability of causes 
combined with a commitment to ameliorative action" and "a belief in society's capacity 
to control and thus, mitigate (and ultimately perhaps even to remove) the causes of 
human distress" (314). Sanders contends that this "knowability" operates as a middle-
class coping strategy. Authors of the numerous sanitary and occupational health studies 
of factory workers, published in the period, faced the untenable problem of how to 
discuss and categorize the miserable conditions of industrial labour - to mark the cause of 
suffering - in an effort to provide solutions, without squarely placing blame on the 
current system and its "affirmed capitalist interests" (Sanders 314-15). 
Specifically, Sanders discusses C. Turner Thackrah's The Effects ofArts, Trades, 
and Professions, and of Civic States of Habits of Living, on Health and Longevity ( 1832), 
one of the first comprehensive studies of the effects of factory work, as an exemplary text 
that grapples with this very tension. Employers have a responsibility for the health and 
safety of their operatives, Thackrah insists, but he also qualifies this claim by asserting 
that employers' indifference towards the moral and physical well-being of their workers 
is rooted in a lack of awareness (knowledge) rather than a lack of sympathetic virtue. 
Such an explanation enabled middle-class reformers to admit to the problems and 
abuses of the industrial economic order, and the authoritative and moral ethos of 
providing detailed evidence as part of the realist impulse, without admitting or affirming 
that they were caused by the present system. The working-class body becomes the 
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substantiation upon which the Victo1ian humanitarian narrative rests, "·a piece of 
irrefutable empirical evidence with which to deny or contest the authority of political 
economy" (Sanders 31 7). Yet the working-class body is "morally neutral as an object of 
knowledge," subject to external forces and as such, "incapable of autonomous agency;" 
instead, it is the observer's response to and the recognition of the (suffering) working-
class body that is the moral act, and in this configuration, it is the observer (or reader) 
who emerges as morally superior to both the sufferers and those who inflict the suffering 
(Sanders 317) This self-serving paradigm places the moral agency largely on (middle-
class) reformers and readers. The impetus and approach to documenting suffering that 
Metz and Sanders outline becomes, necessarily, contested in Chartist and working-class 
narratives. As spectators as well as the very subjects of suffering, working-class radicals 
and labourers envision differently, the questions of agency (and accordant blame) 
inherent in the philosophical and political extensions of suffering. 
Rousseau's series of pointed questions about the prevailing attitudes of the mling 
and monied classes towards the poor overtly concentrates on the "contempt" of the rich 
towards the poor, the result of enduring class distinction. In this sense, it is not a lack of 
feeling, or apathy, but instead, a feeling of "contempt." This deliberate division 
culminates in Victorian social commentaries on the condition of England: in Disraeli's 
tem1s, two nations unfeeling, or at worst, bitter, towards the lives and fates of the other. 
More complex, however, is Rousseau's acknowledgement that suffering requires both a 
recognition of one's own potential for suffering, and how such a acknowledgment must 
transcend rank or class. If one considers sympathy as strictly spectatorial, Rousseau's 
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injunction to transcend rank or class loses any revolutionary potential, since spectatorial 
sympathy constitutes the spectator within a distinct social identity heretofore invisible. 
For radical writers such as Frederich Engels and Karl Marx, the apparent apathy 
(or even contempt) of the rich and powerful towards the suffering poor is one that closely 
mirrors the very capitalistic systems that maintain such economic disparity in the first 
place. Marx argues that capitalism is predicated on suffering, one that makes "the 
accumulation of misery a necessary condition" (799). The "juggernaut of capital," 
defined by Marx, depresses and degrades the worker with little regard or feeling, yet it is 
the accumulated misery (mass suffering) that can spark working-class revolt. Thus Marx, 
among other radical political theorists, implies that the reaction to suffering provokes the 
impassioned impetus for the pursuit of change. The political radical or Chartist who 
witnesses and experiences suffering can no longer be a disinterested spectator, yet being 
entirely guided by feeling presents significantly rhetorical and ideological obstacles as 
well. Indeed, within politics, and within demands for the alleviation of suffering, there 
exists the tentative reminder for caution and sound parameters for judgment and response 
in both radical and conservative discourses. 
As an 1855 article from The Morning Post, a moderate Tory periodical, cautions, 
sympathy is a virtue, but one that must take into account the vicissitudes of human nature 
and social propriety: 
To sympathize with pain, suffering, or deprivation, is a very angelic quality, no 
doubt, especially if the pain, suffering, or deprivation be traceable to no violation 
of properties; yet insomuch as mankind are not angels, there are innumerable 
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conditions of anguish, both mental and corporeal, which a hard convention of 
society regards as subjects of no pity at all. ("To sympathise with pain ... " 4) 
Most clearly, the criterion is one of scale or proportion - "No one pities the toothache," 
the article summarizes ("To sympathise with pain ... " 4). Thus, in order to justify 
responses to suffering as being appropriate, the ve1y breadth of suffering must be suitably 
grand. 
In espousing indignation at social and political inequalities, and making calls for 
action, Chartist periodicals attempt to provide consequent guidelines for sympathy with 
(and anger for) suffering, and in doing so, provide opportunities for resentment and anger 
as a unifying (and legitimate) political force. Many Chartist writers not only criticize the 
ostensible lack of feeling on the part of those with political power and wealth, but also 
critique responses of complacency at current social and political disparities. This charge 
of complacency is one leveled against not only capitalists or industrialists, but also 
would-be radical sympathizers and reformers whose proposed solutions do little to 
change the course of suffering. Perhaps most telling of this prevailing attitude is an attack 
on Charles Kingsley, published in Lloyd's Weekzv7 : a poetic satire titled "Parson Lot's 
'Consolation' for the Suffering Poor" (11 June 1848). From the quotations around the 
word "consolation," the author is decidedly sarcastic about Kingsley's solutions for the 
relief of suffering. Instead, the author satirizes what he sees as the putative refom1er's 
remedy of quiet submission to the misery of urban poverty. Kingsley's religious 
connections are evident by the pseudonym, Parson Lot, and likewise, the submission that 
the author satirizes is one tied to Christian notions of suffering. 
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The opening stanza of the poem relies on the glaring opposition between urban 
toil and heavenly reward in the Christian afterlife: "Oh, toil-worker! spite thy alley, I 
Crowded lodging and grimed suit, I I promise you a lovely valley - /A paradise of 
flowers and fruit" (5). This stark contrast between the urban and the pastoral is 
purposeful and the end rhyme of "alley" and "valley" intensifies this symbolic contrast. 
As such, it illustrates the incongmity, if not absurdity, between working-class urban life 
and an egalitarian (and pastoral) afterlife promised by many Christian reformers. In the 
stanzas that follow, the satirist presents a labourer's life reminiscent of much industrial 
fiction of the time: it features a waning wife, and a "departed crippled child" (5). Both 
figures are sentimental and potent symbols of a threatened working-class masculinity, 
whereby one's economic potential and power, or lack thereof, is indicative of one's status 
as head of household. 8 It is precisely the incongruity between the present suffering of the 
urban labourer and the promise of peace and paradise in the future that makes this 
providential submission so unsatisfactory to the author, and his accusation of 
complacency (as a kind of consolation) is reminiscent of the charge leveled against Sandy 
Mackaye by Crosswraithe in Kingsley's novel, Alton Locke, published years later. 
This poetic satire underscores the fears surrow1ding the connection among 
suffering, sympathy, and resentment by pointing out a prevailing attitude of reformers. 
While sympathetic to the plight of the labouring poor, many reformers advocate avoiding 
feelings of resentment in favour of Christian virtues of acquiescence. Discussing 
Kingsley's novel, Joseph Childers notes how for the author and Church of England priest, 
suffering was "expressly providential and necessary for an increased awareness of moral 
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responsibility, or at least for an increased receptivity to the word of God" (137). Alton 
Locke's surrealistic dream near the end of the novel, argues Childers, engages the 
protagonist with "the necessity of suffering as a sort of purification of the intellect and 
the soul" ( 13 7). In much Chartist discourse, any submission to providence becomes a 
kind of political defeat. Advocating submission to, rather than anger at, miserable 
conditions can strategically supplant or altogether avoid the productive potential of anger 
as a reaction to suffering and the means of overcoming obstacles and facing injustices. 
Providence becomes a willingness to accept a kind of class-based mle, that, like 
Rousseau's critique implies, considers the rich as "ordained by God to rule" ("Parson 
Lot's 'Consolation' for the Suffering Poor" 5). 
For the satirist in Lloyd's, Parson Lot's resolution to "[b ]e contented and 
obedient" is one that justifies rich recompense: "Be contented and obedient I And you' 11 
be rewarded yet; - I Yes, content's a happy meal, I If no other meal you get" ( 5). The last 
line, however, undercuts this compensation and reminds the reader that one must live on 
a metaphorical "meal" of contentment rather than subsistence. To envision that one must 
live on either one or the other is a bitter pill to swallow. Although it provides the fodder 
for satire in this poem, Chartist discussions of suffering often incorporate assertions of 
Christian virtues with the necessity of demanding or implementing radical political 
change. 
In 'The Spirit of the People," an article published in The Northern Star (7 July 
1838), the "determined disposition of the people" becomes intentionally conflated with 
moral virtue in that the two are necessarily in the service of each other. For the author, 
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the "spirit of the people" is a refined sense of liberty and justice, a response to suffering 
that would ultimately prompt the populace to rally against gross inequalities (4). For the 
author, retribution, even in anger, is not the first reaction, yet it may be wholly necessa1y 
and a just alternative to long-term complacency: "Wrongs long endured, with whatever 
degree of patience, beget a desire of redress and when all hope of external succor fails, 
the sufferer naturally looks to his own power of remedying his own grievances" (4). This 
statement provides an antidote to the ineffective consolation ridiculed in the 
aforementioned poem: the natural progression of suffering is not submission but 
"redress." 
Rhetorically relying on a force of incongmity similar to that fmmd in the satirical 
poem, the author of "The Spirit of the People" compares the "drudge" of daily labouring 
life with a life of luxury, and this incongruity both intensifies suffering and the force of 
subsequent redress: 
But when insult is added to injury, the stem pride of honesty flushes the cheek 
with indignation, and produces a resolve that matters shall be thus no longer. The 
meekest of all spirits cannot bear to be both robbed and kicked; and hence, when 
the tax-ridden slaves of this miserable country found themselves insulted by the 
gorgeous and tawdry displays of that wealth which has been extracted from their 
sinews, sparkling in the bedizenments of foolish mummery, when they saw that 
which should have afforded comfort to their firesides wasted on 'an idle and 
useless pageant;' ... their spirit refused to brook the insult, and they were induced 
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to manifest their consciousness of the wrongs they suffering by demanding the 
restitution of their rights. ( 4) 
The demand for political rights is ambiguous here, but contextually, it suggests political 
action, such as the Chartist petition or organized strikes or boycotts of commodities. 
While the author relies on biblical discourse - the "meek" spirit praised in the Sermon on 
the Mount - his exposition of the conditions against this spirit are fierce descriptions of 
current inequalities: the "tax-ridden-slaves" are juxtaposed against the "tawdry" and 
"idle" who care more for their finery - a description that calls to mind lthe demanding, 
and often piecemeal, labour of tailors and seamstresses that is later explored in novels 
such as Alton Locke. Like Rousseau's deliberate comparison between rich and poor, this 
disparity is detailed in terms of emotional affect as much as physical and mental "injury," 
and the extinguished "fireside" in this description functions as a poignant symbol of 
failed or broken familial and domestic comfort for Victorian readers.9 Luxury and reward 
are not necessarily enjoyed only in the after-life, the reward of uncomplaining 
submission, but the large-scale misery of the poor exists alongside (and because of) the 
equally grand pleasures of the rich. 
Yet, despite the revolutiona1y undertones implicit in calls for redress, the author 
maintains a separation between the "flush" of indignation that motivates the cause for 
retribution, and any causal link to violence. It is "only tyrants who require the argument 
of bloodshed to maintain their cause"; the author advocates remedying adversities and 
inequalities through organized acts of civil disobedience or resistance rather than 
violence ("The Spirit of the People" 4). In this respect, the just response to suffering is 
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strong feeling, but one that entails political commitment, and this is decidedly different 
from the "humanitarian response" that Sanders discusses, which purposefully avoids 
attributing cause or blame on industrialists. Given that suffering befalls those without 
political representation, and adhering to the maxim that "[t]axation without representation 
is tyranny, and ought to be resisted," the author of "The Spirit of the People" insists that 
disenfranchised individuals should not pay taxes, and further, advocates a campaign of 
consumer activism to correct the imbalance of power and punish those complacent about 
or profiting from the current inequalities: "Let the ale bench be abandoned - the gin 
palace forsaken. Let the green fields of our own country be ransacked for sweet-smelling 
and nutritious herbs which may be used as substitutes for tea - break the tobacco pipe to 
atoms, and throw it on the dunghill" ( 4). Indeed, for Cha11ists, modes of redress in 
response to suffering are not solely intended for parliamentary institutions, even with the 
demands of the Charter, but also the very economic interests that are complicit within the 
current system. 
To be sure, this particular call to action echoes much of the language of social and 
sanitation reform: the evocation of dirt alongside the address to the moral improvement 
of the poor by way of temperance. Yet, the onus for public response is placed on the 
sufferers, who must rally their own "spirit" and act accordingly through communal 
practices of resistance. In questioning authority, and constructing a shared sense of 
agency through such individual actions, the author also places accountability for suffering 
on those who may, even indirectly, profit from the current system. In particular, the 
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course of action recommended is targeted at merchants and governmental authorities that 
rely on the current political economy and systems of manufacturing and commerce. 10 
This call to action also includes an emphasis on the disclosure of suffering, 
particularly through the dissemination of personal narratives, which present a response to 
suffering from the individual who suffers as the preferred alternative to strictly 
spectatorial accounts and a means to sustain public opinion. These personal nanatives 
also point to the sources of suffering, overtly ascribing blame and instilling responsibility 
in both sufferer and reader. During the period of the Hungry Forties, Chartist periodicals 
such as The Northern Star ran serial narratives recounting the trials, and in more 
melodramatic contexts, the "confessions," of individuals driven to crime by poverty or 
want, or being punished and imprisoned for their political convictions. One of the 
longest-mnning of such serials, spanning four issues (3 April to 1 May 1841 ), was the 
narrative of Mitchell, who while an accomplice to a robbery was arrested for murder. The 
first installment of the serial starts with an introductory statement by the periodical's 
editors and provides a prisoner statement from the "condemned cell," one signed by three 
witnesses ("The Barnsley Murder" 8). This legalistic document is, in the next 
installment, contrasted with Mitchell's personal narrative, which introduces readers to his 
family life and the unfolding of events that lead up to the incident. The periodical's 
editors repeatedly refer to Mitchell's trial and fate as "unfortunate" ("The Barnsley 
Murder" 8), and in his personal narrative, Mitchell explains that he comes from "tender 
and virtuous parents" and praises the conduct of his parents and siblings:: "I mean to say 
that there is not a better conducted family, of a poor man's family, in Yorkshire" 
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("Narrative of Mitchell the Murderer" 1). Ultimately, it is Mitchell's association with a 
band of thieves ("gypsies"), one that is perpetuated by his hunger and their promise of 
food, that leads to his arrest and incarceration at seventeen years of age, and although 
staidly confessing to his thieving, Mitchell, and the editors of the Non hem Star, maintain 
that the current punishment that has befallen him does not fit his crime. Despite his 
avowed crimes, Mitchell's narrative, both editorial and autobiographical, strives to 
present him as a worthy object of sympathy. 
Another long-running serial was the "Narrative of the Imp1isonment of John 
Watkins" (4 April to 9 May, 1840) in the Northern Star, which chronicles the arrest and 
containment of John Watkins (1808 - 1858) for giving a speech in Stockton in 1839. 
Watkins, a Chartist, penned political pamphlets in which he argued a connection between 
the political Charter and a Christian imperative: "Charterism is a secondary Christianity -
Christians must be Charterists' (30). For Watkins, Christian virtue is not complacency 
and submission, but pointed political assertion. He was also a frequent contributor of 
poetry to The Northern Star and contributed the five-part "Narrative" detailing his arrest 
and imprisonment. 11 The first installment of his narrative opens with the very question 
that would later occupy both Gaskell and Kingsley- what made Watkins (or John 
Barton, or Alton Locke) a Chartist? The answer, according to Watkins' series, is the 
experience of suffering and injustice at the hands of the current legal and economic 
institutions. 
Continued use of these serials provides a tacit argument about the need for 
narrative and its effect on mediating and guiding feeling, an attempt not only to answer 
230 
the question of why does one become a political radical, but also to document individual 
experiences of suffering. These serials demonstrate the very politics of suffering through 
these individualized autobiographical narratives, while also acknowledging pervasive 
discursive forms such as investigative journalism, sociological studies, and the 
explanatory social problem or condition-of-England novels. The "flush" of indignation 
decreed in "The Spirit of the People" becomes an important rhetorical force for rallying 
readers in shared feelings associated with suffering. One is meant to feel sympathy for 
Mitchell or Watkins - for their punishments, and consequent suffering, do not fit the 
scale of their misconduct or activities. Thus, like the article cited from The Morning Post, 
Chartist narratives are also suitably concerned with scale. In showing the unnecessary 
(and unwarranted) suffering of individuals, they provide the ethical impetus for responses 
to suffering. 
If anger (and its variances) have traditionally been connected with notions of self-
assertion (and thus, self-constitution) in theories of emotion, within the Chartist "politics 
of suffering" they become profoundly social emotions. Presumably, readers of these 
narratives, even if not having experienced imprisonment, are familiar with the conditions 
of poverty or destitution; they may also harbour their own political and moral 
convictions, ones which may, like Watkins, put them in danger of punitive treatment.12 
Thus, readers provisionally exist alongside these narratives, not as spectators, but 
participants in shared feelings of indignation or anger as a response to unjust or 
"unfortunate" suffering. 
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While attributing blame to the cause of suffering is both integral to the experience 
of, and response to, suffering, for Chartists, consequent redress, was, and still is, a 
complex process, particularly in politically-charged contexts. The threat of large-scale 
demonstrations was a viable outcome in the eyes of lawmakers, yet even for the most 
radical physical-force Chartists, these potentially retributive responses to suffering, in 
order to gamer support, needed to make appeals to more than simply vengeance. As part 
of their campaign to garner public opinion (or sympathy), Chartists understood how 
instilling fear in their opponents, through angry displays of force or retribution, would 
ultimately harm their cause. Even Fergus O'Connor, famed advocator of physical force 
for the Chartist cause, advocated the primacy of controlled expression and "the -
deliberative reasoning quality in man's mind, which teaches him to bear" the inflictions 
and injustices brought upon him ("Physical Force" 2). In this way, the foremost Chartist 
response to suffering is associated with forebearance and deliberation, not violent 
retaliation or stark resentment. Like Watkins, O'Connor links working·-class suffering, 
and its requisite "flush" of indignation, to Christian virtue as a means of providing 
suitable integrity to both suffering and its response. Redress may well be a necessity, but 
in the Chartist politics of suffering, it is not, nor should it be, a reactionary response to the 
injustices towards the labouring poor, but one of intentional commitment. Moreover, 
Chartist responses to suffering are not linked to any one feeling; rather, they validate 
strong feeling with a moral imperative. Feeling works as an energizing and articulate 
force, but one that must fuel initiatives for collective (political and consumer) action and 
class-based identification. To be sure, this approach also relies on the trenchant 
232 
affirmation of social difference, yet in contrast to the criticisms leveled against many 
mid-century industrial or social problem novels, this imperative does not follow the 
typical "change-of-heart" narrative. 
The "change of heart" narrative is, foremost, a conversion narrative, whereby a 
pivotal character, through the witnessing of some "scene" (usually of suffering), 
experiences the moral force of sympathy and, from there, becomes invested in alleviating 
the cause of that suffering. The scene is one that both serves to reify differences between 
social groups, while also advocating ameliorative action both within the story world and 
within the diegesis as a means of plot resolution.13 Patricia Ingham links this change-of-
heart narrative to paternalistic discourses, whereby effective refom1 starts with a change 
of feeling towards one another, and in which the emphasis falls on the moral duties of the 
upper classes towards the urban poor (16). Within this narrative, Ingham argues, the 
urban poor must submit and suffer with the tentative promise to be redeemed either after 
death, in heaven, or by the moral rectitude of the middle and upper classes. Moreover, 
such a narrative requires and validates social differences. For Raymond Williams, feeling 
alone becomes ineffective, and as a plot device, this change of heart is the more subdued 
or inoffensive deflection of significant social and political reform. Williams criticizes the 
"strncture of feeling" which emerged out of middle-class consciousness: inherent in the 
industrial novels of the mid century (88), and he provides, as his example, Mm:y Barton 
(1848). 
Gaskell's first novel has been subject to many such critiques, which declare both 
the emotional resolution between Carson and Barton, as well as the eponymous heroine's 
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emigration to Canada, as a too-tidy resolution that favours this change of heart 
conversion over the proposal of viable solutions to alleviate suffering in the first place. 
Yet I would argue that with its attention to suffering in both the Christian sense and as a 
builder of community, Mary Barton sustains an argument about feeling (and suffering) 
similar to that found in Chartist discourses. Despite its pivotal change-of-heart scene 
between Carson and Barton, Gaskell' s novel demonstrates that "scenes" of suffering and 
sympathy that serve to solidify difference and emphasize inequality an~ not (and cannot 
be) resolved in political and social life. Instead, they serve to strengthen this inextricable 
connection between suffering and redress, prompting more hostility then amelioration. 
III. The Case for Narrative: Elizabeth Gaskell's Mary Barton 
Critics who discuss Gaskell' s first novel vacillate between two contrastive 
positions: whether Gaskell' s depiction of the Manchester poor espouses a radical critique 
of industrial labour and urban living conditions, or whether its depiction of social 
problems is mired in middle-class assumptions and fears about the industrial workforce. 
Those in the latter category often castigate the novel's tum towards the domestic, and the 
shift in plot from John Barton, the intended (political) hero, to the romantic plot of his 
daughter Mary. Others point to the novel's resolution of emigration, and its implication 
that domestic bliss can be fmmd in the bucolic backwoods of Canada, which ultimately 
eclipses any viable political solutions to urban and industrial England. Those who 
critique Gaskell' s proposed apolitical solutions to the condition of England base their 
argument on a direct opposition between feeling and political action. 14 On the other side, 
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critics argue that Gaskell' s industrial fiction, and the illustrious reputation of Gaskell 
herself as the minister's wife and bestselling novelist, present radical departures from 
(and implicit critiques of) existing systems of authorship and publishing, gender 
asymmetry, and industrial labour. 15 
There are considerable claims and evidence for either of these critical stances, to 
be sure, but I would argue that this ambivalent and polarizing reception of Gaskell' s 
industrial fiction demonstrates the complexity of the politics of suffering (and feeling) 
rather than the novel's deliberate political allegiances, or lack thereof. In fact, looking at 
the reception of Mary Barton by Gaskell' s contemporaries shows a multitude of similar 
stances; her sympathy towards the suffering of industrial labourers has generated both 
acclaim and criticism among other nineteenth-century authors and critics. With such 
divided reception, it seems appropriate to refer to Schaub's pithy assertion that sympathy 
is, indeed, "dangerous" (15). I would add that part of its "danger" is sympathy's ability to 
serve multiple ends, depending on who is doing the sympathizing, and depending on how 
one interprets the motives for representing suffering: Lancashire weavers in the mid-
nineteenth century pool their money to buy copies of the book (Recchio 10); school 
authorities in 1907 ban the book in Manchester-area schools for girls because it is too 
emotionally stimulating; 16 and contemporary scholars consider whether Gaskell' s 
sympathetic portrayal of working-class life is political or apolitical (or more specifically, 
guided by class-based assumptions and fears). Gaskell's sympathetic portrayal of 
suffering has heralded varied reactions since its publication, and it also incited judgments 
about the then-anonymous author's identity. 
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As Angus Easson notes, Gaskell's sympathetic tone, which prompted Victorian 
critics and readers to speculate that the anonymous author of Mary Barton was a woman, 
is an intellectual perspective tied to gender and the novel form: "[women] had developed 
the novel, making it pre-eminently the female genre, with its domesticity, its presentation 
of emotion, its 'feminine' qualities of detail and empathy" (2, original emphasis). Easson 
maintains that this designation of "feminine" is not a disparaging marker, but one that 
denotes "an important critical insight, linked as it is to issues of realism, and how the 
language of fiction is experientially controlled" (2). The avowed purpose of the novel, 
according to its narrator, is to show "the romance in the lives of some of those who 
elbowed me daily in the busy streets of the town in which I resided," and who may well 
be "doomed to struggle through their lives" (MB 3). This statement echoes the tension 
between literary modes ·and subject matter that resides in many industrial or condition-of-
England novels: romance and realism, sentimentality and objective distance. The implied 
author-as-sympathetic-observer arrangement is, understandably, most commonly 
conceived as a spectator's position. 
For her part, Gaskell complicates this stance, acknowledging in her Preface that it 
was written out of both personal "circumstances," being the grief over the death of her 
son in 1845, and a "little manifestation" of sympathy along with a "little attention to the 
expression of feelings on the part of some of the work-people" of her ac:quaintance (MB 
3; emphasis added). Gaskell's statement, which relies on personal experience, 
exemplifies the modest (if not self-effacing) tone that pervades her Preface. It also 
negates the strictly spectatorial role of the implied author: Gaskell's ostensible motivation 
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for writing the novel is both sympathy with the suffering of the labouring poor and her 
own suffering at haven lost a child. Despite assurances that her novel was not a timely or 
politically-motivated response to the 1848 revolution in France and elsewhere on the 
Continent (MB 4), critics such as W.R. Greg claim that Gaskell's po11rayal of the 
feelings between rich and poor, manufacturer and labourer, is both exaggerated and 
potentially incendiary. 
Writing an unsigned review in the Edinburgh Review (April 1848), Greg duly 
notes Gaskell' s "intimate" position among, and her "undiscriminating'=· sympathy for, the 
Manchester poor, but he cautions that the novel will do much harm. For Greg, the novel's 
depiction of John Barton's vindictive anger, culminating in the murder of Carson, the 
representative mill owner, has the potential to cause readers to think that such feeling was 
"constant" and pervasive among industrial labourers. Instead, he attributes such ill will to 
"ex-workmen" turned trade union delegates and professional agitators ( 164, 169-70). He 
carefully emphasizes that such extreme feeling and subsequent actions were rare rather 
than characteristic, and he praises the "submissive hopefu111ess" of the novel's secondary 
working-class figures such as George and Alice Wilson (Greg 166). Ye1t, his critique 
makes a profom1dly stark statement on the relationship between sympathy and class 
difference. The "want of sympathy" between rich and poor is pa11 of a larger (and 
contentious) issue: sympathy can "only exist in its fullest extent among persons of the 
same condition" (Greg 168). Thus, "the agony of suffering without the sympathy of the 
happy" (MB 2), while unfortunate, is inevitable, argues Greg. Although the contented 
middle and upper classes may well have sympathetic feeling towards the suffering poor, 
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theirs is an "imperfect" sympathy (Greg 169), and he aligns his critique with existing 
narratives and ideologies of self-help and sanitary reform. Greg's own evaluation of this 
"imperfect" sympathy is that it the result of social difference, and in this respect, his 
discussion of sympathy, suffering, and social difference coincides with many of 
assumptions of sympathy and spectacle in contemporary Victorian scholarship. Raising 
the conditions of the working poor is the responsibility of the poor themselves, who must 
look to their fellow workers, and their moral improvement, to seek relief from suffering 
(Greg 176). For Greg, the novelist's sympathy ultimately fosters a kind of "desperate 
delusion" in readers and reformers. His praise of Gaskell' s sympathy at the beginning of 
his review is subsequently deemed both unjust and imperfect by the end. The novelist's 
emotional response, in this respect, becomes woefully insufficient to epitomize the "state 
of feeling" that Gaskell attempts to represent in her novel (MB 4), and may even provoke 
considerable anger in itself. 
In an unsigned review in the British Quarterly (l February 1849), another critic 
aligns Gaskell' s novel with literary fashion rather than an aim for sympathy or 
verisimilitude. For this reviewer, the "condition of the poor of England''' is "fashionable" 
subject matter for the time that serves political and ideological interests rather than the 
dictates of humanitarianism or social amelioration (102)- a point that echoes Carlyle's 
opening statement in Past and Present. In this the reviewer is unequivocal: 
We do not for a moment mean to insinuate that [England'' s labouring 
population] have not suffered often and severe I y, or that there are not 
many things com1ected with their present circumstances that urgently need 
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amendment; but, making extensive allowance for all this, we are still of 
the opinion that a very exaggerated view of their condition and prospects 
has been and still is entertained in many quarters, and that the influence of 
intemperate partisanship has too frequently diverted attention from evils 
that were real to such as were mainly imaginary. (103) 
By way of this political posturing (as "intemperate partisanship"), fact ultimately suffers, 
and the reviewer supports his or her claim by citing Lord Ashley's par]iamentary 
campaigns concerning the Factory Act (1844), which relied heavily on the "persevering 
misrepresentations" and testimony of William Dodd ( 104). 
Dodd's own personal story, A Narrative of the Experience and Sufferings of 
William Dodd, a Factory Cripple (1841), follows closely the purpose and form of the 
personal narratives serialized in Chartist papers. Yet, after much-publicized allegations of 
exaggeration and unreliability, Dodd' s political and personal reputation suffered and he 
became an enduring example of how politics (variously interpreted as personal gain or 
self-interest) inflect first-person accounts of emotional and physical duress. 17 Despite 
Dodd 's claims that he bears no ill-will to his former employers, the act of representing 
suffering, and publishing it, aligns it with allegations of partisanship or litera1y fashion -
ultimately self-serving interests. Yet, these accounts exist as alternatives to the culturally-
sanctioned (third-person) spectator accounts in journalism, novels, and studies, which 
much explain their hostile reception. Like sympathy, and its associated ''·dangers," the 
responses to Dodd' s narrative illustrate the complex relationship between literary 
reception, authorial identity, and credibility. Indeed, many working-class authors (or 
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Chartists in particular, if we consider the allegations directed at Ernest Charles Jones, 
among others) were subject to similar charges of monetary self-interest, an allegation that 
undercuts truth claims based on personal experience and certainly makes explicit the 
class-based privileges surrounding authorship and literary production. [ would venture 
further to say that such responses are also indicative of the profound discomfort with 
suffering, especially from the vantage point of the sufferer. If the expression of and 
response to suffering is "ineffable," then attempts to articulate such personal experiences 
are met with caution, even disbelief, judged as inadequate or false performances. 
For the reviewer in The British Quarterly, Gaskell' s description of both the 
condition of and the "state of feeling" in labouring Britain is, like Dodd's memoir of 
working-class life, an exaggerated vision, one prompted by an attention to fiction and the 
publishing market rather than claims to tmth. The needs of masters and workmen, 
according to the reviewer, are more interdependent than misaligned or antagonistic (a 
point that, I think, Gaskell is also making in her novel); as such, the representation of 
such vengeance or ill-feeling is, argues the reviewer, a deliberate misrepresentation (104-
05). Moreover, the author takes issue with Gaskell's stated impartiality in her Preface, 
claiming that by "not having judged, the writer left out one of the most necessary 
qualifications for writing such a tale" (107). On this point, the reviewer is correct: 
sympathy with suffering and the strong feelings that prompt redress require a judgment 
on the very merits of such strong feeling. Thus, the sympathizer cannot be impartial but 
must consider who may be accountable for the justifiable causes of feelings such as anger 
or indignation. By focusing on the politics of suffering, Gaskell continually comes up , 
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against issues of accountability, whether in charges exemplified by the previous 
reviewers or in the narrative itself. 
Explaining John Barton's turn to vengeful (and politically-motivated) murder 
becomes a major narrative preoccupation, and even the novel's other protagonists draw 
their own inferences as to what prompted Barton's action. Moreover, the narrator must 
confront the problem of class-based sympathy (and identity politics), which presume that 
one cannot have "true" sympathy for the misfortunes of another unless one has been in 
the same situation. Gaskell's marked ambivalence also surfaces in the narrative itself and 
demonstrates the very "problem" with suffering and sympathy: it may have to address the 
potential for retribution. In this sense, both Gaskell and her narrator must confront the 
practice of vindication and redress as part of a politics of suffering, one that synthesizes 
accountability through multiple causes: the current social and economic system, innate 
and individualistic temperaments, and socio-environmental detenninations. Gaskell 
advocates inter-class sympathy by demonstrating how suffering exists in both the toiling 
and the (ostensibly) contented classes, while acknowledging how it operates specifically 
in working-class contexts. As in Cha11ist discourses, Gaskell conceptualizes class-based 
feeling as an ultimately motivating and redemptive force, one predicated on similarity 
and experiential knowledge of suffering. Yet in doing so, she also disavows notions of 
sympathy solely based on class allegiances, ultimately praising working-class sympathy 
while advocating for inter-class cooperation. 
It is this intense ambivalence both in the narrative and the Preface that fascinates 
critics and supporters alike, both then and now. My interest lies not in resolving this 
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uncertainty, for it is a pronounced part of the tensions surrounding strong feelings and 
their expression, but rather, I want to point out that this ambivalence most clearly 
exemplifies the relationships among suffering, accountability, and resentment. In 
representing and explaining working-class antipathies - the result of unmitigated 
suffering - Gaskell' s narrator must confront blame, and in doing so, must represent, for 
better or for worse, the practices of redress and the enduring consequences of resentment 
within the context of class hostilities and economic recession. This provisional (and 
ambivalent) treatment ultimately resists the "knowability" of h1mmnitarian responses of 
the time. 
In Mary Barton .. the experience of sympathy and suffering form a central 
structuring feature of the novel, and, more specifically, the plot. By representing the 
condition of England (or at least Manchester) as a condition of feeling, Gaskell's novel 
also demonstrates a profound debt to Carlyle, and not only through the quote from 
Carlyle on the title page. Yet, like Kingsley's own sympathetic rendering of the condition 
of working-class industrial labour in Alton Locke, Gaskell's intellectual devotion to 
Carlylean thought also demonstrates its limitations. Despite Gaskell's assertion in the 
novel's preface that her goal in writing this book was to "give some utterance to the 
agony which from time to time convulses this dumb people" (MB 3), a description that 
echoes Carlyle's own description of Chartists in Chartism, she nevertheless relies on 
working-class speech and discourse, whether eloquently uttered or sullenly gruff, for 
narrative authority. As Marjorie Stone explains, it is precisely through this Bakhtinian 
polyphony of voices that Gaskell legitimizes, rather than denounces, working-class 
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speech (175). Thus, rather than assigning working-class (and working-class radical) 
speech to a secondary position of either silence or ineloquence, Gaskell incorporates 
working-class discourses into her novel - the same combination of personal anecdotes, 
folk ballads, and biblical passages that serve as hallmarks of Chartist rhetoric (Surridge 
335-36). Using examples of working-class speech and literary forms, Gaskell's narrator, 
more generally, validates working-class culn1fe. Alongside Chartist and working-class 
discourses, the high-culture references that the narrator employs would be, argues Joanne 
Wilkes, recognizable to middle-class readers, yet ultimately, these literary allusions in the 
novel prompt readers to reject the master's viewpoint (154). 
To represent speech is, argues Bakhtin, to represent a character's "ideological 
world" (335) and in Mary Barton, this is not the sole task of the narrator or the implied 
author, but also the prerogative of the novel's characters, who supply their own 
utterances (and narratives) and introduce cultural references strongly tied to working-
class life and speech. Using Bakhtinian theories of language to discuss Gaskell's novel 
seems appropriate; Gaskell's use of vying discourses becomes part of her complex ethical 
gesture, especially if one considers how utterances - in the Bakthinian sense, units of 
meaning in infinite contexts of exchange or "open-endedness" 18 - are forn1ed through 
processes that include considerations of a speaker's (or writer's) relation to other people, 
their words, and their lived experiences. Indeed, Bakhtin' s discussion of dialogism in 
literary texts is a means of exploring his ethical and philosophical concerns: in dialogism, 
meaning is not fixed (or the interpretative property of the spectator) but is located through 
"interactions between speaking subjects, between texts and readers, between texts 
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themselves" (Lodge 86). In this sense, these interactions - alternatives to spectatorial 
meaning-making - can form the basis for viable commitment from readers (as they do for 
the characters in the novel). 
I want to extend the argument presented by scholars such as Stone, Surridge, and 
Wilkes by considering how the incorporation of various discourses, and the exchange of 
personal utterances and stories, enables the narrator to discuss resentment and consider 
how best to mitigate it. While critics have discussed how Gaskell uses language to garner 
sympathy for the working classes, there has been little discussion about the infiuences of 
Chartism on how Gaskell represents feeling, and particularly suffering, in the novel. 
Discussing the intersection among authorship, class, and politics in the works of William 
Lovett, a Chartist leader, Margery Sabin makes the apt point that language, as a form of 
"property and power [was] systematically denied" to authors such Lovett, whose "verbal 
enfranchisement" was a stmggle that pervaded his work, most notably his autobiography 
( 42-43). Yet, while providing a compelling discussion of Lovett's style, characterized by 
a "narrative sparseness," Sabin quickly establishes an opposition between Lovett and 
condition-of-England authors such as Gaskell: 
Mainstream Victorian writers, even those most sympathetic to the working-class 
plight, pay little regard to the stmggle for verbal enfranchisement central to 
Lovett's Chartism. Thomas Carlyle, Charles Dickens, Elizabeth Gaskell, even 
Friedrich Engels, all deny the working classes ability to function effectively in 
plain English, and base their sympathetic appreciation, as well as their disdain, on 
the very fact of this verbal exclusion. (47; 55) 
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Similarly, in his article on the representation of Chartism in Ma1y Barton, Chris Vanden 
Bossche argues that Gaskell represents Chartism, and historical events such as the 
presentation of the petition to parliament, in a way that disavows working-class agency 
and assumes that those in power will provide the necessary remedy (172-3). Those noting 
any resemblances to or usages of Chartist discourse or tropes often argue that Gaskell 
distances herself from radical politics, whether from middle-class bias or anxieties over 
working-class revolt. My discussion of Gaskell attempts to emphasize some important 
affinities that have heretofore been overlooked. 
In Mary Barton, dialogues between characters provide key moments for the 
exchange of sympathy, and for the disclosure of narratives of suffering, injustice, and 
anger. Also important to this sympathetic rendering is Gaskell' s narrator, who guides 
readers between the various domestic (and psychological) interiors of the characters: 
whether it be the damp cellar of the Davenports or the lavish but staid chambers of the 
Carsons. 19 Sympathy in the novel exists not as an attempt to avoid the political, but as the 
very vehicle for ideological concerns. In this respect, Joseph Childers's assertion that 
Gaskell proposes "a new community based on communication" is apt~ yet, Childers 
proposes that this community is one modeled on Christianity ( 1 7), whereas I suggest that 
it is also one built around Gaskell's radical critique of sympathetic exchange based solely 
on spectatorship (an ''imperfect" sympathy that is grounded in identity politics and social 
difference), which serves only to reinforce social differences and the misunderstandings 
and injustices that continue to perpetuate suffering. 
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The novel's plot is strnctured around moments of failed and successful sympathy. 
There are, in MalJJ Barton, certainly many "scenes of suffering," to use Jaffe 's term, and 
these scenes assert the profound "ethos of care'' that pervades the novel (Surridge 334). 
Through these juxtapositions, however, Gaskell presents her own radical critique of 
sympathy by appealing to narratives of suffering as the first step towards social remedy 
or "succor" ("The Spirit of the People" 4). Unlike the proclamation against these "wrongs 
long endured" in the Northern Star, however, Gaskell's remediation does not suggest that 
such remedy requires either "external" (social and political) aid or personal disclosure of 
such wrongs, but rather, maintains that one requires, and mediates, the other. Although 
writers such as Greg and Carlyle base their discussion of feeling upon differences in 
socio-economic classes, as contemporary scholars have also suggested - a difference that 
is predicated on control over feeling by the middle classes, and a lack of control by the 
working classes - Gaskell' s treatment of feeling and its communication resists such class-
based demarcations and anxieties about working-class expression. Throughout Mmy 
Barton scenes of working-class sympathy become redemptive, even in light of John 
Barton's angry radicalism and subsequent act of murder. Her novel emphasizes 
exchanges of feeling an10ng working-class characters, and, most interestingly, sympathy 
of the working-class characters towards the wealthy industrialist and mill owner, Carson, 
after his son's murder. 
Suffering and sympathy abound in the novel and are intrinsically intertwined, 
whereby sympathy with suffering provides a necessary relief from suffering. For 
example, when Mary enters the Davenports' decrepit cellar after the death of Mr. 
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Davenport, she is ordered by her father to comfort the widow Davenport, a person she 
has heretofore never met. A potentially difficult encounter between the two women, 
however, is averted solely tlu·ough Mary's capacity for sympathetic feeling, which 
supersedes any social awkwardness between two strangers in such an intimate moment: 
"'Mary did not know what to say, or how to comfort, but she knelt down by her~ and put 
her arm round her neck, and in a little while fell to crying herself so bitterly that the 
source of tears was opened by sympathy in the widow, and her full heart was, for a time, 
relieved" (MB 70). The scene is poignant, not solely in its momentary alleviation of 
suffering for the widow Davenport, but in that it also brings relief for the eponymous 
heroine. In her "anxious desire to comfort the poor lone woman," Mary forgets her 
clandestine meetings with the wealthy Harry Carson, the mill owner's son, her grievances 
at work, and, as the narrator enigmatically notes, "her anger," which one could presume 
is generally directed to her own social-economic realities and lot in life, especially in 
contrast to her would-be suitor's (MB 70). The scene emphasizes the ameliorative rather 
than retributive potential of sympathy with suffering. Moreover, such identification 
builds consensus rather than difference, mending relationships rather than causing rifts, 
and it is a type of exchange that is repeated throughout the course of the narrative. 
Despite the obvious lack of words, this "scene," nevertheless, communicates mutual 
relief. 
In Mary Barton there is much necessity for respite: deaths occur repeatedly 
throughout the narrative, usually the result of poverty and want, and they function as the 
main catalysts for suffering. Discussing their importance, Thomas E. Recchio deems 
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them integral to the social impact of the novel, "for they compel readers to confront the 
suffering of imagined but recognizably particularized people" (8). Quite literally, they 
also demonstrate the disintegration of the family and familial bonds by factory labour and 
urban poverty: the Barton household gradually decreases in both size and affection, and 
after each subsequent death, Barton becomes more resentful towards the factory owners 
and less interested in Mary, his sole surviving daughter. Finally, the deaths of the 
characters throughout the novel provide the impetus for meaningful sympathetic 
exchanges and personal introspection. Mary's engagement with the suffering widow 
Davenport, for instance, prompts her to re-examine her meetings with Harry Carson and 
quell her feelings of resentment towards her own meager earnings and home. Most 
significant is the death of Barton himself, which motivates Carson to find out the cause of 
Barton's resentment, scrutinize his own behaviour and feelings towards his labourers, and 
consequently, re-examine his business practices. Importantly, this self-inquiry and 
transformation does not occur without the input of his fellow workers and Job Legh. 
Since reconciliation is impossible in death, or in anger, Carson's sympathetic (and 
ethical) transformation, which relies on inter-class cooperation and dialogue, has the 
potential to stave off further resentment and subsequent deaths. 
Another subtle but illuminating moment occurs between Mary Barton and Jane 
Wilson shortly after the death of Mr. Wilson, the Bartons' long-time family friend. Jane 
Wilson's anger towards the girl who has rejected the courtship of her son is quelled 
through this two-sided exchange: "Mary's listening sympathy softened [Jane], and she 
went on to unburden her heavy-laden heart" (MB 116). Sympathy is reciprocal: 
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characters receive sympathy, often through words of comfort or shared feeling, and in 
turn, re-enter the plot to become sympathetic participants themselves. The progress of 
both Mary Barton's domestic plot and John Barton's political plot can only happen with 
the continued sympathy of friends and strangers. 
It would be an overstatement to say that Gaskell rejects all the destructive 
potential of feeling; the presence of John Barton ensures that all is not rosy or simply 
tearful in the dank cellars and sparse domiciles of the labouring poor of Manchester. 
Indeed, Barton's presence in the narrative amid all these sympathetic exchanges 
exemplifies the persistent and harsh circumstances of the condition of England.. 
Moreover, Barton exists as a necessary instructional foil to his daughter's emotive 
exchanges, a contrast that demonstrates both the social necessity of sympathetic exchange 
and the potentially destmctive and retributive potential of sympathy with suffering. 
The exchanges between Mary and the two older women demonstrate that ameliorative 
sympathy, the temporary relief from suffering which can only exist with an unburdened 
heart (MB 117). This relief comes through the undisguised expression of suffering, 
whether as displays of intense feeling or through narrative disclosure, an exposition of 
one's situation or loss to another. It can also come from the humble acknowledgement of 
one's personal flaws or feelings: the ultimate example of which in the novel is Mary's 
public display of both during the trial of Jem Wilson. Indeed, it is through this 
willingness to acknowledge or disclose that Mary becomes the narrative:·s protagonist 
(rather than her father) and escapes the fate of her aunt Esther. 
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While Mary evolves as the novel's sympathetic and redemptive heroine, her am1t 
and her father represent an opposing fate: both Esther and John Barton initially, and too 
late, refuse to disclose their own narratives of hardship. Esther fabricates an idyl lie (and 
respectable) domestic life for Mary upon their first encounter, which causes the younger 
girl to "shut up her heart instinctively against her aunt" and wonder why she did not share 
her happiness with her sister's family (MB 232)~ similarly, John Barton refuses to 
acknowledge that his mounting bitterness is potentially destructive and alienating. 
When he does attempt to disclose his anguish and anger to those around him, his 
narrative is couched in abstract political threats rather than personal disclosure, and this 
does little to gamer sympathy or understanding from even his closest family and-friends. 
As Barton's familial and communicative exchanges erode, so grows "the rage in his 
heart" (MB 61). In this respect, Barton is the failed political agitator,20 whose political 
speeches fall on listless ears (MB 81-82). 
Eventually, he refuses to provide sympathy as well as fails to receive it When 
Mary seeks comfort after the death of Mr. Wilson, the exchange between the father and 
daughter is bereft of shared feeling, despite their familial connection: 
"Father, do you know George Wilson's dead?" (Her hand was suddenly 
and almost violently compressed.) "He dropped down dead in Oxford 
Road yester morning. It's very sad, isn't it, father? Her tears were ready to 
flow as she looked up in her father's face for sympathy. Still the same 
fixed look of despair, not varied by grief for the dead. "Best for him to 
die," he said, in a low voice. (MB 96) 
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Barton's downward spiral is one that the novel's na1rntor must face and attempt to 
explain. The narrator continually tries to disavow any endorsement of Barton's 
radicalism, explaining that although merciful, Barton's heart is "touched by sin'' (MB 62). 
While his anger and bitterness at humankind come from his tendency to sympathize with 
the suffering of his fellow labourers, as well as his own personal anguish, it has 
nevertheless been perverted by his temperament and the misery of urban life and poverty 
(MB 57). In discussing the tension between determinism and idealism that pervades 
industrial novels, Gallagher makes the apt point that Barton's radicalism (and I would 
say, his anger) paradoxically functions both as "proof that he is incapable of making 
moral choices and as an emblem of his moral responsibility" (73). The inscription on 
Barton's tomb, which he pointedly shares with Esther, is a verse from Psalms (103:9): 
"For he will not always chide, neither will he keep his anger for ever" (MB 324). The Old 
Testament adage becomes a prophetic remark on the state of feeling, especially in the 
context of class relations, in the condition of England: anger may well provide the force 
and motivation to demand or enlist social change (the "flush of indignation" that becomes 
a powerful rhetorical trope in Chartist rhetoric and exists as a response to continued 
suffering). Yet, it is transitory and thus is neither personally nor politically affirming. In 
Mwy Barton, socially valuable and ameliorative responses to suffering are those 
motivated by mutual disclosure and mutual cooperation, whether between families or 
friends, or industrialists and labourers. 
The preoccupation with disclosure, or lack thereof, is a central aspect of Gaskell's 
social critique and commentary, and this concern extends to the representation of the 
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novel's middle-class characters: the factory owners, or masters, and the Carson 
household in particular. For Surridge, the juxtaposition of the highly emotional 
exchanges in working-class homes with the measured exchanges and lavish interiors of 
the Carson household implicitly favours the former over the latter, ancil calls to the reader 
to do the same; industrialist family life is automatic and cold, like machinery, especially 
compared with the vibrant scenes of working-class relationships and social gatherings at 
the beginning of the book (338). I would add that this contrast also serves to explain 
Barton's growing bitterness towards the masters, not unlike the purposeful distinction and 
incongmity between rich/poor and earthly toil/heavenly reward highlighted in Chartist 
critiques. Barton enters the luxurious Carson home as an outside obsenrer and 
immediately after tending to Davenport in his putrid cellar dwelling; he: returns to the 
Davenports to find his friend dead. Exemplifying the "problem" of this spectator-sufferer 
exchange, Barton's mounting bitterness and desire for retribution are carefully narrated 
through a series of spectatorial exchanges between Barton and the objects of his 
resentment. 
The narrator explains that the relationship between masters and workers in the 
period between the first and second Chartist petition was one prompted by retributive 
responses to suffering: ~'In many instances the sufferers wept first and then they cursed. 
Their vindictive feelings exhibited themselves in rabid politics" (MB 83). Witnessing 
(and experiencing) dwindling jobs and wages, Barton fails to see any similar reflections 
in the domestic life of the factory and mill owners, and it is this vast conltrast be1ween the 
luxuries of his employers and his current misery that spurs him to question "[ w ]hy should 
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he alone suffer from bad times" (MB 23). Indeed, it is Barton's unmitigated resentment 
that perpetuates his steady moral decline, and the narrator's description of "rabid politics" 
seems fitting for Barton's animalistic devolution. His involvement with radical politics, 
and resentment, gets explained through a well-known scene in the novel that exemplifies 
how spectatorial exchanges do little to explain suffering or mitigate responses to .it. 
In this scene, Barton encounters the mill owner's wife, whose bags are laden with 
delicacies and purchases for a party. There is no exchange between the two characters -
neither Barton nor Mrs. Hunter speak to each other - and Barton's position is that of the 
spectator, staring into a shop window "where all edible luxuries are displayed" (MB 124). 
Immediately after witnessing this seeming excess, Barton returns home to find that his 
sons have died from lack of proper food and medicine. The chance encounter between 
Barton and Mrs. Hunter is a scene of contrast rather than interaction - no words are 
exchanged and both parties do not acknowledge each other's presence. With this lack of 
exchange, coupled with the poignant contrast between luxury and suffering, begins 
Barton's "bitter spirit of wrath" (MB 24). With the high contrast, or incongruity, between 
Barton and Mrs. Hunter, this scene has the same rhetorical effect on the reader as the 
Chartist periodicals previously discussed: the reader, along with Barton .. comes to the 
conclusion that suffering is unnecessary (and undeserved) given the wealth and luxury 
that exists along side of it. Yet Barton progressively becomes "wild and visionary," as he 
responds to the scenes of suffering around him internally but is unable constmctively to 
express his mounting anger (MB 165). By staying away from suggestions of armed 
rebellion or revolution, the more overt manifestations of the politics of suffering, Gaskell 
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chooses, instead, to show the contrast that breeds such feelings in domestic scenes, 
whereby the domestic becomes the first political ground of the condition of England and 
the "two nations" exist, more specifically, as two homes. 
As the plot progresses, the novel provides a repetition of this scene between 
Barton and Mrs. Hunter, but one realigned with a discussion of capital and wage 
increases in a meeting between the factory owners and operatives. The negotiations 
between the two parties and their interests prove futile, a fact that the narrator interprets 
to be caused by lack of communicative, and sympathetic, exchange: 
So class distrusted class, and their want of mutual confidence wrought sorrow to 
both. The masters would not be bullied, and compelled to reveal why they felt it 
wisest and best to offer only such low wages~ they would not be made to tell that 
they were even sacrificing capital to obtain a decisive victory over the continental 
manufacturers. And the workmen sat silent and stem with folded hands refusing 
to work for such pay. There was a strike in Manchester. (MB 167) 
Despite the evocation of the very terms of political and manufacturing economy - the 
concerns of the market competition and capital losses - this scene serves as an extension 
of the earlier scene between Barton and the mill owner's wife. Part of the distmst, the 
narrator argues, is a "want of confidence," a refusal of the masters to explain why wages 
were so low. "But the masters did not choose to make all these circumstances known. 
They stood upon being the masters, and that they had a right to order work at their own 
prices" (MB 166). Without significant discussion as to the causes of suffering (or the 
causes of low wages) between workers and employers - a discussion that requires a 
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response to Smith's question, "What has befallen you?" (the narratorial prompt for 
sympathetic exchange and moral judgment) - the result is contempt from both sides. 
More specifically, Gaskell's narrator states that the refusal to disclose the personal 
stakes of the owners and industrialists is the direct result of class pride on the part of the 
masters, an anti-social recognition and reinstatement of class difference. Considering 
themselves to be different from their workers, and refusing to explain their own 
predicaments to the strikers' delegates, the mill owners do not think of ~'treating the 
workmen as brethren and friends" (MB 176). The appearance of the delegates, their poor 
physical condition and soiled clothes (the visual markers of class difference), become the 
very obstacles to sympathy. The narrator explains that those selected for the delegation 
were chosen with "regard to their brains, and power of speech, [rather] than to their 
wardrobes." This evident contrast does little to alleviate the subsequent mistmst and 
bitterness; rather, it serves to exasperate strong feelings, as "[s]ome of the masters were 
rather affronted at such a ragged detachment" (MB 177). 
For the foppish Harry Carson, appearance, rather than speech or intellect, is the 
means by which he judges others, a fact that dooms this delegation and any possibility for 
labour negotiation, and points out the flaw in spectatorial sympathy. The visual cues that 
are meant to facilitate sympathetic exchange fall on the deaf ears, or rather, eyes, of the 
masters. The discomfort of the masters towards the workers' ragged appearance is not 
ameliorative because it fails to draw the sympathy of the masters towards their employees 
and their tell-tale suffering. Harry Carson takes his silver pencil and draws a caricature of 
the "lank, ragged, dispirited, and famine-stricken" delegates, an uneasy j1est attempting to 
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displace the owners' initial discomfort at seeing the squalid condition of their workers 
(MB 179). The cartoon (and the pencil) become the tangible markers of this contrast; to 
the operatives, they exist as evidence of the masters' utter disregard for their suffering, 
and Harry Carson's trivial act becomes a searing indictment towards the factory owners. 
Interestingly, although the delegates were chosen for the "power of [their] 
speech," the scene has no direct dialogue until the workers begin to discuss the cartoon at 
the public-house that evening. Similar to the scene between Barton and Mrs. Hunter, it is 
speech that is absent from this meeting between the workers and the owners. Harry 
Carson's picture, the blatant reminder of the indifference to suffering for the operatives 
and the failure of spectatorial sympathy, prompts the workers to pursue: retribution for 
this exhibited lack of sympathetic feeling. As Harry Carson's fate is sealed, so is 
Barton's, and his redemption can only come from Harry's grieving father, who initially 
swears vengeance upon the man who killed his son. Barton cannot fully acknowledge the 
implications of his actions until he is confronted by Carson as the grieving (and suffering) 
parent, a position that Barton knows intimately. As Surridge argues, the "motif of the 
'dying child"' becomes the vehicle or cause behind Chartist political conviction (335) -
and Barton's own progression to "rabid politics" (MB 83) - whereby po.litical action and 
increasing politicization become the result of personal (domestic) suffering. The 
important point for Gaskell's ameliorative vision is that Mr. Carson and John Barton both 
reconcile their personal and class differences through this very motif. 
For this to happen, Carson must cast aside class pride and acknowledge his 
vulnerability (and similarity) to Barton; in response to Barton's confession and disclosure 
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of his own suffering, the mill owner asks, '"And have I had no suffering?"' (J\1B 352). It 
is a moment which foregrounds the inevitability of suffering (in the Christian sense) and 
the futility of it within the existing system of industrial labour and production. Carson 
supplies his narrative in response, recounting his own labour and his now-dashed hopes 
for his only son. By identifying with Carson's grief, Barton learns his redemptive lesson: 
"The mourner before him was no longer an employer; a being of another race, eternally 
placed in antagonistic attitude; going through the world glittering like gold, with a stony 
heart within, which knew no sorrow but through the accidents of Trade~ no longer the 
enemy, the oppressor, but a very poor and desolate old man" (MB 353). It is this 
realization that prompts Barton to beg for forgiveness; his recognition of Carson's 
suffering can only occur through Carson's disclosure of pain and anguish, since the visual 
cues of suffering are simply not there in the factory owner's neat and immaculate figure. 
Thus, sympathy with suffering, and the experience of suffering, may well provoke 
feelings ofretribution, a point made clear in both Chartist writings and in Gaskell's 
novel, but for Gaskell, sympathy must not be solely based on visual cues of difference. 
Sympathy that reinforces difference rather than similarity can provoke responses to 
suffering such as single-minded self-assertion and retribution, a profoundly unproductive 
and antisocial course, as Gaskell 's narrator points out, because "vengeance does not care 
for other feelings" (MB 366). 
Importantly, Carson's disclosure of suffering produces a desire for a more 
thorough understanding of "the circumstances and feelings that had prompted John 
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Barton's crime" in the first place (MB 366). In other words, Carson's exchange provides 
a social and personal awareness necessary to ameliorating injustice and social problems: 
There are stages in the contemplation and endurance of great sorrow, which 
endow men with the same earnestness and clearness of thought that in some of old 
took the form of Prophecy. To those who have large capability of loving and 
suffering, united with great power of firm endurance, there comes a time in their 
woe, when they are lifted out of the contemplation of their individual case into a 
searching inquiry into the nature of their calamity, and the remedy (if remedy 
there be) which may prevent its recurrence to others as well as to themselves. (MB 
373) 
The prophetic potential of suffering comes not from making one "perfect," as Carlyle 
once boldly asserted (On Heroes 92), nor does it end with a simple change-of-heart 
transformation. Rather, it becomes part of the novel's "ethos of care" (Surridge 334), 
whereby the sympathetic response to suffering becomes a means of community-building 
and enhanced interpersonal relations, one that imbues both sufferer and sympathizer with 
political conviction and agency. The answer supplied to the question, "W'hat has befallen 
you?" becomes pivotal to such an experience, whereby the narrative of suffering 
provided also has the effect of appeasement from redress and even supplication. 
In this sense, Gaskell's social and political vision is heavily indebted to Chartist 
discourses and tropes. Job Legh' s gentle scolding of Carson reminds the newly receptive 
Carson that "one's often blind to many a thing that lies right under one's nose" (369). 
Carson's disclosure of what has befallen him, and his subsequent responsiveness to 
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fellow suffering, stand as the poignant resolution of the plot, rather than the oft-criticized 
emigration of Mary and Jem. Read in this way, the recovery of Margaret's vision 
becomes the literal counterpart of Carson's (and perhaps Barton's) own insight and 
revelation, and it is this awareness of suffering, on both sides of the great class divide, 
that Gaskell isolates as the all-important first (and continual) step of social amelioration. 
IV. Conclusion: Narrating Sympathy and Action 
Condition-of-England novels are structured by an epistemology of feeling that 
evokes sympathy as its moral mechanism, whereby sympathy for the suffering of 
characters would, ostensibly, induce a sense of duty and benevolence on the part of the 
reader. Increased urbanization, and its attendant problems, brought about a humanitarian 
sentiment in mid-nineteenth-century England, which, like eighteenth-century moral 
philosophy, culminated in a marked attention to feeling in interpersonal relationships. 
Susanna Engbers argues sympathy has an important role in the "rhetoric of the 
marginalized" in the mid-nineteenth century~ appeals to sympathy acknowledged the 
place of affect in moral decision-making and sociability (307-08). This becomes evident 
in the literary and political discourses of the time, and in this way, Gaskell' s first book is 
a typical example of a condition-of-England novel. In Mm)' Barton, the communication 
and disclosure of feeling promote the very conditions needed to approach and mitigate 
class antipathy or apathy. 
In eighteenth-century thought, sympathy is both an innate ability, demonstrable in 
all levels of society, and a "social virtue" meant to build community and fellowship 
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(Harkin 175-76). The nineteenth century brought a newfound introspection as to the 
markers and innate qualities of class distinction; Smith's sympathetic spectator, a position 
open to both the "greatest rnffian" and the highest ranks, increasingly becomes the 
cultural prerogative of the middle-classes, a marker of cultivated feeling and social 
difference. This class-based distinction is one that requires, and reifies, the middle-class 
spectator's position, one of self-command and cultivated (or controlled) feeling. Yet the 
personal and social experiences of the characters in Mary Barton are not communicated 
solely through spectacle - the "fickleness of interest" of the crowd watching the factory 
fire (MB 54) is short-lived, much like the momentary awe and unease the crowd feels 
when watching the tight-rope walker in Smith's Theory of the Moral Sentiments. 
Smith may have given primacy to the spectator position, but the sympathetic 
imagination in his philosophical discussion of the moral sentiments is, jmportantly, not 
singularly developed through visual cues and social difference, but through narrative. As 
Charles Griswold aptly notes, sympathy is "always seeking to flow and fill up another 
situation and to draw things together into a coherent story," one outside the spectator and 
his or her immediate experience and situation {116). For Griswold, the narratorial 
dimension of sympathy explains why Smith relies on examples from literature in The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments: "Literature can exemplify something of the essential nature 
of the sympathetic understanding or imagination that is at the heart of sociability as well 
as of moral evaluation" (116). 
In Mwy Barton, it is narrative that prompts sympathetic exchanges and helps 
alleviate suffering; importantly, the disclosure of one's suffering, and more largely, the 
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narrative act, has the potential to mediate the politics of suffering and the potential for 
redress. Scholars such as Elizabeth Starr have discussed the novel's attention to narrative, 
particularly as it relates to authorship. Noting the novel's concern with expression (and 
the authority of expression), Starr argues that "Gaskell's novels demonstrate an effo1t to 
present authorship as a legitimate part of an often aggressive, contentious world of public 
streets and factories" (385). Starr suggests that through this attention to authorship, 
Gaskell defends the significance of her industrial novels by suggesting that they can 
"materially intervene in the conflicts they represent, changing public life and commercial 
relations" (386). In this chapter, I have shown that Gaskell's novel demonstrates that it is 
not just novels themselves, but personal narratives, shared among individuals and not 
solely readers and authors, that have a social and political imperative. Narratives of 
suffering can provide the impetus for class-based solidarity or political conviction, but 
the plot of Mary Barton suggests that such solidarity or conviction alone cannot alleviate 
the causes of suffering. What matters are the emotional responses to and. identification 
with such narratives, and a willing (if not spontaneous) disclosure of one's own suffering. 
Thus, the politics of suffering require a communicative exchange rather than 
unidirectional spectatorship, and Gaskell' s pointed social vision anticipates many theories 
about the practice of reading fiction that develop out of this tradition of the sympathetic 
(moral) imagination. 
Relationships among readers, characters, and narrators are intrinsically ones of 
sympathetic exchange, for it is narrative that prompts emotional reactions to fiction. For 
Oatley the act of reading narratives (or listening to them, as the case may be in Mmy 
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Barton) is foremost conceptualized as one of spectatorship -"The reader becomes an 
unobserved observer in scenes of the lives of characters in the story world. He or she 
stands in their bedrooms, hovers at their dining tables, drives with them in their cars" 
(445). Oatley's description of the readerly act echoes Gaskell's own assertion in the 
Preface, in which she announces her intent to capture the daily lives of the people that 
bustle past her on the streets of Manchester. Yet, Oatley describes this position as one of 
observation and dialogue rather than a merely voyeuristic position ( 445), a point that may 
well suit Gaskell's own social and political vision. Indeed, Gaskell's appeals to a mutual 
sympathy are a call to action. It is not just Mr. Carson (and mill owners alike) who must 
respond, but also readers, who must first recognize that they too are not immune to 
suffering. In making such appeals, Gaskell must assume, as part ofthe sympathetic 
exchange, that commonality exists, and it is this faith in unity and shared aims, rather 
than difference, that structures the narrative. 
In this sense, Gaskell' s novel demonstrates a profound departure from Carly lean 
thought, not just because it embraces, rather than denies, working-class speech, but also 
because it attests that such speech is necessary for the mitigation of social problems. 
Similar to Kingsley's eponymous hero, Alton Locke, Gaskell presents Barton and his 
daughter, with all their flaws, as instructional examples to her readers; they serve as 
complementary (rather than divergent) exemplars of the interpersonal characteristics of 
feeling. In this sense, Barton's resentment, the result of continued struggles and familial 
deaths, is understandable, which is why the narrator displays an intense ambivalence 
towards Barton. Yet, Barton's retributive response to his suffering is one that refuses to 
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take the interpersonal quality of all feeling, even resentment, into account. The novel's 
preoccupation with the sharing of feeling with others, through disclosure and personal 
narrative, suggests a powerful political motive: class hostilities cannot be mitigated by 
the separation and demarcation of individuals, and their daily, material, and emotional 
lives. Both Kingsley and Gaskell represent Locke's and Barton's resentment as a 
potentially dangerous (and antisocial) feeling fueled by the witness to and experience of 
stark class difference and privilege; yet Gaskell's novel, structured around successful and 
failed moments of sympathy, is more intimately concerned with suffering and its 
potential responses. 21 Gaskell stresses the commonality of feeling - sp1~cifically, 
interclass cooperation and communication - as the means of addressing the division of 
classed individuals in an already-alienating system of industrial capitalism. 
This attention to both the world within the text, and its corresponding reality, becomes a 
means of dialogic interaction between multiple identities, and presents to the reader 
multiple (daily) realities and an array of emotional reactions. Ultimately, the reader must 
make a judgment for the politics of suffering to become, appropriately, political, but this 
judgment is one affirmed through these series of exchanges, and as such, requires a 
consideration of others outside of the self and the reader's immediate world. 
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Endnotes 
1 The terms "sympathy" and '"compassion" have their own connotations and vary 
across historical periods and disciplines. Within the field of litera1y study, M. H. Abrams 
distinguishes between ~Jlmpathy and empathy. For Abrams, empathy was determined by 
"a spectator's identification with a person or object," one that produced a physiological 
response. Sympathy, on the other hand, is "not a feeling-into, but a fee1ing-alo:ng-with the 
state of mind and emotions of another." This distinction meant that sympathy was 
credited as fellow-feeling, while empathy produced a specific identification with another 
(48-9). See Abrams' A Glossary of Litera1y Terms. 4th Ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, 1981.) More recently, Nussbaum discusses the definitional distinctions 
between pity, which has "nuances of condescension and superiority to the sufferer," and 
sympathy, which is "the imaginative reconstmction of another person's experience, 
without any particular evaluation of that experience." Acknowledging that the related 
terms sympathy and compassion were used interchangeably from the eighteenth century 
and onwards (302), Nussbaum further distinguishes between sympathy and empathy by 
claiming that the fonner is not sufficient for the latter: empathy certainly raises awareness 
of the plight of another, it may well be guided by curiosity or self-interest, and as such, is 
bereft of ethical import (330-33). 
2 In this respect, I an1 using this term within its philosophical context, particularly, 
Martin Heidegger's aletheia or Charles Taylor's disclosure, a practice of making the 
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world intelligible. See Heidgger's Being and Time. Trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York P, 1996). 
3 Although much critical scholarship on the novel discusses how Gaskell's 
narrator makes appeals to predominately middle-class readers, and as such, is concerned 
with middle-class reception, Melissa Schaub rightly points out that Gaskell' s first novel 
was read and praised by working-class readers and was available in working-class 
lending libraries (17). 
4 See Anderson's Tainted Souls and Painted Faces: The Rhetoric of Fallenness in 
Victorian Culture, Chapter 1. 
5 Jaffe uses this term as it was developed by Guy Debord, which she uses to 
critique Victorian middle-class ideologies of social and economic status. 
6 For further discussion, see Nussbaum, Part II, "Compassion." 
7 Founded at the start of the "Hungry Forties" in 1842, Lloyd's Weekly (originally 
called Lloyd's Illustrated London Newspaper) was a liberal, unstamped weekly founded 
by Edward Lloyd, the editorship of which was undertaken by Douglas 'Nilliam Jerrold a 
decade later. Under Jerrold's leadership, the periodical's circulation rose considerably; 
with the removal of the duty on papers, circulation reached one million by 1896. The 
publication aimed for a general, predominately lower-middle class readership, with topics 
that were deemed morally instmctive and of general interest. Periodical infom1ation taken 
from the Dictionary of Nineteenth-Centwy Journalism in Great Britain and Ireland 
(Ghent: Academica Press Scientific, 2008) 3 71. 
265 
8 For a more thorough discussion of working-class masculinities within Chartist 
discourses, see Surridge and Clark. 
9 The cold fireside or hearth is an enduring symbol in mid-nineteenth century 
literature and culture, one tied to discussions of social conditions and domestic virtue. It 
exists as a synecdoche for poverty, brought on by the conditions of industrial labour, and 
the concomitant dissolution of marriage and the family. See, for instance, the final 
paragraph of Dickens' Hard Times (1854), in which the narrator's direct address to 
middle-class readers evokes a similar comparison between the warm hearth and one that 
is "grey and cold" in order to inspire an emotional response to the fates of his Coketown 
characters (298). The gradual decline of the Barton household, and Ba1ton's moral 
decline, is also narrated by way of the waning fireside, along with other domestic 
comforts, pawned and sold, in Mary Barton. 
10 The agitation between working-class radicals and shopkeepers is one largely 
predicated on the Com Law movement during the 1830s and 1840s. The term 
"shopocracy" was one used in multiple Chartist periodicals of the period and in Lord 
Brougham's speeches in the House of Commons, 1839-40. Indeed, like factory and mill 
owners, shopkeepers or merchants in Chartist rhetoric are frequently vilified~ one article 
in the Poor Man's Guardian calls them "vampires that prey upon [working-class] toil" 
(16 June 1832). This criticism becomes an interesting extension of Smith's well-
documented critique of the Navigations Act (1651), which gave considc:rable power to 
merchants and provoked Smith to refer to England as "a nation whose government is 
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influenced by shopkeepers" in An lnqui!Jl into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations. 
11 Biographical info1mation for Watkins is taken from Malcolm Chases' entry in 
The Dictionmy of Labour Biography. Although well-known in Chartist circles as a 
political leader and lecturer, Watkins is not mentioned in the Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography. 
12 The history of working-class radicalism in England after the Peterloo Massacre 
is one marked by laws enacted to prohibit the expression of political dissent and 
mobilization of labourers. The Six Acts ( 1819) included the infamous Seditious Meeting 
Prevention Act, which restricted any public meetings declaring grievance against Church 
and State, and the Newspaper and Stamp Duties Act, which increased taxes on printed 
materials, such as periodicals and pamphlets, thus restricting freedom of the presses. 
Along with the Six Acts, eventually repealed by the mid-1820s, parliament passed the 
Combinations Act ( 1799), which made trade unions and workers meetings illegal. 
Repealed in 1824, this act was reinstated a year later with some concessions. Although it 
made trade unions legal, it provided ambiguously-worded conditions for union members' 
exertion of powers and duties, and the actions of trade unionists, whether legitimate or 
illegal or seditious, were left to the interpretation of the courts. One couJd make the larger 
argument that narratives of imprisonment, such as those by Watkins and Jones, among 
other known Chartist leaders, drew attention to the political persecution of radicals and 
labour activists at the hands of these laws. 
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13 Jaffe's discussion of this "scene" of transformation includes one of the most 
enduring and well-known change-of-heart examples: Dickens' Ebenezer Scrooge, whose 
vantage point as invisible spectator (and spectre) allows him to witness the daily lives of 
the Cratchit family. See Jaffe, Chapter One. 
14 Such criticism abounds in Gaskell scholarship, which has grown considerably 
in the past decade. Most famous is Raymond William's discussion of the novel in Culture 
and Society (1958), which set the tone for such critique. Others who raise similar 
criticisms include Ingham, Shaub, and Wilkies. 
15 See Surridge, Freeland, Starr, and Hilary Margo Schor's Scheherezade in the 
Marketplace: Elizabeth Gaskell and the Victorian Novel (New York: OUP, 1992). 
16 Manchester Guardian (19 June and 22 June 1907). 
17 William Dodd, who worked in a textile factory in Kendal as a child, alleges that 
this work left him a cripple. When his condition worsened, his arm was amputated. He 
wrote about his experiences in A Narrative of the Experience and St(fferings of William 
Dodd, a Fact01y Cripple (1841); Lord Ashley arranged for its publication. As part of the 
Children's Employment Commission, Lord Ashley employed Dodd as a researcher on the 
use of children in textile factories, and Dodd's findings were published in The Factmy 
System: Illustrated (1842). Dodd was famously attacked for his credibility and the 
reliability of his sources by John Bright in parliament. Later, he immigrated to Boston, 
where he continued to write about the labour system in Btitain. 
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18 See M. M. Bakhtin, Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays Ed. 
Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov. (Austin: U of Texas P, 1990). See also Bakhtin, 
"Discourse in the Novel," The Dialogic Imagination (Ed. Michael Holquist. Austin: U of 
Texas P, 1981) 259-422. 
19 Starr makes a similar point by discussing the narrator as a "guide" able to move 
between these discourses and communities, and whose mobility enable~s both a 
sympathetic and public position of authority (389-92). I would suggest that in this 
respect, the narrator becomes the mediary between the two forms of narratives about 
suffering: first-person accounts (sufferers) and the third-person accounts (sympathizers) 
found in sanitary and sociological reports, and blue-book studies. 
20 Patrick Brantlinger explains that the political agitator, a recuning figure or 
trope in mid-nineteenth-century, middle-class industrial fiction, is usually a social 
outsider, often not belonging to the class for which he deems to represent or speak. In this 
respect, Barton is a marked departure from such convention. See The Reading Lesson: 
The Threat of Mass Literacy in Nineteenth-Centwy British Fiction (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana UP, 199), Chapter One. 
21 Locke's involvement in radical politics is motivated not by great personal loss, 
or an overly sympathetic response to suffering, such as Barton's, but by his more sincere 
interest in literary authorship and a reaction to his thwarted desire for Lillian Winnstay. 
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Conclusion: 
Victorian Activism and the Social and Political Life of Emotions 
We could have predicted beforehand that the great wave of reforming 
aspiration and activity which swept over our community in the second 
quarter of this century, and had not subsided in the third., though now it 
would seem to have spent its force, would infallibly make itself felt in 
every branch of literature as well as in the other incorporate members of 
the body politic. We could also have predicted that the novel, so quick to 
catch and reflect the passing moods of society, would in an especial 
degree feel the force of this influence. 
-- Willian1 Minto, Fortnightly Review (1878) 
In a retrospective of Gaskell' s fiction - and more widely, novels of the 1840s -
William Minto, professor, novelist, and literary critic, traces the trajectory of mid-
nineteenth-century novels to a specific literary work of the Regency period. Minto 
provides as his example Pierce Egan's Life in London, or, The day and night scenes of 
Jeny Hawthorn, esq., and his elegant friend, Corinthian Tom .. accompanied by Bob 
Logic, the Oxonian, in their rambles and sprees through the metropolis ( 1821 ), a-
serialized and illustrated novel that, explains Minto, "gave a faithful picture" of 
individuals and groups in the urban space, groups "united by some common object of 
interest" (353-54). Minto claims that without the success of Egan's work, readers would 
not have had the benefit of mid-nineteenth-century novels such as those by Dickens and 
Gaskell, yet he aptly points out the unique contribution of the latter: mid-nineteenth-
century novels concentrate on "humble" rather than fashionable life, "descriptive of the 
humours and the sorrows of the poor, and motivated by some reforming purpose" (355). 
This emergent perspective may be a humanizing one - a newfound inten:st in individuals 
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previously ignored as novelistic subjects - but this d.isse1tation explores another 
consequence of this development of fiction: the necessity to address, explain, and 
represent anger that often comes about as a result of social and political inequities. 
The metropolis, no longer just a scene for the carefree "rambles and sprees" of 
close friends, becomes a site of articulation for class divisions and political antagonisms, 
and as a consequence, enduring enmity. Minto acknowledges that the second and third 
quarter of the century - the period leading to and surrounding the reform acts -- was one 
characterized by the "ominous sounds of deep-seated discontent" (355). This discontent 
may well be the result of divisions in the body politic that prompt large-scale social and 
political concerns over sociability and collectivity; Minto' s characterization of the body 
politic as a "community" is telling, in this respect (355). 
The major contention of this dissertation is that anger is necessary to the 
construction of these communities, as is the sharing and comnnmication of feeling as a 
means of social, political, and moral approbation. These "communities of feeling" 
(Rosenwein 2) provide a means of articulating grievances, demanding action, and 
assigning values and legibility to particular feelings and their expression. In this sense, 
anger and discontent are not solely symptoms of the varying ideological and socio-
economic divides in mid-nineteenth-century England and the urban space, but also points 
of articulation for these divisions and even, perchance, motivating forces to overcome 
them. They exist in tandem with the belief that Lane examines in his study of 
antisociability in Victorian literature and culture: that social progress will fix antipathies 
(35). 
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Part of the seemingly conflictive paradigm ascribed to anger in this period may 
well be a reflection of anger itself, and its vying definitions and classifications throughout 
the history of philosophy, sociology, and political theory. Despite Smith's categorization 
of anger as an "unsocial" feeling, anger can be a profoundly social, and socially-
organizing, emotion - vital to exploring human experience and adaptation to a range of 
cultural forces and belief systems. It is both a basic and complex emotion: widely 
experienced and variously explained or justified. It resides in the self, as a form of 
personal assertion, and as an interpersonal force that dictates assessments of and relations 
with others. Richard C. Soloman explains emotions as "mode[s] of social action" (23), 
and in this respect, anger has a constrnctive function: it may generate solutions to 
interpersonal problems (Reiser 23), and when directed, rather than restrained, "its active 
exercise is necessary to eminence in any pursuit" (EF 54). Moreover, as. an "escalated 
response," anger expresses a reaction to immoveable positions or attitudes in the body 
politic, after efforts of cooperation and coping with change fail or are considered futile 
(Averill 247). Martha Nussbawn makes this connection between anger and praxis in 
politics explicit: "extirpating anger would extirpate a major force for social justice and 
the defense of the oppressed" (394). 
By way of these discussions of anger, I argue for its necessity in ithe 
representation of social and political "problems" or conflicts in the mid-nineteenth 
century: the rise of Chartism and working-class radicalism~ fears over revolution, real or 
perceived, in the wake of demonstrations, mobs, and labom strikes; and the pervading 
sentiment that the nation has become, to evoke Carlyle, mechanical and unfeeling, 
272 
especially to the increasing numbers of the urban and labouring poor. Given that the 
period was concerned with the issue of discontent, and how to alleviate it, it is 
understandable that it was also preoccupied with sympathy - the communication of 
shared feeling - since as a moral sense in eighteenth-century moral philosophy, sympathy 
is intimately concerned with fellow-feeling with suffering. Among nineteenth-century 
authors and policy-makers, sympathy is a sentiment associated with the "condition[s] of 
adversity" (Himmelfarb, Poverty and Compassion 14 ). Yet, calls for sympathy in this 
period were matched with aspersions as to its efficacy and intentions, and I suggest that 
this has to do with its implications for action in the alleviation of suffering and its causes. 
Just like anger - as a reaction to injustice, oppression, or an obstacle - sympathy provides 
a salient bridge between feeling, awareness, and action - one that continues in more 
contemporary cognitive and psychological theories of emotion. Sympathy involves the 
awareness of a suffering that requires alleviation, an accompanied judgment as to the 
unfairness of the suffering, and, frequently, the desire to intervene and mitigate the 
suffering or its cause( s ). 
Both anger and sympathy find their expression in the social and political 
campaigns and discourses of the period. They have political roles in so fair as the impetus 
and desire for the repression, controlled expression, or demarcation of both is part of a 
larger concern over conflicting interests in the body politic. In this respect, W.R. Greg's 
concern over the 4'undiscriminating sympathy" of Gaskell' s first novel is apt ( 164 ), 
particularly given its varied reception. Sympathy may be effusive or ineffectual (as in the 
case of the weeping philosopher figure), or it may be dangerous in that it can motivate 
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strong feelings such as anger and resentment. To call sympathy "undiscriminating," as 
Greg does, is to imply also that there exists (or should exist) a means of controlling or 
directing sympathy to its proper ends or objects, and this raises questions as to who is 
privy to establishing such criteria. The texts explored in this disse11ation variously 
attempt to provide such criteria, so as to make both anger and sympathy legible, and even 
necessary, to the Condition-of-England Question and Victorian activism. 
The term "activism" is rarely used in Victorian discourses or in contemporary 
scholarship on Victorian literature and culture. Rather, the terms commonly used are 
~'reform" - which signifies a divergent array of discourses, institutions, and interests that 
adhere to and recognize existing laws - and radicalism, which carries connotations of a 
kind of fervor or extreme akin to discourses of anger. Yet, in the case of working-class 
political movements, the term radicalism is apt, given that participants favour 
revolutionary change in government, society, and existing laws. Activism is a more 
contemporary tenn, ostensibly aligned with the practices and strategies allowed in a fully 
democratized society. Unlike the fonner tem1s, however, it can include a range of 
methods, ideologies and actions: both reformist and radical, judicial and artistic. 
Moreover, the word "activism" implies some form of action, whether rit11alized or 
spontaneous - action that is tied to the pursuit of change or the overcoming of obstacles. 
E. San Juan Jr., whose scholarship on Victorian activism provides the only 
sustained interrogation of the term as it applies to the nineteenth century, defines 
Victorian activism as "a fundamental courage and alertness of the heart and intellect" 
(583), a designation that implies an emotional and intellectual dimension. For San Juan 
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Jr., activist efforts are expressions of a "striving" - the possession of a "spirit" and will 
power that has the potential to reconcile "the conflicting interests and desires" of the age 
(583). This "striving" includes the collective campaigns of social, medical, and sanitary 
programs among the working and m~ban poor, but also personal improvement (or self-
help ). What connects these, he argues, is the effort for "union with the transcendent 
absolute over and against nature," a striving that goes beyond personal comfo11 (or gain) 
to "achieve a condition of complete expressiveness and inclusiveness, disclosing the 
essences of objects, capturing and reproducing the diversity and complexity of existence" 
(597). San Juan Jr.'s definition of activism may seem lofty- especially among those who 
question the likelihood of transcendence, either in religion or philosophy - but then 
again, activism is always, in some measure, a lofty enterprise. Certainly, activism is the 
deliberate organization of groups of people: the waving of placards; the gathering of 
individuals united by some shared feeling or purpose; the demand for change or action. 
Extending this definition, one could envision, as part of this endeavour:, the invention of 
beliefs that shape the future, the creation of new sets of morals and social practices, and 
the definition of new ways, or routines, of living. In this respect, activism is as much 
about the politics of representation - the representation of these new beliefs, morals, 
practices, and routines - as it is about the pursuit of certain goals, however lofty. I 
suggest that anger, along with sympathy, are pivotal to this representation of "striving." 
For these experiences and pursuits to be compelling, they must be integrated into 
some intelligible form (San Juan Jr. 589). Another main contention of this disse11ation is 
that feeling becomes a means to ascribe to these manifestations of striving some 
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recognizable meaning, because emotions are organizing categories that make legible 
these experiences and pursuits. Given that my research explores a variety of discursive 
texts, I also suggest that language, and more specifically, narrative, are important to how 
writers (and readers) understand and recognize these manifestations. 
The literary form of the novel, a central concern in my dissertation, attempts to 
explain and represent reactions to, and ideologies of, mid-nineteenth-century activism -
Minto's "reforming aspiration" -within the realm of novelistic discourse and the 
organizational structures of plot, protagonists (and antagonists), and resolution (or lack 
thereof). Joseph Childers argues for the importance of the novel in mid-nineteenth 
century political and social life by suggesting that novels, and novelistic discourse, are a 
means of"reworking the world" (71). Novels participate in politics and constitute "the 
way politics represents itself to itself' (Childers 27). Within literary discourses - whether 
the condition-of-England novel, Carlyle's essays, or Chartist prose - anger and its 
representation are also emphatic, and thus rhetorical: variously providing urgency to the 
Condition-of-England Question, delineating anger from its variants or antitheses, creating 
a sense of righteous indignation, and addressing the reader directly in an effort to inspire 
a striving beyond the pages of the text. Within the context of class antagonisms, class 
identities (and identity politics), and varying and conflicting campaigns of humanitarian 
and radical reform, anger and sympathy, given a degree of social legitimacy, engender 
collectivity by creating the affective and emotional bonds between groups that are 
necessary for activism. 
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In A Hist01y of the French Passions, 1848-1945 ( 1973 -1977), philosopher and 
historian Theodore Zeldin explores the history of France by examining not strictly 
historical events, but also the attitudes and feelings behind these events - a methodology 
that affirms the importance of feelings in the creation of collective identities and public 
opinions. For Zeldin, "the history of anger has yet to be written" ( 1120), a statement that 
affirms anger's complexity. This dissertation does not claim to have written such a 
history; instead, it follows a similar premise by asserting that an understanding of 
feelings, and their representation, is integral to the understanding of the political and 
cultural forces and forms of a distinct period. 
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